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INTRODUCTION

Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934 establishes both the
procedures by which a Bell Operating Company (BO) may apply to provide interLATA services in one of its in-region States, and the substantive
standards by which that application must be judged. The provision reflects
Congress's judgment that, under appropriate circumstances, the BOCs
should be allowed to offer interLATA services. Section 271 cannot be
fully understood or properly applied, however, unless it is viewed in the
larger context of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act or 1996 Act)
and its underlying purposes.
1. Section 271(i) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271, 47
U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1997), defines an in-region state to mean "a State in which a
[BOC] or any of its affiliates was authorized to provide wireline telephone exchange service
pursuant to the reorganization plan approved under the AT&T Consent Decree, as in effect
on the day before the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996." 47
U.S.C.A. § 271(i)(1). Pursuant to that decree, 22 BOCs owned by AT&T were dispersed
among seven new and independent Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).
NYNEX, for example, received the two companies that offer local telephone service in New
York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. Thus, NYNEX
would need to secure authorization pursuant to section 271 in order to market interLATA
services originating within the State of New York.
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The overriding goal of the 1996 Act is to promote competition in all
telecommunications markets.2 But Congress was particularly concerned
about introducing and expanding competitive entry into local telecommunications service markets.' Consequently, the 1996 Act required the BOCs
and other local exchange carriers (LECs) to "unbundle their networks and
to resell to competitors the unbundled elements, features, functions, and
capabilities that... new entrants need to compete in the local market."4
More importantly, perhaps, Congress sought to create incentives for
firms to cooperate in the opening of their monopoly markets to competition.5 Section 271 is the most prominent example of that effort. In essence,
2. The 1996 Act "provide[s] for a procompetitive, de-regulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition ....
" H.R. CONF. RFP. No. 104-458, at 113
(1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124 (emphasis added). A conference report is
"the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent besides the statute itself." Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 421 (7th Cir. 1993); accordEstate of Wallace v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 965 F.2d 1038, 1045 (11th Cir. 1992).
Members of Congress understood that the 1996 Act would be judged by its success in
bringing into full bloom the nascent competition that had appeared as of the date of enactment. 141 CONG. REC. S700 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bums) ("We must
all be vigilant to ensure that competition can take root and that it grow and it prosper. If it
does not, then this bill will be a failure.").
3. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
4. 141 CONG. REC. H8465 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte); see
also Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 816 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,66 U.S.L.W.
3387 & 3459 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998) (No. 97-826 et al.) ("Congress clearly included measures
in the Act, such as the interconnection, unbundled access, and resale provisions, in order to
expedite the introduction of pervasive competition into the local telecommunications industry.").
5. See 141 CONG. REc. H8282 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley)
("[K]ey to this bill is the creation of an incentive for the current monopolies to open their
markets to competition."). As a sponsor of the House telecommunications reform bill,
House Bill 1555, the Chairman of the Committee with jurisdiction over the bill, and the
majority floor manager of that bill during the House debate, Representative Bliley's views
on the meaning and purpose of the bill are entitled to substantial weight. See, e.g., Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728 (1983) (Sponsor's interpretation is .....
authoritative guide to the
statute's construction ....
(quoting Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 832 (1983)
(quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 527 (1982)))); Mills v. United
States, 713 F.2d 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,464 U.S. 1069 (1984) (floor manager's remarks afforded "substantial weight").
6. See 141 CONG. REC. H8465 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte)
(Bill's conditioning of BOC interLATA entry on the presence of local competition "is a
strong incentive for [BOCs] to comply with the requirements of this legislation."); id. at
58464 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) ("Complete elimination of barriers to competition will occur only if the [BOCs] have positive incentives to cooperate with
the introduction of meaningful competition."); id. at S8138 (daily ed. June 12, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kerrey) (Long-distance entry "is the carrot that is being offered" for
opening local markets.). Statements of individual legislators can provide evidence of legis-

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

Congress held out interLATA entry as a reward for the BOCs' acceptance
of and compliance with interconnection, unbundling, and resale obligations designed to facilitate entry by alternative providers of local telecommunications services. The floor manager of the telecommunications bill in
the House of Representatives, Representative Bliley, succinctly summarized the bargain: "Once the [BOCs] open the local exchange networks to
competition, [they] are free to compete in the long distance and manufacturing markets."7
Congress charged the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) with the task of reviewing and disposing of BOC interLATA
applications The Commission may not act completely on its own, however. It must consult with the state commission implicated by each BOC
application "in order to veri7 the compliance of the [BOC] with the requirements of [section 271]." Section 271 also directs the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to evaluate each BOC application and requires the Commission to give "substantial weight," though not preclusive effect, to that
evaluation.'0 In the end, though, section 271 makes the BOCs the masters
of their own fate, because it links the success of their interLATA applications directly to their commitment to opening their local markets to meaningful competition."
The Commission has considered-and denied-three section 271 applications: one by Southwestern Bell (SBC) to provide in-region, interLATA services in Oklahoma; another by Ameritech to market such services in Michigan, and a third by BellSouth to commence long-distance
operations in South Carolina. 2 In so doing, the Commission has given its

lative intent when they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative history. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 567 (1984).
7. 141 CONG. REc. H8282 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
8. Section 271(b)(1) provides that a BOC may offer in-region, interLATA services "if
the Commission approves the application of such company... under subsection
[271](d)(3). ... " Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271, 47 U.S.CA. §
271(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
9. Id. § 271(d)(2)(B).
10. Id. § 271(d)(2)(A).
11. See Application of SBC Comm., Inc. to Provide In-region, InterLATA Servs. in
Okla., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, 8729, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
198 (1997) [hereinafter SBC Order] (separate statement of Chairman Reed Hundt).
12. See id.; Application of Ameritech Mich. to Provide In-region, InterLATA Servs. in
Mich., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267 (1997) [hereinafter
Ameritech Order] (reconsideration pending); Application of BellSouth Corp., et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in S.C., Memorandum Opinion and Order,CC Dkt. No.
97-208, 1997 WL 799081 (Dec. 24, 1997) [hereinafter BellSouth Order]. The Commission
dismissed SBC's application because the company failed to demonstrate "that it is providing access and interconnection to an unaffiliated, facilities-based competing provider of
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answers to many, though by no means all, of the questions raised by the
frequently ambiguous text of section 271. The Commission's decisions
have not, however, terminated the many disputes about the meaning and
application of that provision. SBC has appealed the Commission's denial
of its Oklahoma application. 3 The Commission's order dismissing Ameritech's request has already sparked collateral litigation in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 14 and may eventually be appealed
to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. 5 Other questions will
6
doubtless arise as BOCs seek to offer interLATA services in other states.'
This Article examines the text and legislative history of section 271
in an effort to divine how Congress intended that provision to be applied.
This Article also assesses whether the interpretations of section 271 that
the Commission has issued to date are consistent with that congressional
design. Part II addresses the claim that section 271 is an unconstitutional
bill of attainder. Part I considers the preconditions to BOC entry--the legal and factual findings that the Commission must make in order to grant a
BOC's application to offer in-region, interLATA services. Part IV discusses the procedural framework within which the Commission must operate-the agencies with whom it must consult, the standard of proof that it
must apply, and the legal standard against which any Commission decision
must be judged. The objective is to develop a construction of section 271
that is consonant with the text and intent of the statute, and that promotes

telephone exchange service to residential and business subscribers, as required by section
271(c)(1)(A) of the statute." SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 1, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
198. The Commission rejected Ameritech's request because the firm did not show that it
had fully implemented the competitive checklist of section 271(c)(2)(B) or that its interLATA operations would be conducted in accordance with the structural separation requirements of section 272(b)(3) and 272(b)(5). Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267,
para. 5. The Commission turned down BellSouth's request for failure to comply with the
competitive checklist. See BellSouth Order, 1997 WL 799081, paras. 2, 12.
13. SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, No. 97-1425 (D.C. Cir. argued Jan. 9, 1998).
14. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, No. 96-3321 et al. (8th Cir. filed Jan. 22, 1998)
[hereinafter Iowa Utils. Mandamus Order] (issuing a writ of mandamus directing the FCC,
in reviewing BOC interLATA applications under section 271, to comply with a prior Eighth
Circuit order declaring that the FCC has no jurisdiction over the pricing of interconnection,
unbundled elements, and resold services). For a discussion of the issues presented by the
Eighth Circuit litigation, see infra notes 230, 233-49 and accompanying text.
15. Any Commission decision granting or denying a section 271 application may be
reviewed only by the D.C. Circuit. 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(6), (9).
16. BellSouth has applied for authorization to provide long-distance service in Louisiana. Application of BellSouth Corp. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in La. in
CC Dkt. No. 97-231 (Nov. 6, 1997). BellSouth's request will require the Commission to
determine, among other things, whether a BOC may rely on competing wireless telecommunications services-specifically personal communications services (PCS)-to satisfy the
facilities-based competitor requirement of section 271(c)(1)(A). See infra Part III.A.2.a.
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the overriding goal of the 1996 Act--to promote competition in all telecommunications markets, particularly the market for local exchange services.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 271
On New Year's Eve 1997, a federal district court invalidated section
271, as well as the provisions in the 1996 Act that govern BOC entry into
manufacturing, alarm services, and electronic publishing. 7 While the court

intimated that the challenged provisions could be considered appropriate
economic regulation, it judged them to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder.'8 A statute constitutes a bill of attainder when it "(1) identifies a specific
individual or group (2) inflicts punishment on that individual or group (3)
without the benefit of a judicial trial."' 9 As demonstrated below, section 271
easily passes muster under each of these tests.
The first criterion is somewhat misstated, because the case law indicates that a statute must do more than specify an individual or group for
punishment. The statutes that the Supreme Court has found to be bills of at-

tainder were enactments that penalized individuals to one degree or another
for some immutable past behavior or affiliation." The individuals' place
within the attainted class was thus irreversible or inescapable. For a statute to

be considered a bill of attainder, therefore, the penalized class must be both
"specified" and "fixed." 21
Section 271 establishes no such closed class. To the contrary, the BOCs

17. SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (motions for stay
pending).
18. Id. at 1008. The court concluded that the Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 9,cl.
3, applies to corporations as well as to individuals. SBC Comm., 981 F. Supp. at 1008
n.4. The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue, but it has noted that "courts have
consistently regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause... only as protectionol for individual persons and private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of
guilt." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,324 (1966).
19. SBC Comm., 981 F. Supp. at 1004 (citing Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846-847 (1984)).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (statute barring anyone who
had been a Communist Party member in the preceding five years from serving on the board of
any labor union declared unconstitutional); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (law
prohibiting further payment of salaries to three named federal government employees in retribution for past "subversive" conduct declared unconstitutional); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1866) (law preventing former Confederate sympathizers from practicing law in
federal courts unless they sign an oath denying any past allegiance to the Confederate cause
rescinded); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (law requiring preachers to
take similar oath also struck down).
21. See LAURENCE B. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTnTmONAL LAW § 10-5, at 655 (2d ed.
1988) (statute must "single out or 'specify' a fixed class of persons for disadvantageous treatment'').
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can escape the restriction by complying with the competitive checklist and,
thereby, open their market to competition. By applying the language of Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group to the
section 271 analysis, the following results: "'Far from attaching to... past
and ineradicable actions,' ineligibility" for interLATA entry "'is made to
turn upon continuously contemporaneous fact' in this case the lack of an
open local exchange marketplace which a BOC desiring interLATA entry
"'can correct."'22 Because section 271 does not single out a fixed group, it
does not constitute a bill of attainder.
As for the second criterion, section 271 cannot be said to "punish" the
BOCs. Indeed, the alleged penalty it imposes is not even permanent. Again,
a BOC can secure interLATA entry by complying with the market-opening
provisions of the 1996 Act. "A statute that leaves open perpetually the possibility of [escaping the pertinent restriction] does not fall within the historical
meaning of forbidden legislative punishment."23 The court discounted the
temporary nature of the interLATA restriction, concluding, without discussion or substantiation, that the principal statutory precondition for interLATA entry (i.e., checklist compliance) is "onerous," "tainted with indefiniteness and replete with arbitrary standards," and "may never be met by the
BOCs."24 But ipse dixit cannot provide the "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent" required before a statute may be invalidated as a bill of attainder.2
22. Minnesota PIRG,468 U.S. 841, 851 (1984) (quoting Communist Party of U.S. v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 87 (1961)).
23. Id. at 853. The court attempted to distinguish MinnesotaPIRG on the grounds that the
statute challenged there involved ....
the mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit,' ....
whereas section 271 denies the BOCs their right to participate in a particular employment or business (i.e., interLATA services). SBC Comm., 981 F. Supp. at 1006 (quoting Minnesota PIRG, 468 U.S. at 853 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960))). One
noted constitutional scholar has opined, however, that the quoted language "may have been a
makeweight in the [Minnesota PIRG] Court's bill of attainder analysis," given the Court's
prior finding that the contested statute did not specify a fixed class. TRiBE, supra note 21, § 105, at 653 n.11.
24, SBC Comm., 981 F. Supp. at 1007.
25. See Minnesota PIRG, 468 U.S. at 856 n.15 (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. 603, 619);
see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) ("It is not on slight implication
and vague conjecture, that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers,
and its acts to be considered void.").
The court's haste to condemn section 271 and to impugn the motives of the Congress
that enacted it cannot be squared with the court's duty "not to destroy [an act of Congress]
if [it] can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with
constitutional limitations." Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571
(1973); accord Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis,
., concurring) (When an act of Congress is drawn into question, "it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.").
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The court's characterization of the competitive checklist, moreover,
would doubtless surprise those Members of Congress who questioned the
adequacy of the checklist as an entry condition because it could be complied
with easily without producing meaningful local competition.2' Further, the
sponsor of the Senate telecommunications reform bill, Senator Pressler, indicated that the checklist was a less rigorous standard than the one that governed BOC interLATA entry prior to passage of the 1996 Act. In short, the
court's unsubstantiated assertions about the severity of the checklist requirements are contrary to Congress's understanding of those requirements.
The evidence demonstrates that Congress intended section 271 not to
penalize the BOCs, but "to further nonpunitive legislative purposes.2'' The
fundamental goal of the 1996 Act was to promote competition in all telecommunications markets, notably local exchange service markets. 29 Congress therefore imposed on the LECs that dominate the latter markets certain
obligations designed to facilitate competitive entry." There is no question
that Congress had the authority to establish the goal of greater competition
and to prescribe mechanisms to achieve it. The legislature realized, however,
that the path to expanded local competition would be smoother if the LECs
could be induced to cooperate with the 1996 Act's market-opening provisions.31 Section 271 was intended to create such incentives on the part of the
BOCs, the principal providers of local service in the metropolitan areas
where most Americans live and work." Far from removing a carrot from the
BOCs, as SBC claimed,33 section 271 was a carrot that Congress held out to
encourage the BOCs to collaborate in the effort to promote local competition. 34 Properly viewed, section 271 is not a punitive law but rather "a prophylactic measure-an incentive to comply with valid laws [to promote

26. See, e.g., 141 CONG. R c. S8444 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
See generally infra notes 277-81 and accompanying text
27. 141 CONG. REc. S8195 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (Checklist was a compromise between the entry standard in the AT&T ConsentDecree and the date-certain standard favored by
some senators.); see also 142 CONG. REC. S713 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Breaux) (suggesting that some BOCs may be able to satisfy the statutory standard for interLATA entry (presumably including checklist compliance) shortly after enactment); 141 CONG.
REC. at S7888 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler) ("[A]t least one of the
[BOCs]--NYNEX--can probably fulfill all the checklist's requirements very soon.").
28. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,475-476 (1977).
29. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
30. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), §251(c), 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)

(West Supp. 1997).
31. See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
32. See supranote 6.

33. SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (motions for stay
pending).
34. See supranote 6.
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competition], enforced by withholding the enjoyment of various benefits
(and even rights) until such compliance is evidenced."35
The court nonetheless determined that Congress meant for section 271
to "serve as punishment for the BOCs' presumed anticompetitive conduct."36
But there is not a shred of evidence for that conclusion in the statute or the
legislative history. To the contrary, the record is replete with congressional
statements favoring expeditious BOC entry into the interLATA market. 7
Had Congress actually meant to enact a punitive statute, section 271 would
have looked quite different from the provision that came before the court.
For example, Congress would not have allowed the BOCs to provide, upon
of their monopoly
enactment of the 1996 Act, interLATA services outside
o
I would
ol not
o generally
eeal possess
poss prvosy
service areas, a right they di" not
previously.3did
It
have permitted the BOCs to offer, upon enactment, certain "incidental" interLATA services within their service areas, including wireless long-distance
services.3 It would not have established a standard for judging BOC requests
to offer in-region, interLATA services that was, in the minds of many Members of Congress, more favorable to the BOCs than the test in effect before
passage of the 1996 Act. 4°
35. TRIBE, supra note 21, §10-4, at 648 (suggesting that Cummings v. Missouri,71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277 (1866) and Exparte Garland,71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) would have been decided differently if the challenged statutes had had the goal of inducing Confederates to lay
down their arms and to rejoin the Union).
36. SBC Comm., 981 F. Supp. at 1007.
37. E.g., 142 CONG. REc. S713 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Breaux) ("The
legislation contemplates that the FCC should act favorably and expeditiously on [BOC] petitions to compete in the long distance business."); id. at S71 1 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Thurmond) (BOCs "certainly should be allowed to enter long distance markets under
appropriate circumstances, for it is generally desirable to have as many competitors as possible
in each market."); 141 CONG. REc. H8465 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (citing "the AT&T Consent Decree that prevents the [BOCs] from competing in the long
distance market" as one of the "artificial government-imposed restraints [that] inhibit the development of real competition"); id. at H8463 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Berman) ("I do not think we should put artificial restrictions on the ability of the [BOCs] to go
into long distance ....).
38. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, see. 151(a), § 271(b)(2), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
39. Seeid. § 271(b)(3), (g).
40. The court also seems to condemn section 271 because it subjects the BOCs to restrictions that are not borne by other LECs.See, e.g., SBC Comm., 981 F. Supp. at 1005 (Statute
"fail[s] to set forth a generally applicable rule requiring all local exchange carriers to comply
with [the interLATA] restriction.... [A]ll other telecommunications carriers, including all
other non specified similarly situated local exchange carriers, may offer any of the
[interLATA] services forbidden to the BOCs."). The Supreme Court has made clear, however,
that differential treatment, without more, is not sufficient to transform a legal restriction into a
bill of attainder
However expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it surely was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine, invalidating every
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Thus, section 271 displays none of the features that the Supreme Court
has stated are necessary characteristics of a punitive statute.4 ' It does not fall
within the historical meaning of legislative punishment, because its restriction is escapable. There is no evidence that Congress enacted the provision to
punish the BOCs. In the absence of such evidence, section 271 should be
taken for what it appears to be-a mechanism for allowing the BOCs into
the interLATA market in a way that promotes both long-distance and local
competition. It is not a bill of attainder.
Finally, section 271 cannot be seen as a punishment imposed without a
judicial trial. The 1996 Act, after all, did not impose the interLATA restriction on the BOCs. It first appeared in the 1982 AT&T ConsentDecree, which
was entered in settlement of a 1974 federal antitrust suit against the Bell
System. That settlement was precipitated by the trial court's denial of
AT&T's motion to dismiss the case. The court concluded, after months of
trial, that the "evidence adduced by the government demonstrate[s] that the
Bell System has violated the antitrust laws in a number of ways over a
lengthy period of time." 42
The SBC court response is that the consent decree and its restrictions
were "born out of alleged antitrust violations by AT&T," not the BOCs.43
But the AT&T court also concluded, in its order approving the proposed
AT&T ConsentDecree, that "[t]he key to the Bell System's power to impede
competition has been its control of local telephone service." 44 It recognized,
moreover, that after the divestiture contemplated by the decree, the Bell
System's local service monopolies would pass from AT&T to the newlycreated BOCs. The court therefore concluded that unfettered BOC entry into
related markets such as long distance "carrie[d] with it a substantial risk that
Act of Congress or the States that legislatively burdens some persons or groups
but not all plausible individuals. In short, while the Bill of Attainder Clause
serves as an important "bulwark against tyranny," it does not do so by limiting
Congress to the choice of legislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits,
or not legislating at all.
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 (1977) (citations omitted).
41.
In deciding whether a statute inflicts forbidden punishment, we have recognized
three necessary inquiries: (1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, "viewed in
terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes"; and (3) whether the legislative record
"evinces a congressional intent to punish."
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984)
(quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-476, 478).
42. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1331, 1381 (D.D.C. 1981).
43. SBC Comm., 981 F. Supp. at 1007.
44. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 223 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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the [BOCs] will use the same anticompetitive techniques used by AT&T in
order to thwart the growth of their own competitors."45 Accordingly, the
court also ratified provisions in the AT&T Consent Decree that barred each
BOC from providing interLATA services until it could show that "there is no
substantial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the market it seeks to enter.""6
Thus, contrary to the SBC court's assessment, the interLATA restriction is not some vestige of a parent's sins two decades old.47 Nor was it imposed "for what offenses Congress believes the BOCs may (without any evidence) commit in the future.' 48 Rather, the restriction exists because a
judicial tribunal concluded that it was necessary to prevent the recurrence of

anticompetitive conduct documented in a lengthy antitrust trial. As the
AT&T court put it, "[t]o permit the [BOCs] to compete in [the interLATA]
market would be to undermine the very purpose of the proposed decree-to

create a truly competitive environment in the telecommunications industry.2549

When Congress was debating telecommunications reform legislation, it
recognized that the BOCs' local exchange monopolies had not eroded much
in the years after their separation from AT&T. Congress also reasonably

45. Id. at 224.
46. Id. at 225 (modifying the parties' proposed decree by adding a new section VHI(C)).
The court did not impose line-of-business restrictions on the BOCs lightly. Realizing that such
restraints are themselves anticompetitive, the court scrutinized each one carefully before approving it:
The Court will not impose restrictions simply for the sake of theoretical consistency. Restrictions must be based on an assessment of the realistic circumstances
of the relevant markets, including the [BOCs'] ability to engage in anticompetitive behavior, their potential contribution to the market as an added competitor for
AT&T, as well as upon the effects of the restrictions on the rates for local telephone service.
Id. at 224.
47. SBCComm., 981 F. Supp. at 1005, 1007.
48. Id. at 1005.
49. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 188.
50. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 49 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
10, 12 (1995) ("BOCs provide over 80% of local telephone service in the United States ....
While some competition has developed in the local business service and exchange access markets, local residential service remains a monopoly service."); 141 Cong. Rec. H8289 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("The truth is....very little has changed since
1984. The [BOCs] still have a firm monopoly over the local exchange market...."); id. at
S8361 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Warner) (The heart of the Bell System's
ability to engage in discriminatory conduct "was the control which the local [BOC] had-and
still has--over the local telephone exchange."); id. at S8141 (daily ed. June 12, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (AT&T Consent Decree "left the [BOCs] with local exchange monopolies, which persist today."); id. at 57892 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Pressler) (BOCs "are protected with monopoly status in the local residential phone service

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

relied upon the court's previous findings that, left unchecked, the BOCs

dominant position in the local markets could enable them to forestall competition in interLATA and other markets. At the same time, however, the
legislature was disturbed by the fact that, with the AT&T ConsentDecree in
place, the AT&T court and the DOJ were controlling national telecommunications policy in several important areas.' Congress also was frustrated with
certain aspects of DOJ's administration of the decree. 2
In the end, Congress chose not to terminate the AT&T Consent Decree.53 It also retained the decree's interLATA restriction (albeit with some
modifications), incorporating it into section 271.54 To address the concerns
described above, however, Congress transferred prospective administration
and enforcement of the decree from the court to the Commission. 5 Further,
Congress modified the legal standard governing BOC applications to remove

the interLATA restriction from the "no substantial possibility" formulation
in the AT&T ConsentDecree to the standard that now appears in section 271.
Thus, the SBC court oversimplified the matter when it suggested that
the 1996 Act replaced the AT&T Consent Decree.5' As noted, the Act primarily altered the way in which the BOCs could seek and justify removal of
the decree's continuing restrictions, and changed the forum in which those
requests would be heard. Congress did not alter the decree's core interLATA
restriction-its ban on BOC provision of long-distance services originating

markets.").
51. See, e.g., 142 CONG. Rsc. S688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hollings)
(AT&T court "has been doing yeoman's work in attempting to ensure that monopolies do not
abuse their market power. But it is time for Congress to reassert its responsibilities in this
area .. ");141 CONG. REc. H8274 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("One
judge, a couple of law clerks, a gaggle of Justice Department lawyers... have been making the
entirety of telecommunications policy for the United States since the breakup [of AT&T].");
id. at S7887 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler) ("[L]egislation reasserts congressional authority over [BOC] provision of long distance and restores the FCC authority to
set communications policy over those issues.").
52. 141 CONG. REc. H8463 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("The
Justice Department is in good part responsible for the unfair situation which this country confronts in telecommunications."); id. at S8147 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Pressler) (complaining of lengthy delays in DOJ's processing of BOC petitions to waive specific decree restrictions).
53. Congress recognized that terminating the decree would unlawfully deprive the AT&T
court of its jurisdiction over decree violations occurring prior to passage of the 1996 Act. See
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 198 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 212
(Congress cannot retroactively overturn ajudicial consent decree.).
54. Telecommunications Act of 1996, see. 151(a), § 271(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West
Supp. 1997).
55. Seeid.§271(d)
56. SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (motions for stay
pending).
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within their local service areas. In so doing, the legislature did not have to
make any findings about the need for that restraint. That determination had
been made years earlier by a court after a judicial trial.
Section 271 is not an unconstitutional bill of attainder. The SBC court's
conclusion to the contrary rests on its misapplication of the relevant law, its
lack of deference for an act of Congress, and its misunderstanding of the underlying facts. The court's opinion also results, however, from an overly
broad reading of the Bill of Attainder Clause. The clause seems intended to
protect individuals and
groups from being
out for punishment be. ....
. singled
57
cause of their beliefs or political affiliations. Extending it to the realm of
economic regulation-an application that likely was never intended by the
Framers of the Constitution-would "cripple the ability of legislatures to respond to some perceived social or economic problem by imposing restrictions or limitations on individuals, corporations, or industries which are
deemed responsible for the problem."' 8 Section 271 provides no cause for
such a dramatic step.
Ill. PRECONDITIONS TO BOC ENTRY
Under section 271, the Commission "shall not approve" a BOC application to offer in-region, interLATA services unless the Commission
finds that:
1. The BOC has concluded agreements with one or more facilitiesbased competitors under which the BOC is offering access or interconnection that satisfies the requirements of section 271(c)(2)(B)-the so-called "competitive checklist." Alternatively, if a BOC has not
received a qualifying interconnection request within a designated period of time, the BOC can satisfy this requirement by providing a
statement of generally-available terms and conditions that complies

57. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841,
860 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) ("No minority or disfavored group is singled out by Congress [in the challenged statute] for disparate treatment."); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 453 (1965) (The statute in question "inflicts its deprivation upon the members of a political group thought to present a threat to national security... [S]uch groups were the targets of
English and early American bills of attainder."); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F.
Supp. 370, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Bills of attainder historically have been passed in times of
war or rebellion, or when some menace to domestic tranquility was perceived.").
The clause's narrow cast perhaps explains why it has seldom been used to void a federal statute. See Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal at 4, SBC Comm., 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (filed Jan. 6, 1998) (The
"Supreme Court has only invalidated a law on bill of attainder grounds twice in this century, and, on both occasions, the law at issue was enacted in response to the perceived threat
of the Communist Party.").
58. Long IslandLightingCo., 666 F. Supp. at 403.
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with the competitive checklist and that "has been approved or permitted to take effect by the [relevant] State commission ....
2. The BOC will offer interLATA services through a separate affiliate
that complies with the requirements of section 272.6
"is consistent with the public interest,
3.
Grant of the BOC's application
' 61
necessity.
and
convenience,
This Article will focus on the first and third conditions-the "facilitiesbased competitor" requirement and the "public interest" test.
A.

Facilities-BasedCompetitor

Section 271(c)(1), which sets out the facilities-based competitor requirement and the permissible exception from it, "comes virtually verbatim" from section 245(a)(2) of House Bill 1555, the telecommunications
62
bill passed by the House of Representatives in August 1995. Thus, the
language and legislative history of House Bill 1555 provide the keys to
unlocking the meaning of section 271 (c)(1). That section commands explication because it raises a host of questions that the text leaves unanswered:
What are the necessary characteristics of the facilities-based competitor
mentioned in section 271(c)(1)(A)? What types of facilities must it possess? How many subscribers must it have? In how many markets must it
operate?
1.

Relationship Between Section 271(c)(1)(A) and Section
271(c)(1)(B)

Section 271(c)(1) creates two "tracks" by which BOCs may seek
authorization to offer in-region, interLATA services. In order to qualify for
interLATA entry under subparagraph (A) (Track A), a BOC must provide
access and interconnection to at least one facilities-based competitor that
offers local exchange telephone service to residential and business subscribers." If, by a certain date, "no such provider" has requested access or
interconnection, a BOC can pursue interLATA entry via subparagraph (B)
(Track B) by providing a state-ratified statement of generally available
terms and conditions that satisfies the checklist requirements."
When may a BOC choose Track B, which plainly charts an easier
59. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B), (c)(3)(A)(ii).

60. Id. § 271(c)(3)(B).
61. Id. § 271(c)(3)(C).
62. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 147 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
160.
63. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(A).
64. Id. § 271(c)(1)(B).
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course than Track A, as its route to interLATA entry? By its terms, Section
271(c)(1) makes Track A the primary avenue for interLATA entry because
the statute
phrases Track
B as an exception, to be invoked only if certain
•
65
circumstances occur. SBC notes correctly that Congress created Track B,
in part, to prevent long-distance carriers from keeping the BOCs out of the
interLATA market by avoiding local-market entry.66 As stated in the
House Conference Report, Track B "is intended to ensure that a BOC is
not effectively prevented from seeking entry into the interLATA services
market simply because no facilities-based competitor.., has sought to
enter the market." 67
A BOC may take Track B "if, after 10 months after February 8, 1996
[the date the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted], no such provider has requested the access and interconnection described in [Track A]
before the date which is 3 months before the date the [BOG] makes its application" for interLATA entry.61 Plainly, then, there was no Track B for a
BOC to invoke until at least December 8, 1996, and then only if it did not
receive an interconnection request by September 8. That date having come
and gone, a BOC can now opt to proceed via Track B only if it received no
qualifying request for access and interconnection more than three months
prior to the date of its application. 69
Not surprisingly, a debate rages over what type of provider can make
a "qualifying" request that triggers Track A and, hence, forecloses Track
B. Parties concerned about premature BOC entry into the interLATA market contend that virtually any interconnection request by a prospective
competitor will be sufficient to vitiate Track B.7" BOCs, on the other hand,

65. SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 41, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997).
("[L]egislative history surrounding [Track A] establishes that, consistent with its goal of
developing competition, Congress intended Track A to be the primary vehicle for BOC entry in section 271.").
66. Brief in Support of the Application ofSBC Comm., Inc. et al. to ProvideIn-Region,
InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121 (Apr. 11, 1997) [hereinafter SBC Oklahoma Brie].
67. H.R. CONF. REP. No.104-458, at 148, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 161;
accordH.R. REP. No.104-204, pt. 1, at 77 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43.
68. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B).
69. If a BOC receives such a request, it may not invoke Track B unless the relevant
state commission certifies that the prospective interconnector has failed to negotiate in good
faith or has failed to implement within a reasonable time the terms of the negotiated agreement. Such conduct on the part of the competitor would terminate the BOC's obligation to
proceed in accordance with Track A. See id.
70. See, e.g., Motion To Dismiss and Request for Sanctions of the Ass'n for Local
Telecomm. Servs., to the Application of SBC Comm., Inc. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121, at 4-8 (Apr. 23, 1997) [hereinafter ALTS
SBC Motion]; SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 26 & n.88, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198
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assert that "only a timely request from a [competitive provider] that actually qualifies under Track A [for example, that is already providing facilities-based service to residential and business subscribers at the time the
interconnection request is made] can foreclose Bell company entry under
Track B.' The Commission has rejected these antipodal positions in favor
of a more moderate alternative:
[W]e conclude that the request from a potential competitor must be
one that, if implemented, will satisfy [Track A]. That is, we find that a
"qualifying request" must be one for access and interconnection to
provide the type of telephone exchange service to residential and business subscribers described in [Track A]. That view is consistent with
(1997) (identifying myriad commenters that echoed ALTS's position).
71. Comments of BellSouth Corp., to the Application ofSBC Comm., Inc. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121, at 5 (May 1, 1997)
[hereinafter BellSouth Oklahoma Comments]; see also SBC Oklahoma Brief supra note 66,
at 14.
72. SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 54, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (footnotes
omitted). The Commission concluded that allowing potential competitors to make qualifying requests for access and interconnection could strengthen a BOC's commitment to fostering local competition:
Upon receipt of a "qualifying request," as we interpret it, the BOC will have an
incentive to ensure that the potential competitor's request is quickly fulfilled so
that the BOC may pursue entry under Track A. As long as the qualifying request
remains unsatisfied, the requirements of [Track A] would remain unsatisfied, and
Track B would remain foreclosed to the BOC.
Id. para. 57 (footnote omitted).
BellSouth contends that the Commission's "qualifying request" standard also includes
the requirement that a prospective competitor "'tak[e] reasonable steps toward implementing its request in a fashion that will satisfy [Track A].' Reply Brief in Support of the Application of BellSouth Corp. et al. to ProvideIn-Region, InterLATA Servs. in S.C. in CC
Dkt. No. 97-208, at 10 (Nov. 14, 1997) (quoting SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, par. 57, 8
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198). That argument misreads the SBC Order. At no point in its discussion of the qualifying request standard did the Commission even hint that the test also
includes a "reasonable steps" requirement. See SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, paras. 5457, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198; see also, BellSouth Order, CC Dkt. No. 97-208, 1997 WL
799081, para. 61 (Dec. 24, 1997) ("The Commission's statement concerning the relevance
of 'reasonable steps' taken by a requesting carrier toward provision of the type of telephone
exchange service described in [Track A], however, was made in a different context."). Indeed, such a requirement would be inconsistent with the statute, which plainly links the
suspension of Track B with the occurrence of a single event--a request for access and interconnection that satisfies Track A.
Having made a qualifying request, a competitor must follow through on that request in
good faith and in a timely fashion. A competitor's failure to negotiate in good faith or to
comply with an implementation schedule contained in a final interconnection agreement can
transform its interconnection request from qualifying to nonqualifying and resurrect Track
B as a path to BOC interLATA entry. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B). It is in this context
that a "reasonable steps" obligation arises, as the Commission understood:
[I]n some circumstances, there may be a basis for revisiting our decision that
Track B is foreclosed in a particular state. For example, if following such a determination a BOC refiles its section 271 application, we may reevaluate whether
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both the statutory text and the intent and underlying purposes of section 271(c)(1).

The BOCs' claim--that the party seeking interconnection must be

fully operational when it first makes its request-is not without support in
the statute and the associated legislative history. The statutory text indicates, for example, that Track B applies if "no such provider has requested

the access and interconnection described in [Track A]" more than three
months prior to the filing date of a BOC interLATA application. 73 The

phrase "no such provider" arguably refers back to the entity described in
Track A-a facilities-based provider of local exchange service to residential and business subscribers. 74 The reference in Track B to the require-

ments of Track A thus raises an inference that Congress intended for Track
B to apply unless a BOC received a timely interconnection request from a
provider that satisfies the criteria of Track A at the time that request is
made.
A closer reading of the statute refutes that inference, however. Track

B can indeed be read to incorporate the "criteria" of Track A if one considers only the operational characteristics of a qualifying "provider"--

what it must provide ("telephone exchange service"), how it must provide
(either "exclusively" or "predominantly" over its own facilities), and to

whom it must provide ("residential and business subscribers"). The same
cannot be said about the matter of timing (when the provider must exhibit

the characteristics that Track A specifies).
On that question, Track A indicates only that a BOC's interLATA
application fulfills section 271(c)(1) if the BOC "has entered into one or
more binding agreements.., under which [it] is providing access and in-

it is entitled to proceed under Track B in the event relevant facts demonstrate that
none of its potential competitors is taking reasonable steps toward implementing
its request in a fashion that will satisfy [Track A].
SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 58, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (emphasis added).
The "reasonable steps" requirement, then, is not part of the Commission's qualifying
request standard, but instead provides protection against potential abuse of that standard.
That safeguard, moreover, can be invoked, if at all, only at some point after the Commission determines whether a qualifying request has been made. Additionally, there is some
question whether the Commission can create such a safeguard. While Track B can be revived if a competitor fails to negotiate in good faith or to implement a final interconnection
agreement, that can occur only if the relevant state commission certifies that the competitor
has engaged in such dilatory conduct. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B). The statutory text
nowhere authorizes the Commission to enforce a parallel safeguard.
73. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B).
74. See 142 CONG. REC. Hi 152 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hastert) (A
BOC may petition for interLATA authorization 10 months after enactment if it has "not received.., any request for access and interconnection from a facilities-based competitor that
meets the criteria in [Track A].").
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terconnection to... one or more unaffiliated competing providers of telephone exchange service... to residential and business subscribers."" The
quoted language indicates only that the "criteria" of Track A can be satisfied if an unaffiliated provider offers qualifying services as of the filing
date of the BOC's interLATA application. Track A thus cannot be read to
require that the competing provider must be offering such services at some
earlier date--such as when it first seeks an interconnection agreement with
a BOC. If Track A does not contain such a requirement, afortioriit cannot
be incorporated by reference into Track B.
The notion that, in order to invalidate Track B, a competing provider
must already be offering facilities-based service when it requests access
and interconnection is also at odds with the structure and purpose of section 27 1(c)(1). As Congress recognized when it considered telecommunications reform legislation, few, if any, companies could provide, as of the
enactment date of the 1996 Act, the facilities-based competition that Track
A requires. In its report on House Bill 1555, the House Commerce Committee acknowledged that "[w]hile some competition has developed in the
local business service and exchange access markets, local residential service remains a monopoly service." 76 Moreover, the BOCs and other local
exchange carriers:
are frequently protected from competition by government barriers to
entry. In fact, the Committee found that the majority of States restrict
full and fair competition in the local exchange, either by statute or
through the public utility commission's regulations.7
Although Congress understood that local competition was emerging,
it concluded that such competition was not yet sufficient to meet the facilities-based competitor requirement. The House Report noted specifically
that "[i]t is not sufficient for a competitor to offer exchange access service
to business customers only, as presently offered by competitive access
providers (CAPs) [such as Teleport Communications Group and MFS
Communications] in the business community."" Similarly, while Congress
believed that cable television systems "hold the promise of providing the
sort of local residential competition that has consistently been contem-

75. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(A).
76. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at49 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 12.
Where the terms of a statute are unclear, committee reports provide authoritative evidence
of congressional intent; see, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984); Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969); United States v. Hoslett, 998 F.2d 648, 656 (9th Cir.
1993).
77. H.R. REP.No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 50, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 13-14.
78. Id. at 77, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43.
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plated,"' 9 the examples cited in the Conference Report indicate that, in
February 1996, the promise of cable competition was still just that. Time
Warner and Jones Intercable were "actively pursuing plans to offer local
telephone service in significant markets;" Cablevision Systems had "the
goal of offering telephony on Long Island....""
Given Congress's awareness of, and dissatisfaction with, the general
absence of local competition when it enacted section 27 1(c)(1), 81 a considerable leap of logic is required for the BOCs to argue that Congress chose
to rely on an interconnection request by an existing facilities-based competitor as the only barrier to BOC interLATA entry ten short months after
that enactment. That argument is also flatly inconsistent with the timetable
that section 271 erects. As noted above, the BOCs could seek interLATA
entry via Track B on December 8, 1996 if they had not received a qualify12
ing interconnection request prior to September 8, 1996. Because little, if
any, facilities-based competition existed on the date of enactment, it would
have had to develop during the seven months between February and September.
As Congress understood, however, competition would not be possible
unless and until new entrants could link their facilities with the BOCs'
ubiquitous local exchange networks." And interconnection, in most cases,
79. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
160.
80. Id. (emphasis added). Time Warner apparently offers residential services only in
Rochester, New York. It has put its other "local residential telephony plans on hold, because of uncertainty in the regulatory environment." COMM. DAILY, Jan. 14, 1997, at 7. But
see Elizabeth Corcoran, Microsoft to Invest $1 Billion in Comcast, WASH. PosT, June 10,
1997, at CI (noting that Microsoft's investment may accelerate Comeast's deployment of
fiber optic distribution facilities capable of delivering telecommunications services). It remains to be seen whether this latest effort by cable firms to provide competitive telecommunications services will be the one to bear fruit.
Representative Jack Fields, one of the foremost proponents of cable as a local exchange competitor and a principal author of the House telecommunications bill, has expressed disappointment that "cable hasn't emerged as [a] more aggressive local service provider because industry leaders continuously have promised offerings of local residential and
business telephony." Fields Blames Hundtfor Interconnection Order, COMM. DAILY, Dec.
2, 1996, at 2.
81. See SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 51, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997)
("[T]he very passage of the 1996 Act-which was designed to remove impediments to local
entry-indicates that Congress believed that the degree of local telephone competition and
interconnection prior to the passage of the 1996 Act was unsatisfactory.").
82. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
83. See, e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124, 160 (Because "it is unlikely that competitors will have a fully redundant network in
place when they initially offer local service," they will need to obtain some facilities and
capabilities from incumbent local telephone companies.); 141 CONG. REC. S8191 (daily ed.
June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler) ("The problem with competition in telecommu-
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was not feasible until the Commission promulgated rules implementing
sections 251 and 252 six months after enactment. As a practical matter,
then, facilities-based entrants would not have had time to emerge soon
enough to play the role in the section 271 process that the BOCs demand. 5
Viewed against this backdrop, the BOCs' insistence that, to nullify Track
B, a facilities-based competitor must be offering qualifying services at the
time it requests access and interconnection is tantamount to a claim that
Congress intended Track B to be the operative provision in most instances,
thereby rendering Track A nugatory."
There is ample evidence that Congress did not intend such a result. 7

nications is that you have to use somebody else's wires to get where you are going."); SBC
Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 33, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198. ("Potential competitors
usually request access and interconnection under section 251 in order to become operational." (emphasis added)); Comments of WorldCom, Inc., to the Application of SBC
Comm., Inc. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121,
at 18 (May 1, 1997) [hereinafter WorldCom Comments] ("[Clompetitors need to be able to
purchase interconnection and unbundled network elements before they can provide local
exchange service....").
84. Congress directed the Commission to issue its interconnection rules within six
months after enactment so that prospective entrants would "have the benefit of being informed of the Commission rules in requesting access and interconnection before the statutory window in [Track B] shuts." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148-149, reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 161.
85. As adopted by the House Commerce Committee, House Bill 1555 (from which
section 271(c)(1) is taken) paired Track B with a version of Track A that required a facilities-based competitor providing residential and business services "comparable in price,
features, and scope" to those offered by the incumbent BOC. See H.R. REP. No. 104-204,
pt. 1, at 7 (1995). Congressmen Dingell, Tauzin, Boucher, and Stupak, prominent Committee members who were closely involved in crafting House Bill 1555, expressed concern that
the provision would force a BOC to "wait to apply for long distance relief until some competitor has duplicated the [BOC's] network and offers service of comparable 'scope'
throughout the [BOC's] service territory." Id. at 210, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
103. Those fears were groundless unless the Congressmen believed that a competitor could
invoke Track A by requesting interconnection even though it would not offer qualifying
services until sometime after the request was made.
Indeed, if a qualifying request could be made only by a firm that is already offering
service, a stringent definition of the service that the requestor must provide will benefit the
BOCs. The stricter the standard, the less likely any competitor will be to satisfy it and,
therefore, the more likely the BOC will be able to pursue interLATA entry via Track B. The
committee-passed bill was amended on the floor, but the change did not alter the relationship between Track A and Track B-it merely reduced the level of service that a competitor
had to provide in order for Track A to be satisfied.
86. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining
that courts "must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every
effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous"); accord Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528,
538-39 (1955).
87. BellSouth attempts to harmonize Track A and Track B by claiming that Track A
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The House Commerce Committee, which inserted Tracks A and B into
House Bill 1555, viewed Track A's facilities-based competitor requirement as:
the integral requirement of the checklist, in that it is the tangible affirmation that the local exchange is indeed open to competition. In the
Committee's view, the "openness and accessibility" requirements are
truly validated only when an entity
offers a competitive local service in
8
reliance on those requirements.
The House Report, in discussing Track B, indicated that the provision was
included in the bill because a BOC should not be denied interLATA entry
"simply because no facilities-based competitor which meets the criteria
specified in the Act [presumably meaning Track A] sought to enter the
market."" The Report states further that, because access and interconnection negotiations could be commenced as of the date of the legislation's
enactment, "it does not create an unreasonable burden on a would-be competitor to step forward and request access and interconnection" within the
time period prescribed." The foregoing language implies that the House of
Representatives believed that a qualifying request for interconnection
could be made by a firm that intends to offer facilities-based local residential and business telephone services, rather than solely by a company that
is already providing such services.9"
"creates an expedited route to apply for entry into long-distance [i.e., prior to December 8,"
1996], but, in exchange, requires actual facilities-based competition to be present." AsSOCIATION FOR LOCAL TELECOMM. SERVS., SECTION 271: CREATING SUSTAINABLE LocAL
COMPETITION BEFORE THE RBOCs ENTER LONG DISTANCE 7 (1997) (quoting BellSouth's

"Statutory Avenues for Bell Operating Company Entry to the Long Distance Market"). If,
however, Congress had intended to so limit Track A, it could easily have drafted section
271(c)(1) to say as much. It also would not have allowed timely-made interconnection requests to suspend the operation of Track B after December 8, 1996. Finally, BellSouth's
interpretation cannot be reconciled with Congress's emphasis on facilities-based competition as evidence that the market-opening provisions of the 1996 Act were actually working
in practice. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
88. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 77, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 42. The
author of Track B, Representative Hastert, took a similar position:
What's more, we have included a facilities based competitor requirement
[in House Bill 1555]. This means there must be a competing company actually
providing service over his or her own telephone exchange facilities. Just meeting
the checklist isn't enough--there must be some proof that it works.
141 CONG. REC. H8289 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995); see also 142 CONG. REC. HI 152 (daily ed.
Feb. 1, 1996) (Representative Hastert identifies himself as the author of Track B.). The
views of a provision's sponsor are generally given weight in construing that provision.
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978); United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323,
1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
89. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 77, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43.
90. Id. at 77-78, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43 (emphasis added).
91. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124, 161 (Track B was designed to permit a BOC to seek interLATA authority if no quali-
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The House Conference Report provides evidence that the full Congress adopted that view. It states that the purpose of Track B was to facilitate BOC interLATA entry if no competitor "that meets the criteria set out
in [Track A] has sought to enter the market." 92 The reference to a competitor seeking to enter the local exchange market makes no sense at all if
a competitor can "meet the criteria" of Track A only if it is already in the

market--that is, only if it is already providing facilities-based local telephone service to residential and business subscribers-when the competitor submits its interconnection request.

If the BOCs' construction of Track B cannot be squared with the language and intent of section 271(c)(1), the same can be said for competitors' claims that any interconnection request can suspend the operation of
Track B. That argument effectively erases from Track B the crossreference to Track A, contrary to the plain language of the statute.93 Taken
together, Tracks A and B clearly require the party requesting interconnection to exhibit certain specific characteristics: it must provide telephone
exchange service; it must operate predominantly or exclusively over its
own facilities; and it must serve both residential and business subscribers.
The fact that the statute does not specify when the requestor must exhibit
94
those characteristics, does not mean that it need never possess them.
If a potential competitor can make a qualifying request under Track
fying competitor "has sought to enter the market."). But see 141 CONG. REC. H8458 (daily
ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (offering several examples of the workings of
Tracks A and B, a number of which suggest that a facilities-based carrier must already be
providing service when it requests interconnection from a BOC). The weight to be given
Representative Tauzin's views is limited by the fact that they are inconsistent with the legislative history cited above. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 567 (1984)
(asserting that statements of individual legislators provide evidence of legislative intent
when they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative history and with
his previously-expressed understanding of the statute); see also supra note 85. Furthermore,
at least one of Representative Tauzin's examples (number six) describes a situation where a
competitor seeks interconnection to begin providing alternative residential or business
services, rather than to extend existing services to a new group of prospective customers.
92. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 161.
93. "The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for '[i]f the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter."' Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S.
402, 409 (1993) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (alteration in original)).
94. As the Commission points out, if any interconnection request can suspend Track B,
a BOC could be exiled to a statutory "no-man's land." For example, a competitor seeking
interconnection to provide facilities-based service only to business customers would preclude the BOC from pursuing interLATA entry via Track B. Yet, the BOC could not then
apply for interLATA entry under Track A (assuming that no other competitor enters the
market), because it would not face a facilities-based competitor that serves both residential
and business subscribers. See SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 54, 8 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 198 (1997).
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B, 95 how can the Commission distinguish bonafide requests from attempts
to manipulate the statutory framework in order to bar the BOCs from the
interLATA market? One approach would be to focus on the party making
the request. If, for example, the firm is certificated by the relevant state
regulatory commission to offer local residential and business services
within the state, the FCC could take that fact as persuasive evidence that
the prospective
entrant is a "would-be competitor" to the incumbent
96
BOC, or a company that is "actively pursuing plans" to offer services that
would satisfy Track A.97 The Commission could also infer an intent to
serve from a competitor's decision to file a tariff for residential and business services with the relevant state agency,98 Finally, if the requestor is
offering such services in another jurisdiction, the Commission could reasonably assume that the company will do the same in the state in which it
is seeking access and interconnection.
An alternative, but complementary, tactic would be to consider the
interconnection request submitted. The Commission has opted for this approach; it will treat as qualifying any request that, if implemented, would
produce "the type of telephone exchange service to residential and business subscribers described in [Track A]." 99 Under this standard, the Commission would presumably accept a prospective competitor's request for
unbundled loop facilities that would allow it to serve residential and busi-

95. The Commission tweaked SBC for suggesting that an interconnection request may
become qualifying at some future date if it were not so when initially submitted: "SBC fails
to explain how the meaning of the statutory term 'request' can vary according to the operational status of the requestor." Id. para. 49. Yet, as noted, operation of Track B hinges on
the requestor's present or future operational characteristics-what services it offers or intends to offer, how, and to whom. If those operational characteristics should change over
time, the Commission's treatment of the underlying request for purposes of Track B should
change as well.
The Commission cannot let a request for interconnection evolve indefinitely, however.
In fairness to the BOCs-who need to know whether their interLATA application must
proceed via Track A or Track B--the Commission must at some point finally determine
whether or not a competitor has submitted a qualifying request for access and interconnection. BellSouth suggests that that assessment must be made as of the date which is three
months prior to the date of a BOC's interLATA application. Brief in support of the Application ofBellSouth Corp. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Sen's. in S.C. in CC Dkt.
No. 97-208, at 10-11 (Sep. 30, 1997) [hereinafter BellSouth South Carolina Brie]. The
statute appears to compel that result. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), §
271(c)(1)(B), 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997) (BOC may proceed via Track
B if no one has made a qualifying interconnection request "before the date which is 3
months before the date the company makes its [interLATA] application .... ).
96. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 78 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43.
97. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 160.
98. See SBC Order,12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 18, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198.
99. Id. para. 54.
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ness customers as evidence that the new entrant intends to do just that.

To be sure, allowing potential competitors to make qualifying interconnection requests for purposes of Track B "will require the Commission,
in some cases, to engage in a difficult predictive judgment" as to the true

intent of party seeking access and interconnection. Although that is
cause for some concern, the fact remains that the Commission will have to
make a raft of difficult factual determinations in deciding whether to grant

a BOC's application to offer interLATA services. The question of whether
or not a prospective entrant intends eventually to provide the services
Track A requires seems no less susceptible to proffer and proof than any of
the other issues that will likely arise during the section 271 review process.
The Commission's approach could create incentives for some potential entrants to "game" the system--to request interconnection so that a

BOC must show the existence of a facilities-based competitor in order to
gain authorization to offer interLATA services, and then to delay facilitiesbased entry to guarantee that the BOC can never satisfy that requirement.' '
Several provisions of the 1996 Act mitigate the potential for such opportunistic behavior. Section 252 provides, for example, that once a request
for interconnection is made, the negotiations must proceed to conclusion
100. Id. para.57.
101. The BOCs assert that interexchange carriers may have an incentive to engage in
such strategic behavior to safeguard their interLATA market shares. SBC Oklahoma Brief
supra note 66, at 13; BellSouth Oklahoma Comments, supra note 71, at 6. That claim generally lacks force when directed at other potential local competitors (such as cable television
companies) with no long-distance businesses to protect. Moreover, prospective competitors
are not the only parties with incentives to "game" the situation. The BOCs are wellpositioned to influence the pace at which competition develops because the BOCs control
the bottleneck facilities that new entrants need to compete. See supra note 83. They would
have every incentive to exercise that power if, by so doing, they knew that they could seek
interLATA entry via Track B no later than December 8, 1996. See SBC Order, 12 FCC
Rcd. 8685, paras. 47, 53, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198.
SBC contends that even alternative local competitors with no interLATA operations
may be moved to manipulate the section 271 framework "to force [access and interconnection] concessions [BOCs] need not make under sections 251 and 252." Reply Comments
and Opposition to Petitions To Deny of SBC Comm., Inc. et al., to the Application of SBC
Comm., Inc. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121, at I
n. I (May 27, 1997) [hereinafter SBC Oklahoma Reply]. SBC acts as if the requirements of
sections 251 and 252 were frozen in amber upon enactment of the 1996 Act or upon promulgation of the Commission's implementing regulations. To the contrary, the provisions of
section 251 "permit regulatory flexibility and are not limited to a 'snapshot' of today's
technologies or requirements." 141 CONG. REc. S8469 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Pressler). Given that, one cannot, without more, ascribe nefarious motives to local
competitors who are simply relying on the incentive structure embedded in section 271 (i.e.,
using the prospect of interLATA entry to induce the BOCs to open their networks, see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text) to secure from the BOCs access and interconnection
arrangements that are needed for meaningful competitive entry, but may not yet be required
by Commission regulations implementing section 251.
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according to an expeditious timetable. 1 2 Once discussions have begun,
moreover, a party's refusal "to participate further in the negotiations, to

cooperate with the State commission in carrying out its function as an arbitrator, or to continue to negotiate in good faith in the presence, or with
the assistance, of the State commission shall be considered a failure to negotiate in good faith,"'0 3 which would reopen Track B as a path to BOC
interLATA entry.104
Additionally, section 251 directs the BOCs and other LECs to negotiate agreements with prospective entrants that fulfill the LECs' access and

interconnection obligations under the 1996 Act.

5

That obligation includes

"the duty to negotiate in good faith the terms and conditions of such
agreements.""' Thus, as the Commission has concluded, the BOCs have a

right to insist that their agreements with new competitors contain a implementation schedule.'0 7 If a competitor refuses to negotiate such a schedule
voluntarily, the BOC can ask the pertinent state commission to arbitrate
the issue. And section 252 mandates that any interconnection agreement

arbitrated by a state commission shall "provide a schedule for implemen'
tation of the terms and conditions by the parties to the agreement. 108

In short, the 1996 Act gives the BOCs the means to inoculate themselves from the threat of dilatory conduct by prospective competitors. The
BOCs need only ensure-whether through voluntary negotiations or by
state arbitration--that their interconnection agreements require imple-

mentation of the incorporated terms within a reasonable time.'O In the
102. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 252(b), 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(b)
(West Supp. 1997).
103. 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(b)(5).
104. See id. § 271(c)(1)(B)(i).
105. Id. § 251(c)(1).
106. Id.
107. See SBC Order, 12 FCC Red. 8685, para. 37 n.109, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198
(1997) ("BOCs are free to negotiate implementation schedules for their interconnection
agreements."); BellSouth Order, CC Dkt. No. 97-208, 1997 WL 799081, para. 64 (1997)
("[N]othing in the Commission's rules precludes [BOCs] from negotiating, or states from
imposing in arbitration, schedules for the implementation of the terms and conditions by the
parties to the agreement."); see also Comments of the S.C. Cable TV Ass'n, to the Application of BellSouth Corp. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in S.C. in CC Dkt.
No. 97-208, at 3-6 (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter SCCTA Comments].
108. 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(c)(3).
109. Id. § 271(c)(1)(B)(ii). Ameritech contends that a BOC should be entitled to proceed
via Track B unless "there is an interconnection agreement that commits the potential competitor to a reasonable schedule for the commencement of [service that would satisfy Track
A] and that carrier complies with the schedule." Comments of Ameritech, to the Application
of BellSouth Corp. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in S.C. in CC Dkt. No. 97208, at 7 (Oct. 20, 1997). To hold otherwise would, in Ameritech's view, "relegate a BOC
to such a blind alley based on an interconnection agreement that leaves provision of service

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

event that a competitor fails to comply with a binding implementation
schedule, the BOC could petition the state commission to certify that fact,
reviving the BOC's option to pursue interLATA entry via Track
thereby
0
B. 1

2.

Characteristics of a Facilities-Based Competitor

To satisfy Track A, a BOC must interconnect with or provide network access to companies that provide telephone exchange service to residential and business subscribers "either exclusively over their own telephone exchange service facilities or predominantly over their own
telephone exchange service facilities in combination with the resale of the
telecommunications services of another carrier."" Given the centrality of
Track A to the Commission's consideration of a BOC interLATA application, interested parties have vigorously contested each of the operative
phrases in Track A.

a.

"Telephone Exchange Service"

As noted, Track A requires that there be an interconnection agreement between a BOC and a competing provider of "telephone exchange
service." The statute then defines "telephone exchange service" by reference to section 3(47)(A); specifically excludes "exchange access;"" 2 and,
pursuant to that agreement completely in the hands of a potential competitor that itself
would benefit from such an absurd regulatory result." Id. at 6. Yet, given the way the statute
operates, an interconnection agreement will lack an implementation schedule only if a BOC
fails to request one. See SCCTA Comments, supra note 107, at 6-7 (suggesting reasons why
a BOC might chose not to insist upon a firm implementation schedule). Adopting Ameritech's proposal would thus reward a BOC that did not protect its own interests by giving
the company an easier route to the interLATA marketplace. While the Commission should
not construe section 271 so as to "relegate" a BOC to a "blind alley," neither should it protect a BOC that chooses to walk there on its own.
110. Section 271(c)(1)(B) narrowly defines the behavior that would warrant revival of
Track B-a competitor's failure "to negotiate in good faith" or its failure "to comply,
within a reasonable period of time, with the implementation schedule contained in" the
competitor's interconnection agreement. 47 U.S.C.A § 271(c)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Thus, a state
commission cannot, as BellSouth asserts, resurrect Track B by making a generalized finding
that "'potential competitors are [not] taking any reasonable steps towards implementing any
business plan for facilities-based local competition .... " BellSouth South CarolinaBrief,
supra note 95, at 8 (quoting Entry of BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. into InterLATA Toll Market, Order, at 19 (Dkt. No. 97-101) (Order No. 97-640) (SCPSC July 31, 1997)). See BellSouth Order, CC Dkt. No. 97-208, 1997 WL 799081, para. 66 n.179 (Dec. 24, 1997)
(rejecting BellSouth's argument for lack of evidence that the state commission had in fact
certified that either of the two statutory exceptions was applicable).
111. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(A).
112. Id. "Exchange access" refers to the provision of facilities or services that connect
individual subscribers to the long-distance network. See id. § 153(16) ("The term 'exchange
access' means the offering of access to telephone exchange services or facilities for the pur-
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more obliquely, establishes that cellular telephone service may not be
treated as telephone exchange service for purposes of Track A. The exclusion of cellular service has prompted debate about the appropriate categorization of a "technically and commercially similar" mobile radio offering-personal communications service (PCS). Although it is a close
question, the better reading of the statute and the relevant case law is that
PCS should not at this time be considered telephone exchange service for
purposes of Track A.
The Communications Act defines "telephone exchange service" as:
(A) service within a telephone exchange, or within a connected system
of telephone exchanges within the same exchange area operated to
furnish to subscribers intercommunicating service of the character ordinarily furnished by a single exchange, and which is covered by the
exchange service charge, or (B) comparable service provided through
a system of switches, transmission equipment, or other facilities (or
combination thereof) by which a subscriber
can originate and termi14
nate a telecommunications service.1
Subparagraph (A), which is the operative definition for purposes of Track
A, was formerly section 3(r) of the Communications Act of 1934."5 Over
the years, the Commission has construed section 3(r) very narrowly to
limit the range of offerings that would be deemed telephone exchange
service. Thus, it has described telephone exchange service as "the provision of two way voice communications between individuals by means of a
central switching complex which interconnects all subscribers within a
geographic area.""' It has also equated telephone exchange service with
pose of the origination or termination of telephone toll services."). Congress's specific exclusion of "exchange access" from "telephone exchange service" seems unnecessary because the two terms appear to be mutually exclusive. The definition of exchange access, for
example, plainly distinguishes the former from the latter. More tellingly, the statutory definition of "local exchange carrier" encompasses "any person that is engaged in the provision
of telephone exchange service or exchange access." Id. § 153(26). The inference is that
Congress viewed exchange access as a separate and distinct offering, and not as a subcategory of telephone exchange service. Congress thus did not need to clarify that exchange
access is not telephone exchange service for purposes of Track A because the definitional
structure of the 1996 Act had already accomplished as much.
113. Id. § 271(c)(1)(A) ("services provided pursuant to subpart K of part 22 of the
Commission's regulations (47 C.F.R. 22.901 et seq.) shall not be considered to be telephone
exchange services"). The Conference Report confirms that the quoted language was intended to refer to cellular service. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 147 (1996), reprintedin
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 160.
114. 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(47).
115. The 1996 Act added subparagraph (B). There is nothing in the legislative history to
indicate why Congress added the new provision or what services it was intended to encompass.
116. Amendment of Parts 21 and 43 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. Relative to Various Procedural Requirements for the Domestic Pub. Radio Serv., Second Report and Order,
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"the ubiquitous, interconnected switched service that is characteristic of
[traditional wireline] local exchange carriers."' 7
Prior to the passage of the 1996 Act, the Commission never ruled that
cellular radio, PCS, or any other commercial mobile radio service (CIMRS)
is a telephone exchange service under section 3(r).' The general pre-

sumption is that Congress was aware of the Commission's construction of
that provision when it enacted section 3(47) and that its decision to incorporate former section 3(r) into the new definition of "telephone exchange

service" without change effectively adopted the Commission's interpretations as Congress's own. "9 Although the Commission concluded, subsequent to the passage of the 1996 Act, that CMRS providers do furnish telephone exchange service, it did so pursuant to section 3(47)(B) and not
subparagraph (A). 21 Consequently, that decision is of no help in deter-

76 F.C.C.2d 273, para. 13, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1701 (1980); accord The Offshore Tel.
Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order,3 FCC Rcd. 4513, para. 30, 64 Rad Reg. 2d (P & F)
1808 (1988).
117. Application of Teleport Comm.-N.Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC
Rcd. 5986, para. 17, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 250 (1992), affirmed by Orderon Reconsideration, 8 FCC Rcd. 5464 (1993), vacated sub nom. United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 38
F.3d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Courts adopted similarly restrictive interpretations of section
3(r) in holding that a variety of communications offerings are not telephone exchange service. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 607 n.23 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (two-way, nonvideo communications delivered via cable television); General
Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 855 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971)
(telephone company provision of transmission capacity for cable television service); ATS
Mobile Tel., Inc. v. General Comm., 282 N.W.2d 16, 18-19 (Neb. 1979) ("mobile radio
telephone exchange services," specifically one-way paging).
118. Ameritech notes that a federal district court has ruled that mobile radio services are
"exchange telecommunications services" for purposes of the AT&T Consent Decree and
that the Commission has stated that such services are "exchange services" under sections
2(b) and 221 (b) of the Communications Act. Comments of Ameritech to the Application of
BellSouth Corp. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in La. in CC Dkt. No. 97231, at 4-5 (Nov. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Ameritech Louisiana Comments]. Even if true,
those assertions are irrelevant. In determining compliance with Track A, the determinative
question is whether CMRS offerings such as cellular and PCS are telephone exchange
services under 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(47)(A).
119. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be
aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.") (citation omitted); Dutton v. Wolpoff &
Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 655 (3d. Cir. 1993) ("[W]hen Congress reenacts legislation, it incorporates existing administrative and judicial interpretations of the statute into its reenactment.").
120. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 1013, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) I
[hereinafter Local Competition Report and Order], modified by Orderon Reconsideration,
11 FCC Rcd. 13,042, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1057, reconsideredby Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd. 19,738, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 420 (1996), reconsidered by
Third Order on Reconsideration and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 Comm.
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mining compliance with Track A.
The Commission and some BOCs cite other provisions of the Communications Act that allegedly confirm that PCS and other CMRS services
constitute telephone exchange service. Section 3(26), for example, defines a LEC to include any person that provides telephone exchange service, but specifically excludes CMRS providers until such time as the
Commission determines that they should be included.'2 2 Similarly, section
253(f) permits states to impose certain obligations on firms that seek to offer telephone exchange service in rural areas, but then specifically exempts
CMRS providers.' Neither of these exclusions would have been necessary, these parties assert, "if some CMRS were not telephone exchange
service. , , 24
The problem with that argument is that, unlike Track A, the sections
cited rest on the broader definition of telephone exchange servicesubparagraphs (A) and (B). The CMRS exclusions contained in sections
3(26) and 253(f) confirm nothing more than what the Commission has already found-that some CMRS offerings may constitute telephone exchange service under subparagraph (B). Those provisions in no way demonstrate that "mobile services, such as PCS and cellular, fall2 within
the
5
definition of telephone exchange services in Section 3(47)(A)."'
The language of Track A itself is less easily-dismissed. Recall that
the provision requires a competing provider of telephone exchange service
as defined by section 3(47)(A), but then declares that cellular service may
26
not be considered telephone exchange service for purposes of Track A.
As the Commission has pointed out, the cellular exception would have
been unnecessary "if Congress did not believe that cellular providers were
engaged in the provision of telephone exchange service" under section
3(47)(A). '27 Moreover, Congress's decision to exclude only cellular from
the category of telephone exchange services that may satisfy Track A2 arguably implies that other CMRS offerings, such as PCS, would qualify. 1
Reg. (P & F) 1206, vacatedin partsub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. granted,66 U.S.L.W. 3387 & 3459 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998) (No. 97-826 et al.).
121. See, e.g., id. para. 1014; Ameritech Louisiana Comments, supra note 118, at 5-7.

122. 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(26).
123. Id. § 253(f).
124. Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 1014, 4 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1; see alsoAmeritech Louisiana Comments, supra note 118, at 6.
125. Ameritech Louisiana Comments, supranote 118, at 5-6.
126. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(A).
127. Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 1014, 4 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1.
128. See, e.g., Ameritech LouisianaComments, supra note 118, at 8-9; Brief in Support
of the Application of BellSouth Corp. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in La.
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One should not assume, however, that the cellular exception reflects
a congressional decision that cellular and other mobile services necessarily
are telephone exchange service under section 3(47)(A) and, thus, for purposes of Track A. As noted above, by reenacting section 3(r) unchanged as
section 3(47)(A), Congress presumedly ratified previous Commission decisions limiting telephone exchange service to a narrow set of services that
did not readily accommodate mobile services. Further, the legislative history indicates that Congress rejected cellular service as a potential competing service under Track A because "the Commission has not determined that cellular is a substitute for local telephone service."' 29
Consequently, one could reasonably conclude that the cellular exclusion in
Track A was not intended to define cellular as telephone exchange service,
but rather to preclude the Commission from doing so at some later date. 130
Under this interpretation, Congress's limitation of the exception to cellular
providers means only that the Commission would be free to conclude, under the appropriate circumstances, that other mobile radio services, including PCS, do constitute telephone exchange service under section
3(47)(A).
Invoking the venerable maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alter3
ius,"' ' Ameritech argues that Congress's specific declaration that cellular
radio should not be deemed telephone exchange service for purposes of
Track A necessarily implies that PCS and other CMRS offerings must be
so classified. 132 But if the purpose of the cellular exclusion was simply to
bar the Commission from ruling that cellular is a telephone exchange
service under section 3(47)(A), application of expressio unius merely confirms that the Commission is free to make that determination with respect
to PCS or any other wireless service that it has not already found to satisfy
subparagraph (A).
in CC Dkt. No. 97-231, at 11-12 (Nov. 6, 1997) [hereinafterBellSouth LouisianaBrie].
129. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 77 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43.
130. See Comments of ACSI, to the Application of BellSouth Corp. et al. to ProvideInRegion, InterLATA Servs. in La. in CC Dkt. No. 97-231, at 10 (Nov. 25, 1997) [hereinafter
ACSI Louisiana Comments] (Cellular exclusion "merely reflects Congress' desire to ensure
that cellular services were not defined by the FCC to fall within the Section 3(47)(A) definition."); cf Comments of MCI Telecomm. Corp., to the Application of BellSouth Corp. et
al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in La. in CC Dkt. No. 97-231, at 8 (Nov. 25,
1997) [hereinafter MCI Louisiana Comments] ("Congress' exclusion of cellular providers
from the definition of telephone exchange service merely shows that Congress thought that
it was so clear that cellular providers do not and will not provide competing telephone exchange service that the Commission need not take any time to adjudicate the issue in section
271 proceedings.").
131. Literally, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
132. Ameritech Louisiana Comments, supra note 118, at 9.
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Furthermore, expressio unius is a canon of statutory construction; it

is not a rule of law. Although the maxim carries weight, it is not concluhas little force in the administrative setsive.133 More importantly, it .....
ting,"' where [courts] defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute unless
Congress has "'directly spoken to the precise question at issue....134 The
maxim has also been criticized because "it stands on the faulty premise

were necessarily
that all possible alternative or supplemental provisions
135
considered and rejected by the legislative draftsmen."'

There is reason to believe that Congress's failure to mention PCS in
Track A was the result of oversight, rather than design. The Commission
136
did not issue the first PCS licenses until June 1995 , some time after
Congress first began drafting and debating the bills that would become the
1996 Act. PCS did not become commercially available until November

1995 (and then only in one market), several months after the House of37

Representatives had finalized the language that would become Track A.'

Not surprisingly, then, the voluminous legislative history of the 1996 contains almost no mention of PCS. It is therefore difficult to argue that Congress's adoption of the cellular exception in section 271(c)(1)(A) reflected
a conscious choice to treat a largely unknown (but "technically and commercially similar") PCS as local exchange service for purposes of Track A.

Accordingly, a BOC should not be allowed to claim PCS providers as
facilities-based competitors until such time as the Commission decides that
PCS constitutes local exchange service under section 3(47)(A). On the

133. See, e.g., Schmeling v. Nordam, 97 F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir. 1996); Smart v.
Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 1995).
134. Mobile Comm. Corp. of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404-1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(quoting Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 694 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (quoting Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984))).
135. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see
also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983) (quoting SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1944) (rejecting application of expressio
unius because "such canons 'long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will
construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose')); American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Why should we infer from the list
of ways to do something that there are no others? The legislature does not tie up every knot
in every statutory subsection."); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Bethlehem Mines Corp., 669 F.2d 187, 197 (4th Cir. 1982) ("The maxim is to be applied
with great caution and is recognized as unreliable.").
136. See FCC ProposesRules Changesfor Entrepreneurs'Auction,Sets Aug. 29 Start,
CoMM. DAILY, June 26, 1995, at 1.
137. Mike Mills, A Beginner's Guide to the CellularMaze, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1995,
at F12 (reporting that PCS became commercially available in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area on November 15, 1995). The House passed House Bill 1555 on August 4,
1995.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 50

other hand, if the Commission should so decide, and assuming that the
PCS providers possess the other characteristics required by Track A, the
Commission should hold that a BOC has complied with Track A even if
PCS is not a perfect substitute for traditional wireline local exchange
service. Some have argued that the phrase "competing providers" in Track
A requires that the alternative service(s) on which a BOC application rests
be substitutable in the economic sense with the BOC's own local exchange
service--that is, that the alternative service be comparable in price, quality, or convenience to the BOC's offerings.'
There is, however, nothing in the statutory text or the associated legislative history to suggest that Congress used the term "competing providers" in the technical sense to require economic substitutability between the
alternative service and a BOC's offerings. 39 In fact, the evidence is to the
contrary. As adopted the House Commerce Committee, Track A contained
a requirement that services provided by competing providers be
"comparable in price, features, and scope" to that of the BOC. 14 That language, which can be read to require a substantial amount of economic substitutability between the competing service, was deleted during the House
debate on the bill in favor of the language that now appears in section
271(c)(1)(A). Thus, if the Commission should rule that PCS is a telephone
exchange service under section 3(47)(A), BOCs can cite PCS providers as
potential facilities-based competitors even if consumers do not view PCS
as comparable service to wireline local telephone service.
b.

"Over Their Own Facilities"

Ameritech has argued that "[a] facilities-based provider is one that
uses facilities and equipment to which it has title to supply service to its
138. See, e.g., Comments of the Competition Policy Inst., to the Application of BellSouth Corp. et al. to ProvideIn-Region, InterLA TA Servs. in La. in CC Dkt. No. 97-231, at
2 (Nov. 25, 1997) ("PCS does not 'compete' in the standard economic sense" with the
BOCs' local services.); ACSILouisiana Comments, supra note 130, at 11 (Agreements with
PCS carriers do not satisfy Track A "absent a finding that PCS... is a substitute for wireline local telephone service."); Comments of AT&T Corp., to the Application of BellSouth
Corp. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in La. in CC Dkt. No. 97-231, at 66-67
(Nov. 25, 1997) (Higher cost and reduced user flexibility means that PCS is not a "viable
substitute" for wireline service.); MCI Louisiana Comments, supra note 130, at 5-7 (higher
prices, and economic and technical limitations of PCS prevent it from being a real
"commercial alternative" to the BOCs' offerings).
139. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, words in a statute are assumed to have
their "ordinary, contemporary, common [i.e., nontechnical] meaning." Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 117 S.Ct. 660, 664 (1997); accord Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993).
140. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. § 101(a) (1995) (adding section 245(a)(2)(A) to
the Communications Act of 1934), reprintedin H.R. REP. No.104-204, at 7 (1995).
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customers, or that purchases access to such facilities and equipment from
any other entity,... and thereby obtains the use of such facilities and
equipment for the purchase period."' 41 Under this view, if a competitor receives, for example, unbundled network elements (UNEs) from a BOC
pursuant to a negotiated access agreement, those facilities can be treated as
the competitor's "own!' facilities for purposes of Track A.
The Commission adopted that view in construing section 214(e) of
the 1996 Act, which contains "own facilities" language parallel to that in
Track A.'42 In its Order dismissing Ameritech's Michigan application, the
Commission extended that interpretation to the coinciding phrase in Track
A. 43 A review of the statutory text and its legislative history confirms that
141. See Brief in support of the Application ofAmeritech Mich. to Provide In-Region,
InterLATA Serv. in Mich. in CC Dkt. No. 97-1, at 12-14 (Jan. 2, 1997) (withdrawn as premature on Feb. 11, 1997); see also SBC Oklahoma Brief,supra note 66, at 11-12; Brief in
support of the Application of Ameritech Mich. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in
Mich. in CC Dkt. No. 97-137, at 12-14 (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter Ameritech Michigan
Brie].
142. Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776,
paras. 154-68, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997) [hereinafter UniversalServ. Report and
Order]. Section 214(e)(1)(A) provides that in order to be eligible to receive federal universal service support, a carrier must provide qualifying services throughout a designated
service area "either using its own facilities or a combination of its own facilities and resale
of another carrier's services (including the services offered by another eligible telecommunications carrier)." Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 102(a), § 214(e)(1)(A), 47
U.S.C.A. § 214(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
143. Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, paras. 91-101 (1997). The Commission was not obliged to construe the phrase "own facilities" in the same fashion in both
places. As the Commission recognized, the words "own" and "owner" are broad and flexible concepts, whose meanings depend on the subject, object, and terms of the legislation in
which they are found. UniversalServ. Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, para. 158 &
nn.407-08, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109. Thus, there is no reason to assume a priori that
Congress meant for the word "own" to have the same meaning in both places.
It is true that words generally are presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995);
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994); Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983).
Nevertheless, "[w]here the subject matter to which the words refer is not the same
in the several places where they are used, or the conditions are different, or the
scope of the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that exercised
in another, the meaning well may vary to meet the purposes of the law.. .. "
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 421 (1973) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)); accord NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 262 (1995) (stating that "a characterization fitting in
certain contexts may be unsuitable in others").
Interpreting the phrase "own facilities" differently for purposes of section 214(e) and
Track A would both reflect the different functions of the two provisions and promote the
procompetitive goals of the overall statute. Section 214(e)(1) states that to be eligible to receive universal service subsidies, a carrier must provide qualifying services, at least in part,
using "its own facilities." Because new entrants would likely need the same access as in-
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the Commission's reading of the critical phrase is most likely what Congress intended.
As noted, the statutory text indicates that in order for Track A to be
satisfied, competitors must provide telephone exchange service to residential and business subscribers "either exclusively over their own telephone
exchange service facilities or predominantly over their own telephone exchange service facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications services of another carrier."' 44 Thus, the statute identifies only
two ways in which a competitor may provide service to its subscriberseither over its own facilities or via service resale. 45 UNEs must fall within
one of those categories. Otherwise, one is faced with an absurd result: the
section 271 competitive checklist requires a BOC to provide interconnection, UNEs, and services for resale to prospective competitors,'4 but the
BOC's provision of UNEs (and UNEs alone) is of no consequence for determining compliance with Track A and, thus, eligibility to provide interLATA service.
The Commission properly concluded that a competitor's use of UNEs
does not constitute resale of a carrier's telecommunications services. As
the Commission determined in its Universal Service Report and Order, a
"network element" is not a "telecommunications service;" 148 it is, instead,
cumbents to such subsidies in order to compete effectively, the procompetitive purposes of
the 1996 Act would be better served by construing section 214(e) so as to maximize the
number of carriers qualified to receive universal service support. Construing the words
"own facilities" broadly to include network elements would serve that end. See Universal
Serv. Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, paras. 161-66, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109.
On the other hand, Track A's role is to ensure that there is some degree of competition
in the local marketplace before the BOC is permitted to offer interLATA services. Because
the construction of network facilities by new entrants provides the surest evidence of such
competition, it arguably would better serve the purposes of Track A to interpret "own facilities" narrowly to exclude network elements.
144. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(A).
145. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 92.
146. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), (xiv).
147. In construing a statute, courts presume that Congress did not intend an absurd result. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994); Pacific-Atl.
Trading Co. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 1995).
148. UniversalServ. Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, para. 158, 7 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 109. The Commission further distinguished network elements from resale of services:
The opportunity to purchase access to unbundled network elements.., provides
carriers with greater control over the physical elements of the network, thus giving them opportunities to create service offerings that differ from services offered
by an incumbent. This contrasts with the abilities of wholesale purchasers, which
are limited to offering the same services that an incumbent offers at retail. This
greater control distinguishes carriers that provide service over unbundled network
elements from carriers that provide service by reselling wholesale service ....
Id. para. 160 (footnotes omitted); see also Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267,

Number 2]

CREATING BETER INCENTIVES

"a facility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications
service.' ' If the competitor's use of network elements does not constitute
resale, an absurd construction of the statute can be avoided only by treating
those elements as the competitor's "own" facilities for purposes of Track
A.
This interpretation is substantiated by the legislative history. In
adopting the final language of Track A, Congress recognized that:
[It is unlikely that competitors will have a fully redundant network in
place when they initially offer local service, because the investment
necessary is so significant. Some facilities and capabilities (e.g. central
office switching) will likely need to be obtained from the incumbent
local exchange carrier as network elements pursuant to new section
251. Nonetheless, the conference agreement includes the
"predominantly over their own telephone exchange service facilities"
requirement to ensure that a competitor offering service exclusively
through the resale of the BOC's telephone exchange service does not
qualify, 5and
that an unaffiliated competing provider is present in the
0
market.1

Thus, Congress understood that some new entrants would need to acquire
BOC network elements in order to complete or to extend their competing
networks. Yet Congress never suggested that an entrant's dependence on
BOC facilities would disqualify it as a facilities-based competitor. In fact,
Congress expressly reserved that fate for those firms that entered entirely
via resale of BOC services which, by definition, do not include UNEs.
The Commission also concluded that treating UNEs as a competitor's
own facilities would further the purposes of the 1996 Act. It would, for example:
provide the BOCs a greater incentive to cooperate with competing
providers in the provision of unbundled network elements [thereby
advancing local competition], because they will be able to obtain inregion, interLATA authority under Track A regardless of whethercompeting carriers construct new facilities or provide service using
para. 100. It is worth noting, however, that the competitor's ability to "control" the network
elements it leases from a BOC is maximized when those elements can be separated from the

rest of the BOC's network and provided to a competitor on an exclusive basis. See Applica-

tion of Ameritech Mich. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Mich., Petition To
Deny of Sprint Comm. Co. in CC Dkt. No. 97-137, at 10-11 (petition date June 10, 1997).
Loop facilities may satisfy both of those criteria in many instances. Other network elements,
however, such as transport and switching, are common and likely cannot be provided to
requesting competitors on an exclusive basis. See Local Competition Report and Order, 11
FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 258, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 125 (1996). As a result, a competitor's

ability to "control" them is more limited.
149. 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(29).
150. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
160.
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5

unbundled network elements.1 '

The Commission continued:
If unbundled network elements are treated as a competing carrier's
"own telephone exchange service facilities," it is more likely that a
BOC will receive a request for access and interconnection from a
competing carrier that, if implemented, would satisfy JTrack
"
A],thereby barring the BOC from proceeding under [Track B]. Z

That, in turn, would give effect to Congress's intent that Track A should be
"the primary vehicle for BOC entry in section 271 ."1

c.

"Predominantly'"

The word "predominant" typically means "having the greatest ascendancy, importance, influence, authority, or force" or "most common or
conspicuous; prevalent."'154 Thus, Congress's use of the word
"predominantly" in Track A suggests that a facilities-based competitor's
"own" facilities must comprise at least the majority of its overall local exchange network facilities, if it also resells services obtained only from a

BOC, or a plurality of competitor's total network facilities, 5 if it resells

services procured from a BOC and one or more other carriers. 1
The statute does not identify what parts of the competitor's network
should be considered in determining whether its "own" facilities predominate."' SBC contends that the competitor's network "can be broken down
into three principal network elements:

local loops, local transport, and lo-

151. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 99.
152. Id. para. 99 n.230.
153. SBC Order, 12 FCC Red. 8685, para. 41, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997).
154. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 976 (1979); see

also Application of SBC Comm., Inc. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in
Okla., Petition To Deny of Sprint Comm. Co. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121, at 10-11 (petition
date May 1, 1997) [hereinafter Sprint Oklahoma Petition]; Initial Comments of Brooks Fiber Comm. of Okla., Inc. and Brooks Fiber Comm. of Tulsa, Inc., to the Application of
Ernest G. Johnson, Dir. of the Pub. Utils. Div., Okla. Corp. Comm 'n, to Explore the Requirements of Section 271 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996 in Proceeding Cause No. PUD

970000064, at 11 (1997) [hereinafter Brooks Oklahoma Comments] (appended as exhibit 2
to the Opposition of Southwestern Bell to ALTS SBC Motion, supra note 70 (Apr. 28, 1997)
[hereinafter SBC Oklahoma Opposition].

155. See 141 CONG. REC. E1699 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1995) (statement of Rep. Tauzin)
(delivered on Aug. 4, 1995) (indicating that to satisfy the "predominance" test, more than
50% of a competing provider's facilities must be "owned by the competing provider, or
owned by entities not affiliated with" the incumbent BOC).
156. Without question, however, "predominance" is determined by reference to the
composition of the competitor's own network, and no other. Thus, Brooks Fiber erred when
it argued that its network cannot be considered predominant because it is so much smaller
than SBC's. Brooks Oklahoma Comments, supra note 154, at 11.
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cal switching."'5 7 If a competitor takes only one of those elements from a
BOC, for example, local loops, "the test of predominance is met."' 58 The
only specific legislative history on the subject suggests a different conclusion. Representative Tauzin's "statement of intent" on the construction of
the word "predominantly" indicates that the Commission should consider
"only the local loop and switching facilities used by the competing provider to provide telephone exchange service."' 59
There is also evidence that Congress thought it important for subscriber loops to be provided on a competitive basis. Congress identified
cable television systems as the most likely local exchange competitor, in
part because the cable industry "has wired 95% of the local residences in
the United States and thus has a network with the potential of offering"
meaningful facilities-based local service competition. 6 ° The heart of that
"network" is, of course, the distribution facilities that bring a second wire
to the home and, therefore, offer a viable alternative to the lines (or loops)
from the telephone switching office to the home, which comprises the bulk
of the BOCs' monopoly local exchange plant. Given this characteristic of
cable networks, Congress's emphasis on cable as the most probable facilities-based competitor evinces a desire to eliminate or to at least mitigate
the BOCs' monopoly control over loop facilities. Consequently, it makes
sense to require, for purposes of determining compliance with Track A,
that a competitor's own facilities to the home, whether self-constructed or
should constitute the predomiobtained from a BOC as network elements,
161
nant share of its total local loop plant.

157. SBC Oklahoma Brief,supra note 66, at 11.

158. Id.
159. 141 CONG. REC. E1699 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1995) (statement of Rep. Tauzin)
(delivered on Aug. 4, 1995).
160. See H.R. RP. No. 104-204, pt.1, at 77 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
43; 142 CONG. REC. HI 149 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Fields) ("[A] cable
company would in most instances and in all likelihood be that facilities-based competitor in
most States-even though our concept definition is more flexible and encompassing."); 141
CONG. REC. H8476 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields) ("[T]he only competitor in the residential marketplace will be the cable company."); id. at H8475 (statement
of Rep. Richardson) ("[C]able has the potential to offer our constituents a choice in how to
receive information."); id. at H8474 (statement of Rep. Manton) ("C[T]he cable television
industry is poised to compete with local telephone companies in offering consumers advanced communications services.").
161. The Commission has not yet had occasion to offer its interpretation of the word
"predominantly." SeeAmeritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 103 (1997).
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d.

ProvidingService to Residentialand Business Subscribers
In response to Ameritech's first application to provide interLATA
service in the State of Michigan, I the Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS) contended that the application was defective
because, among other things:
[Track A] requires that competitors serve residence customers as well

as business customers, but residence customers currently have competitive choices only in a few Michigan communities in and around

Grand Rapids. None of the 10 million people living in metropolitan
Detroit... are currently able to order competitive residential service."

Similarly, interested parties asserted that SBC should not be authorized to
provide interLATA services in Oklahoma since it "remains the monopoly
provider of telephone exchange service in Oklahoma,"'6 because it "is not
challenged by even one statewide, facilities-based, local service provider,"' 5 or because most Oklahomans cannot change local telephone
companies.) 6 At the root of these arguments is the assumption that a
BOC's local market cannot be truly open unless residential and business
customers in significant portions of a state can choose among alternative
local exchange service providers. Although that claim has appeal as a
matter of economics, it is flatly inconsistent with congressional intent.
As noted, Track A requires only that a facilities-based competitor
provide telephone exchange service "to residential and business subscribers," without offering any guidance on how many subscribers must be
served or where they must be located. The Conference Report is silent on
the issue, but the discussion of Track A in the House Report reveals that
the threshold is not high. As for the number and type of customers that a
162. This application was filed on January 2, 1997, but was withdrawn as premature on
February 11, 1997 because Ameritech had relied on an interconnection agreement with
AT&T that had not been approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission. Id. para.
25. Ameritech then refiled its application on May 21, 1997.
163. Motion to Dismiss of the Ass'n for Local Telecomm. Servs., to the Application of
Ameritech Mich. to ProvideIn-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Mich. in CC Dkt. No. 97-1, at 4
(Jan. 14, 1997) [hereinafter ALTSAmeritech Motion].
164. Sprint Oklahoma Petition,supra note 154, at 5.
165. MCI Urges FCC To Reject Southwestern Bell's Request To Offer Long Distance
Service in Oklahoma, at 2 (Apr. 11, 1997) (press release).
166. Why SBC's Long Distance Application Is Premature (Apr. 10, 1997) (AT&T
Factsheet); see also Opposition of the Telecomm. Resellers Ass'n, to the Application of
SBC Comm., Inc. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in Okla. in CC Dkt. No.
97-121, at 6 (May 1, 1997) [hereinafter TRA Oklahoma Opposition] (SBC "should not be
awarded the authority it seeks here until it is facing established facilities-based competition
in at least all of the major population centers within the State of Oklahoma.").
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competitor must serve, the House Report states only that (1) "[i]t is not

sufficient for a competitor to offer exchange access service to business
customers only" and (2) a competitor may not "merely offer service in one

business location that has an incidental, insignificant residential presence." 167 As for geographical coverage, the determinative question is
whether "a competitive alternative is operational and offering a competitive service somewhere in the State prior to granting a BOC's petition for
entry into long distance."'6 8 The fact that Congress used such flimsy

phrases to describe the level of competition that would not satisfy Track A
virtually commands the conclusion that a competitor need not do much
more to clear the statutory hurdle.
The weakness of the statutory standard prompted objections by some

Members of Congress that a BOC could conceivably satisfy Track A, and
gain interLATA entry, by reaching an agreement with "only a single entity
requesting interconnection, without regard to whether the requesting company ,,161
is weak, undercapitalized, and lacking either expertise or a business

plan.

Other members were of the view that "[r]eal competition will oc-

cur only when there are facilities-based companies serving many custom-

ers in major markets" throughout a state. 170 Consequently, those members
made several attempts to define a competitor's minimum acceptable service level with more specificity and rigor. All were unsuccessful.
As approved by the House Commerce Committee, House Bill 1555

167. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 77 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43.
168. Id. (emphasis added). That position was predicated on the belief that once a facilities-based competitor is operating somewhere,:
[W]hatever agreement the competitor is operating under must be made generally
available throughout the State. Any carrier in another part of the State could immediately take advantage of the "agreement" and be operational fairly quickly.
By creating this potential for competitive alternatives to flourish rapidly throughout a State, with an absolute minimum of lengthy and contentious negotiations
once an initial agreement is entered into, the Committee is satisfied that the
"openness and accessibility" requirements have been met.

Id.
169. 141 CONG. REc. S8319 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kerrey). Senator Kerrey was referring to provisions in the Senate telecommunications reform bill, Senate
Bill 652, which did not include a facilities-based competitor requirement, but instead allowed a BOC to satisfy its interconnection obligations by negotiating an agreement with a
potential competitor that complied with the bill's competitive checklist. Although the Senate bill differed from House Bill 1555 on this point, both bills raised the same concernthat a BOC could begin providing interLATA services without facing significant local
competition.
170. 142 CONG. REc. HI 174 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watts); see also
141 CONG. REC. H8276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Holden) (complaining
the House Bill 1555 "does not require that there be any real, substantial competition in the
local telephone loop prior to [BOC] entry into the long-distance business").
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required that a competitive provider offer "telephone exchange service that
is comparable in price,features, and scope [to that provided by a BOC]
and that is provided over the competitor's own facilities to residential and
business subscribers."17 ' A manager's amendment adopted during the
House floor debate on House Bill 1555 deleted that language and replaced

it with the phrasing that now appears in Track A. In response to the
changes proposed in the manager's amendment, Representative Bunn offered an amendment requiring that a competitor be available to at least ten
percent of the customers within a state, whether or not they actually chose
to subscribe. The House Rules Committee declared the amendment out of
order, so it was never voted on. On the other side of the Capitol, Senator
Kerrey offered an amendment to Senate Bill 652 that would have condi-

tioned BOC interLATA entry on its negotiation of agreements with
"telecommunications carriers that have requested interconnection for the
purpose of providing telephone exchange service or exchange access
service, including telecommunications carriers capable of providing a substantial number of business and residential customers with telephone exchange or exchange access service."' 73 His colleagues rejected the amendment by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty-one.
Thus, Track A can indeed be said to "set[] an extremely low standard
for defining 'competition."1 74 But there is a standard. Essentially, Congress rejected a quantitative, market-share test in favor of a more qualitative standard: Facilities-based competitors must provide telephone service
to some residential and business subscribers, and the number served cannot
171. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 101(a) (1995) (enacted), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 104204, pt. 1, at 7 (1995) (adding section 245(a)(2)(A) to the Communications Act of 1934)
(emphasis added).
172. 141 CONG. REc. H8454 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bunn). Under
the Bunn amendment, a BOC could provide interLATA service, for example, in Pennsylvania, once a competitor was capable of providing alternative local exchange service to
530,000 of the state's 5.3 million access lines. Id. at H8276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Holden).
173. Id. at 58319 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (text of the Kerrey amendment).
174. Comments of the Tex. Ass'n of Long Distance Tel. Cos., to the Application of SBC
Comm., Inc. et al.to ProvideIn-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-12 1,
at 2 (May 1, 1997). This conclusion is not inconsistent with the structure of section
271(c)(1). Four members of the House Commerce Committee complained that the Committee's selection of Track A as the primary avenue for BOC interLATA entry, coupled
with a requirement for extensive facilities-based competition, could create an entry requirement that "can never be met." H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 210 (1995), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 103. The Committee-passed bill was subsequently amended on
the floor to insert the more lenient facilities-based competition standard that now appears in
Track A. That compromise can reasonably be interpreted as an effort to satisfy critics without sacrificing the more important requirement that the BOCs pursue interLATA entry in
most cases via Track A.
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be "incidental" or "insignificant."' 75 The Commission determined that the
standard was satisfied in Michigan, where Brooks had 21,786 lines in
service in the Grand Rapids area at the time the Commission considered
Ameritech's application, of which 5910 were residential." While 22,000

subscribers in a metropolitan area of 985,000177 hardly suggests the presence of effective competition, the legislative history discussed above indiwas more than Track A demands, and
cates that Brooks's customer base
7
1
concluded.
so
Commission
the

SBC's Oklahoma application presented a much different situation,
however. The record in that proceeding indicated that Brooks had only
twenty business customers (thirteen in Oklahoma City; seven in Tulsa) and
179
in Tulsa).
four residential users (one in Oklahoma City and three

Twenty-four customers in communities with a combined populatibn in excess of 1.7 million could very well be deemed "insignificant."''

°

More importantly, the Commission properly ruled that Brooks's residential customers cannot be considered "subscribers" for purposes of
Track A.81 The company had stated-without contradiction in the rec-

ord--that "Brooks is not now offering residential service in Oklahoma, nor
has it ever offered residential service in Oklahoma."'8 Brooks's four residential "customers" were, in fact, Brooks employees who were receiving
test circuits as part of a market trial using resold SBC local telephone
service." The employees "[did] not pay for the test circuit 'service,"' and,
in Brooks's view, the test was "in no way a general offering of residential
service."' 4
175. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1,at 77, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43.
176. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 65 (1997).
177. THE AMEPRCAN ALMANAC 1996-1997: STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED
STATES 47 (116th ed. 1996) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. The population of Grand
Rapids proper was 190,000 in 1994. Id. at 44.
178. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, paras. 76-78.
179. Brooks Oklahoma Comments, supranote 154, at 2.
180. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 177, at 45-46 (1994 data for Oklahoma City
(1.007 million) and Tulsa (743,000) metropolitan areas). In 1994, the cities of Oklahoma
City and Tulsa had 463,000 and 375,000 residents, respectively. Id. at 41-42.
181. SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 17, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997); see
also BellSouth Order, CC Dkt. No. 97-208, 1997 WL 799081, para. 57 (Dec. 24, 1997)
(holding that MCI's provision of service to 19 employees, at no charge and on a test-basis
did not make MCI a competing provider for purposes of Track A).
182. Affidavit of John C. Shapleigh of Brooks Fiber, para. 3 (appended to ALTS SBC
Motion, supranote 70).
183. Id. para.5.
184. Id. There is nothing to be made of the fact that Brooks was providing residential
service only on a trial basis when SBC filed its interLATA application. Brooks indicated
that the purpose of the trial was "to allow Brooks to gain some limited 'hands-on' experi-
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SBC was aware of these facts"' but asserted that they were
"irrelevant" to SBC's interLATA application:
Section 271 makes no distinctions based upon the end user's employment, the label a carrier attaches to its local service, or the pricing of
the service. Because Brooks Fiber serves both businesses and residences in competition with [SBC], it satisfies the "residential and business subscribers" requirement.

SBC's own words are the rocks on which its argument founders. Section
271 makes no mention of "end users"-a term that encompasses a wide
range of relationships between a supplier and a consumer. Nor does it refer
vaguely to services furnished to "businesses" or "residences." Instead, it
requires the provision of services to "subscribers"--a word that implies a
commercial arrangement between a buyer and a seller in which money
changes hands or the obligation to pay money arises."' Brooks's four customers may have been both "residences" and "end users;" they were not,
ence with [SBC's] resale systems (for example, billing, directory assistance) and coordination of those systems with Brooks's retail systems, and to troubleshoot any problems." Opposition of Brooks Fiber Properties, Inc., to the Application ofSBC Comm., Inc. to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121, at 6 (May 11, 1997)

[hereinafter Brooks Oklahoma Opposition]. Customer trials of prospective services are, of
course, common in the telecommunications industry and enable a provider to identify and
correct technical and operational problems with a service before exposing it to the rough
and tumble of the marketplace. See WorldCom Comments, supra note 83, at 9. Brooks's
rational decision to begin its residential operations in Oklahoma with a trial does not call
into question its intent to provide residential service in the state.
185. See Letter from Edward J. Cadieux, Director, Regulatory Affairs-Central Region,
Brooks Fiber, to Martin E. Grambow, Vice President and General Counsel, SBC (Mar. 4,
1997) (Attachment A) (appended to ALTS SBC Motion, supranote 70).
186. SBC Oklahoma Opposition,supra note 154, at 9-10.
187. See, e.g., TCI Cablevision, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd.

2925, para. 10, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 305 (1995) ("[A] cable operator provides cable
service [to subscribers] in consideration for fees paid."); TCI TKR of Houston, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 83, para. 4 (1995) (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1176 (1989) (defining subscriber as a person "receiving
something of a continuing or periodic nature on a prepayment plan")); Implementation of
Section 9 of the Comm. Act, 9 FCC Rcd. 5333, para. 88, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 399
(1994) (defining mobile service subscriber "as an individual or entity authorized by the
mobile service provider to operate under its blanket license in exchange for monetary consideration"); BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (3rd ed. 1969) (defining "subscriber" as
one "who has subscribed to something" and "subscribe" as "[t]o agree to take and pay for
corporate stock on the issuance thereof or for a newspaper or magazine to be issued periodically").
In the SBC Order,the Commission also pointed out that the term "telephone exchange
service," which a competitor must provide for Track A to be satisfied, requires some form
of payment by the user to the supplier. The Commission reached that conclusion because
(1) telephone exchange service is a type of telecommunications service and because (2) the
1996 Act defines "telecommunications service" as requiring the offering of service "for a
fee." SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 17 & n.64, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997)
(citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(46) (West Supp. 1997)).
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however, "subscribers." That is not only relevant for purposes of Track A,
but also establishes definitively that Brooks's activities in Oklahoma do
not satisfy Track A."'
The statutory text also provides no definitive answers to two important questions concerning how competitors must serve their residential and
business subscribers. First, does Track A require the presence of at least
one competitor that serves both residential and business customers, or is
the standard satisfied if all competitors, taken together, serve both groups
of buyers? Second, must a competitor serve both its residential and business customers either exclusively or predominantly over its own facilities,
or may the competitor serve one customer class entirely by resale as long
as the majority of its total customer base is served exclusively or predominantly via the competitor's own facilities?
Concerning the first question, the Commission has concluded that
"when a BOC relies upon more than one competing provider to satisfy
[Track A], each such carrier need not provide service to both residential
and business customers.... [I]f multiple carriers collectively serve residential and business customers."'8 9 That construction is both consistent
with the legislative history of Track A and sound as a matter of policy.

188. The fact that Track A requires competitors to serve "subscribers" disposes of the
argument that Track A can be satisfied if a competitor merely has an effective tariff in place
for residential and business service. See SBC Oklahoma Brief,supra note 66, at 10. Although a tariff may evidence a competitor's intent to provide service, see text accompanying supra note 98, it means no more than that the company holds itself out to furnish service upon reasonable request. Track A demands that someone actually take--and pay forthe service offered. See SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 18, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
198.
Similarly, Track A is not satisfied simply because a competitor may have a legal obligation to provide service to residential and business customers. See id. para. 10 (citing assertions to that effect by SBC and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission). A duty to serve
is of no consequence unless and until individuals find the competitor's offerings sufficiently
attractive to put its duty to the test---by requesting service. On the other hand, if a competitor repeatedly refuses requests for service, without adequate explanation, the relevant state
commission could reasonably treat the competitor's breach of its duty to serve as evidence
of its failure to implement its interconnection agreement, thereby reviving the affected
BOC's ability to seek interLATA authorization via Track B. See Telecommunications Act
of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(c)(1)(B)(ii), 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
189. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 82 (1997) (footnote omitted).
By implication, if a BOC predicates its application only on the presence of a single competitor, that competitor must have both residential and business customers. See Evaluation
of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, of the Application of SBC Comm., Inc. et al.to Provide InRegion, InterLATA Servs. in the Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121, at 9-10 (May 16, 1997)
[hereinafter DOJ Oklahoma Evaluation] ("While each qualifying facilities-based provider
need not be serving both types of customers if the BOC is relying on multiple providers, it
necessarily follows that if the BOC is relying on a single provider it would have to be competing to serve both business and residential customers.").
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When the provision that became Track A emerged from the House
Commerce Committee, it required that there be "an unaffiliated competing
provider of telephone exchange service that is comparable in price, features, and scope and that is provided over the competitor's own network
facilities to residential and business subscribers." ' The accompanying
Committee Report stated that "the Commission must determine that there
is a facilities-based competitor that is providing service to residential and
business subscribers."''M The conference committee, however, replaced the
House phrasing with the "one or more binding agreements" language that
now appears in Track A.0 2 The Commission reasonably concluded that
Congress made that alteration to give the BOCs "greater flexibility in
complying with [Track A], by eliminating the requirement that one carrier
serve both residential and business customers, and allowing instead, multipie carriers to serve such subscribers."' 93
The Commission's interpretation is also consistent with the purposes
of Track A. The plain text of that provision indicates that Congress did not
want the BOCs to offer interLATA services until they faced some local
competition, that is, until the BOCs' residential and business customers
had at least one alternative for meeting their local communications needs.
If the two classes of customers have that option, the procompetitive aims
of Track A are furthered whether the two groups are served by a single
provider or each group is served by a different firm.' 94 Moreover, as the
Commission notes, requiring at least one competitor to serve both residential and business customers could have the anomalous result that a large
percentage of such customers can choose among competing providers in a
state, but a BOC would still be precluded from interLATA entry because
no one competitor made the business decision to serve both types of subscribers. 95

190. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 7 (1995) (reprinting section 245(a)(2)(A) of House
Bill 1555) (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 76-77, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 42 (emphasis added).
192. The Commission erroneously stated that the language change occurred during the
House debate on House Bill 1555. SeeAmeritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para.
84. The full House did indeed debate and approve a manager's amendment that substantially revised the Track A language adopted by the Committee. That amendment, however,
did not modify the Committee's requirement that there be one affiliated competitor serving
residential and business customers. See 141 CONG. REc. H8445 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995)
(text of amendment 7); see also id. at H9980 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (reprinting text of
House Bill 1555 as adopted by the House, including the requirement in section 245(a)(2)(B)
of a single competitor).
193. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 84.
194. Id. para. 85.
195. Id.
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As for the second question, the DOJ has argued that as long as a
competitor offers local exchange service to its collective subscriber base
predominantly over its own facilities, Track A is satisfied even if the carrier does not furnish facilities-based service to each customer class individually."' On the other hand, Representative Tom Bliley, Chairman of the
House Commerce Committee, has stated that Track A is satisfied "if-and
only if-a BOC faces facilities-based competition in both residential and
business markets.' 97 The Commission has elected not to address the issue, 98 and the legislative history provides no clear guide. Nevertheless, the
most reasonable conclusion is that Chairman Bliley's interpretation best
reflects the intent of Congress.
Facilities-based competition lies at the heart of the procompetitive,
9
deregulatory vision that moved Congress to draft and pass the 1996 Act.'
20
Local competition was a fundamental goal; the interconnection, unbundling, and resale obligations of section 251 and the competitive checklist
in section 271 were the tools that Congress chose to achieve that objective. 2 Facilities-based competition was Congress's litmus test for determining whether those tools were adequate to the task. The development of
such competition would "validate" the "openness and accessibility" requirements of section 2512°2and provide proof that the competitive checklist actually works. 0 3

Therefore, it is not surprising that Congress also made facilitiesbased competition central to the structure and operation of section 271

which, after all, links BOC interLATA relief to evidence of the emergence
196. Addendum to the DOJ Oklahoma Evaluation, supra note 189, at 2-4 (May 21,
1997) [hereinafter DOJ Oklahoma Addendum].
197. Letter from Representative Tom Bliley, Chairman, House Commerce Committee, to
Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, FCC (June 20, 1997). Mr. Bliley's views are of limited use in
construing the statute because they were offered more than a year after the law was enacted.
Courts generally afford little deference to postenactment statements of legislators and legislative committees. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982) ("Such post hoc statements of a congressional Committee are not entitled to much weight."); Nevada Employees'
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bryan, 916 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[P]ost-enactment letters from
Congress are afforded little deference.").
198. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 85 n.190.
199. Consistent with congressional intent, the term "facilities-based competition" encompasses situations where a new entrant constructs its own transmission network and
where it acquires UNEs from a BOC or another carrier. See supraPart III.A.2.b.
200. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
201. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
202. See H.R. REp. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 77 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
42 ("'Mhe openness and accessibility' requirements are truly validated only when an entity
offers a competitive local service in reliance on those requirements.").
203. See 141 CONG. REc. H8289 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hastert)
(facilities-based competitor requirement offers proof that the checklist works).
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of competition in their local markets. Thus, Congress not only included a
facilities-based competitor requirement, but also made Track A "the primary vehicle for BOC entry in section 271."2°4 There is nothing in the statute or legislative history of Track A to suggest that Congress, having done
so, would be satisfied with the development of facilities-based competition
for business customers and not for residential customers. The evidence, in
fact, is to the contrary. Recall that the text of Track A does not stop with
the requirement that one or more competing providers offers telephone exchange service to residential and business subscribers. It states, further,
that "such telephone exchange service may be offered by such competing
providers either exclusively over their own telephone exchange service facilities or predominantly over their own telephone exchange service facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications services of
another carrier. ' 5
The most reasonable construction of the quoted language is that it defines further the service that competitors must offer to residential and
business customers in order for Track A to be satisfied. It indicates that
Track A requires competitors to provide their customers with a particular
type of service (i.e. local exchange service), and to furnish that service in a
particular way (i.e. either exclusively or predominantly over their own facilities). That, in turn, prompts the conclusion that those service conditions
apply equally to the competitors' offerings to both customer groups. To
argue that competitors may, consistent with Track A, serve their residential
subscribers entirely via service resale if the majority of their total customers are served on a facilities basis is no different from saying that competitors may provide something other than telephone exchange service to
residential customers as long as most of their customers do receive that
service. No one has advanced the latter proposition.
The legislative history also shows that Congress was particularly
concerned that facilities-based service be offered to residential subscribers.
Indeed, the legislative history is bereft of statements about business competition, with the notable exception of the admonition in the House Report
that service provided only to business customers would not satisfy Track
A. 206 Congress probably was not overly concerned about the development
of such competition because it assumed that new entrants would move
fairly quickly to serve business customers. 207 On the other hand, Congress

204. SBC Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8685, para. 41, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997).
205. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(c)(1)(A), 47 U.S.C.A. §

271(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
206. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. I, at 77, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43.
207. The Commerce Committee's insistence that competitors could not satisfy Track A

Number 2]

CREATING BETTER INCENTIVES

repeatedly displayed its interest in stimulating facilities-based competition
on cable telefor residential customers. Once again, Congress's
• • emphasis
.
208
vision as the most likely local competitor is instructive. The Conference
Report, after repeating the House Commerce Committee's assertion that
"cable services are available to more than 95 percent of United States
homes," stated that cable companies' "initial forays.., into the field of local telephony therefore hold the promise of providing the sort of residential local competition that has consistently been contemplated."2"9 In view
of Congress's obvious interest in residential facilities-based competition, it
strains credulity to contend that Congress intended a construction that
would allow Track A to be satisfied even if competitors offered no facilities-based service whatsoever to their residential customers.
The weight of the evidence, then, supports Chairman Bliley's view
that Track A is satisfied "if--and only if--a BOC faces facilities-based
competition in both residential and business markets." This does not mean,
however, that at least one competitor must furnish facilities-based service
to both residential and business customers, any more than Track A in all
instances requires at least one competitor to provide service to both classes
of customers. Instead,
.. 210 if a BOC's application relies on the presence of
multiple competitors, the Commission should deem Track A satisfied if
at least one of those competitors serves a sufficient number of residential
subscribers either exclusively or predominantly over its own facilities and
at least one does the same for a satisfactory number of business custom211
ers.
by having "an incidental, insignificant residential presence," suggests that Congress anticipated that many competitors would devote much of their efforts to garnering business subscribers. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 77, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43. Developments since passage of the 1996 Act have borne out those expectations. Ameritech's
Michigan application, for example, rested on interconnection agreements with three competitors, Brooks Fiber, Teleport Communications, and MFS Worldcom. See Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 64 (1997). Of those three only Brooks had any resi-

dential subscribers. See id., paras. 65-67. And more than 70% of Brooks's 21,786 lines in
service were business accounts. Id. para. 65.
208. See H.L REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 77, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43
(indicating the Commerce Committee's expectation that the cable industry would "provide
meaningful facilities-based competition").

209. H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 104-458, at 148 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
160; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 77, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 43
(Cable industry "has wired 95% of the local residences in the United States and thus has a
network with the potential of offering this sort of competitive alternative.").
210. Of course, if a BOC's application rests on a single competitor, that competitor must
furnish qualifying, facilities-based service to both its residential and business subscribers.
211. This reading of the facilities-based competitor requirement could erect a daunting
barrier to BOC interLATA entry if Track A can be satisfied only if competitors enter by
constructing their own local exchange networks. Because Congress decided to treat UNEs
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3.

Compliance with the Competitive Checklist
Section 271(c)(2) states that a BOC can qualify for interLATA entry
if, within the state for which such authorization is sought, the BOC provides to competitors access and interconnection that satisfies the competitive checklist requirements of subsection (c)(2)(B). 212 Some parties read
section 271(c)(2) to require that each of the BOCs' interconnection agreements must contain all of the checklist elements. On the other hand,
some BOCs suggest that they can comply with the checklist via a "mix and
match" approach; (1) by including some checklist items in a negotiated
agreement and offering the remaining items to competitors via a statement
of generally available terms and conditions pursuant to section 252(f), 2' 4 or
(2) by negotiating multiple access and interconnection agreements that,
taken together, contain all of the checklist elements.
The text of section 271(c)(2) indicates that parties requesting access
and interconnection from a BOC are entitled to have all of the checklist
elements included within their interconnection agreements, if they so
choose. Section 271(c)(2)(A) directs the BOCs to provide access and interconnection that "meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph."' 21 5 Subparagraph (B) provides, in turn, that "[a]ccess and interconnection provided or generally offered by a [BOC] to other
telecommunications carriers meets the requirements of this subparagraph
if such access and interconnection includes each of the following" elements in the competitive checklist. 21' The plain language of section
271 (c)(2), then, creates a presumption that all items in the checklist should
be included in a BOC's interconnection agreements with each of its competitors.
This reading of section 271(c)(2) is also consistent with congressional intent, as expressed in the bills that were merged to create the 1996
Act. House Bill 1555, for example, stated that a BOC could qualify for interLATA entry only by submitting to the Commission "a certification by a
State commission of compliance with each of the following conditions
[referring to the bill's competitive checklist] in any area where such comsecured from a BOC as the competitor's own facilities, it should be considerably less difficult for competitors to enter on a facilities basis, thereby satisfying Track A.
212. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(c)(2)(A)-(B), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(c)(2)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1997).
213. See, e.g., ALTS Ameritech Motion, supra note 163, at 9-11; TRA Oklahoma Opposition, supra note 166, at 26-28.
214. See, e.g., SBC Oklahoma Brief supra note 66, at 15-17; Ameritech Michigan Brief
supra note 141, at 18-21; BellSouth Oklahoma Comments, supra note 71, at 7-12.

215. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(2)(A)(ii).
216. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
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2' 7
pany provides local exchange service or exchange access in such State.,
Similarly, Senate Bill 652 indicated that a BOC could offer interLATA
services only if it negotiated an interconnection agreement that "provides,
at a minimum, for interconnection that meets the competitive checklist requirement of paragraph (2).' 2 8
The proposed construction of section 271 (c)(2) is also consistent with
Congress's understanding of the purpose of the competitive checklist. A
central objective of the 1996 Act was "opening the local telephone network to competition." 21 9 The competitive checklist, in turn, "set[s] forth
what must, at a minimum, be provided by a [BOC] in any interconnection
agreement.., to which that company is a party... before the FCC may
authorize the [BOC] to provide in region interLATA services." 0 The principal sponsor of Senate Bill 652, Senator Pressler, spoke of the checklist in
similar terms:
This competitive checklist can best be described as a snapshot of what
is required for these competitive services now and in the reasonably
foreseeable future. In other words, these provisions open up the local
loop from a technological standpoint as section
[253] opens the local
2
loop from a legal barrier to entry standpoint.
The market-opening function of the checklist is confirmed further by
the way in which the checklist items were selected:
The long distance companies came to us early on with a list of areas
(such as number portability, dialing parity, interconnection, equal access, resale, and unbundling) that give monopolies their bottleneck in
the local loop. We agreed to remove the monopoly power in each and
every one of those areas [in House Bill 1555].

217. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1995) (enacted), reprinted in 141
CONG. REC. H9981 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (emphasis added) (adding section 245(b) to the
Communications Act of 1934).
218. S. 652, 104th Cong, 1st Sess. § 221(a) (1995) (enacted), reprintedin 141 CONG.
R~c. H9965 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (adding section 255(b)(1) to the Communications Act
of 1934).
219. 141 CONG. REC. H8284 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields); see
also id. at H8282 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley) ("[The] key to this bill
is the creation of an incentive for the current monopolies to open up their markets to competition.").
220. S.REP. No. 104-23, at 43 (1995). Many elements of the competitive checklist in
section 271(c)(2)(B) of the 1996 Act are taken verbatim from the Senate bill. Nevertheless,
the basic outlines of many essential checklist items (e.g., UNEs, interconnection, dialing
parity, and number portability) can be detected in both bills.
221. 141 CONG. REc. S8469 (daily ed. June 15, 1995); see also id. at H8465 (daily ed.
Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (House Bill 1555 "requires the [BOCs] and
other local exchange carriers... to unbundle their networks and to resell to competitors the
unbundled elements, features, functions, and capabilities that those new entrants need to
compete in the local market.").
222. Id. at H8289 (Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hastert).
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Thus, the purpose of the checklist was to identify certain features, func-

tions, and capabilities, the availability of which was essential to opening
the local exchange bottleneck to competitive entry? 3 That objective would

be frustrated if section 271(c)(2) were to be construed so as to allow a
BOC to withhold one or more checklist items from one or more prospective entrants, so long as the BOC made each element available to at least

one entrant.
Although section 271(c)(2) entitles all parties requesting access and
interconnection to insist that every element in the competitive checklist be
included in their final interconnection agreements,' it does not follow that

an agreement must include each checklist item in order to satisfy section
271(c)(2). It is certainly conceivable, for example, that one or more prospective entrants would neither want nor need all of the features and capa-

bilities set forth in the checklist.2 Cable television companies could be
such competitors. With their extensive local distribution facilities, cable

systems might not have any226need for unbundled local loops from a BOC
(checklist item number 4). Similarly, because many cable companies
have already secured access to BOC poles and conduits in order to construct their distribution systems, they might not request such access

(checklist item number 3) as part of an interconnection agreement with a
BOC.

7

When that is the case, a BOC should not be penalized for the ab-

223. See id. at H8153 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Breaux) (Although
the checklist requirement "is very complicated.., what it essentially says is that [a BOC]
has to do all of these things, give permission to all of your competitors to come in and use
your equipment, use all of these things so you can compete for local customers ......
(emphasis added).
224. See 142 CONG. REc. E262 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Paxon)
(delivered Feb. 1, 1996) (The purpose of the checklist "is to ensure that a new competitor
has the ability to obtain any of the items from the checklist that the competitor wants.").
225. See id. ("It is very possible that every new competitor will not want every item" on
the checklist.); SBC Oklahoma Brief,supra note 66, at 16; BellSouth Oklahoma Comments,
supra note 71, at 9-10; see also S. REP. No. 104-23, at 43. (The checklist elements define
the minimum level of service that a BOC must provide "assuming the other party or parties
to that agreement have requested the items included in the checklist").
226. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), §271 (c)(2)(B)(iv), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(c)(2)(B)(iv) (West Supp. 1997). In the same way, a party that seeks "[i]nterconnection
in accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1)" (47 U.S.C.A. §
271(c)(2)(B)(i) (checklist item number 1)) may have no use for "[n]ondiscriminatory access
to network elements in accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(3) and
252(d)(1)" (Id. § 271 (c)(2)(B)(ii) (checklist item number 2).).
227. The way in which the checklist items are priced may also influence whether prospective competitors will request them from a BOC. Thus, the Commission's decision in its
Local Competition Report and Order to impose a temporary surcharge on the price of the
local switching UNE in order to collect certain universal service subsidies, may have deterred prospective interconnectors from seeking local switching from the BOCs while the
surcharge remained in effect. Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499,
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sence of such items in a final interconnection agreement. That agreement,
therefore, should be treated as complying with the checklist.
ALTS contends that if section 271(c)(2) is not construed to require
that each element of the competitive checklist be included within a BOC
interconnection agreement, the Commission will face the demanding task
of determining in each case whether an interconnector's decision not to request a checklist item was freely made, rather than a consequence of BOC
manipulation. 22 ' Although that concern is not without merit, questions
about checklist compliance would seem to be no less susceptible to proffer
and proof than questions about a prospective competitor's intent to provide
service to residential and business subscribers.29

4.

Pricing of Interconnection, Unbundled Network Elements, and
Services for Resale

Section 251(c) of the 1996 Act requires BOCs and other LECs to
provide prospective competitors with interconnection and UNEs on just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms.20 It also directs LECs to make
any of their retail services available to competitors at discounted rates, so
that the latter may resell those services to the competitors' own customers.2 Section 252 indicates that a LEC's precise interconnection, unbundling, and resale obligations are to be established through negotiations
between the LEC and its potential competitors, subject to review and, in

paras. 717-32, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996); see, e.g., ALTS Ameritech Motion, supra
note 163, at 12 (quoting an affidavit by Gregory Dunny, appended to Ameritech's January
2, 1997 interLATA application) ("[N]ew entrants may prefer to provide their own switching
as a means of avoiding access charges."). Similarly, below-cost pricing of residential telephone service in many jurisdictions may induce competitors to enter the market via resale
(because they will be assured of getting a discount from the tariffed rates, see 47 U.S.C.A. §
252(d)(3)), rather than by purchasing UNEs from the incumbent LECs or by constructing
their own facilities (either of which may entail costs that exceed the below-cost, tariffed
rates). See Brooks Oklahoma Opposition, supra note 184, at 11-12 (The effective price of
unbundled loops in Oklahoma is more than $19 per month, while the retail rate for SBC's
residential local exchange service in the Oklahoma City and Tulsa metropolitan areas is approximately $13 per month).
228. ALTS Ameritech Motion, supra note 163, at 11. In view of the fact that interconnection negotiations between BOCs and competitors are subject to review and, if necessary,
arbitration by the relevant state regulatory commission, it would be difficult for a BOC to
prevent a competitor from requesting and receiving a checklist item that the competitor
truly wanted.
229. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Ameritech Order, 9 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 113 (1997) ("[The Commission is called upon in many contexts to
make difficult determinations and has the statutory mandate to do so.").
230. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(2)(B). LECs are also obligated to provide interconnection
and UNEs "at any technically feasible point" within their networks.
231. Id. § 251(c)(4).
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some instances, arbitration by the public utility commission for the state
implicated. 232 Section 252(d) indicates, however, that for arbitrated agreements, the prices charged must reflect costs incurred by the LECs (in the
case of interconnection and UNEs) or costs avoided by the LECs (with respect to resold services).233
In its Local Competition Report and Order,the Commission promulgated detailed national rules governing the prices that LECs could charge
competitors for interconnection, UNEs, and services for resale. Specifically, the Commission decreed that prices for interconnection and UNEs
should reflect forward-looking, economic costs calculated in accordance

with a methodology that the Commission dubbed "total element long run
incremental cost" (TELRIC). 234 With respect to services for resale, the

232. A LEC must commence negotiations upon receipt of a request from a prospective
entrant "for interconnection, services, or network elements. .. ." Id. § 252(a)(1). A party to
the negotiation may at any point ask the pertinent state commission to participate for the
purpose of mediating any disagreements that arise during the discussions. Id. § 252(a)(2).
During the period from the 135th to the 160th day after the original interconnection request,
a party to the negotiation may petition the state commission to arbitrate any unresolved issues. Id. § 251(b)(l)-(3). The agency must decide the contested issues within nine months
after the interconnection request was first made. Id. § 252(b)(4)(C). Lastly, all final interconnection agreements, including those with provisions established by arbitration, must
then be submitted to the state commission for ratification. Id. § 252(e).
233. Rates for interconnection and UNEs:
(A) shall be
(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or
other rate-based proceeding) of providing the interconnection or
network element (whichever is applicable), and
(ii) nondiscriminatory, and
(B) may include a reasonable profit.
47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d)(1). Section 252(d)(3) states that prices for resale services shall be determined "on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications
service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the [LEG]." See id. § 252(d)(3).
Rates contained in agreements negotiated by the parties without state commission arbitration need not comply with the standards of section 252. Section 252(e) directs a state
commission to approve a voluntarily-negotiated agreement unless it finds that (1) the terms
of the agreement discriminate against a telecommunications carrier not a party to that contract, or (2) implementation of the agreement would not be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Id. § 252(e)(2)(A).
234. Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, paras. 672-73, 4
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996). For an extensive discussion of the chosen methodology, see
id. paras. 679-703. TELRIC is based on a "total service long-run incremental cost"
(TSLRIC) methodology advocated by many commenters in the Commission's interconnection proceeding. See id. para 672 (Setting UNE prices in accordance with forward-looking,
long-run economic cost will, in practice, "mean that prices are based on the TSLRIC of the
network element, which we will call [TELRIC] .... "). Some commenters, however, expressed concern that TSLRIC-based prices may not reflect the true economic costs of providing interconnection and UNEs, potentially deterring competitors from deploying their
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Commission directed state commissions to establish resale discounts in

one of two ways. The first, and preferred, approach would be to calculate
avoided costs using a cost study that satisfies certain Commissionspecified minimum criteria. In the event that an acceptable avoidable-cost

study is not available, the state commission must select a default discount
from a range defined by the Commission.3'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in July 1997 held that the Commission had exceeded its authority in prom-

ulgating its pricing rules .36 The court concluded that sections 252(c)(2)
and 252(d) "undeniably" authorize state regulatory commissions, rather

than the FCC, to determine the prices that LECs may charge for interconnection, UNEs, and resale2 37 The court also ruled that section 2(b) of the

Communications Act of 1934-which generally gives states exclusive
authority to regulate intrastate services -erects a jurisdictional "fence
that is hog tight, horse high, and bull strong, preventing the FCC from intruding on the states' intrastate turf."'
In the Ameritech Order, however, the Commission claimed its

authority under section 271 to employ its nationwide pricing rules in its
review of BOC interLATA applications. The Commission recognized the

alternative local facilities and reducing the incumbents' incentives to maintain their existing
networks. See, e.g., Reply Comments of the Nat'l Telecomm. Info. Admin., to the Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996 in CC Dkt.
No. 96-98, at 22-23 (May, 30, 1996). The NTIA recommended that the Commission use
TSLRIC only to establish the lower bound of a zone of reasonableness (with the upper
bound to be defined by "long run average incremental cost") within which LECs, and prospective entrants could negotiate a final price. Id. at 25-28; see also Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 631, 4 Comm. Reg (P & F) I (indicating that several state
commissions have used TSLRIC to establish a price floor for UNE rates); MFS Comm. Co.,
175 PUR4th 362, 369 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n 1997) (in arbitration, state commission accepted a rate for unbundled local loops proposed by a prospective competitor that
fell between TSLRIC and available evidence of the LEC's average service incremental
cost).
235. Local Competition Report and Order, I I FCC Rcd. 15,499, paras. 908-09, 4
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1. For a discussion of the criteria used to identify a satisfactory cost
study, see id. paras. 911-20. For an explanation of how the Commission derived its range of
acceptable default resale discounts, see id. paras. 921-34.
236. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 792 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 66
U.S.L.W. 3387 & 3459 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998) (No. 97-826 et al.).
237. Id. at 794. The court found nothing in the 1996 Act or in any portion of the Communications Act of 1934 that would empower the Commission to supersede the states' jurisdiction and to issue its own regulations. Id. at 794-796.
238. 47 U.S.C.A. § 152(b) ("[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to
give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to (I) charges, classifications, practices,
services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service
by wire or radio of any carrier .... ).
239. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 800.
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court's holding that "the Commission lacks jurisdiction to issue national

rules establishing a methodology by which the states determine the rates
for interconnection, unbundled network elements, resale ... in statearbitrated interconnection agreements pursuant to section 252." 240 It nev-

ertheless concluded that the court's ruling did not bar the Commission
from applying those same rules for purposes of section 271. Noting that
the competitive checklist requires BOCs to provide interconnection,
UNEs, and resale "in accordance with the requirements of" sections 251 (c)
and 252(d) (including the latter section's mandate that rates be cost-

based), 241 the Commission claimed that "Congress must have intended the

Commission, in addressing section 271 applications, to construe the statute
and apply a uniform approach to the phrase 'based on cost' when assessing
BOC compliance with the competitive checklist." 242 Accordingly, the

Commission concluded that a BOC would not be deemed in compliance
with the checklist unless the BOC demonstrated that its prices for interconnection
and UNEs are based on forward-looking costs and TELRIC
S••243
principles.
Predictably, the Commission's decision sparked a storm of protest.

240. Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 283 (1997). After acknowledging that the Eighth Circuit had invalidated federal pricing rules on jurisdictional
grounds, the Commission asserted that the court "expressly did not address the substantive
merits of the Commission's rules" and "made no ruling concerning the proper meaning of
the statutory requirement in section 252(d) that rates must be cost-based." Id. But the court
had no cause to examine the merits of the Commission's regulations. Indeed, having dismissed those rules on jurisdictional grounds, anything the court said as to their substantive
merits would have been an advisory opinion, which federal courts are loath to give. Likewise, the court had no reason to opine on the meaning of section 252. Its jurisdictional ruling plainly implies, however, that the task of construing section 252, at least in the first instance, lies with the states and not the Commission.
241. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), (xiv) (addressing interconnection, access to
UNEs, and resale respectively).
242. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 288. Although the Commission
emphasizes the need for uniformity, the effect of the Ameritech Orderis to create two sets
of "requirements" for section 252(d)-the standards adopted by state commissions when
they arbitrate interconnection agreements between LECs and prospective entrants under to
section 252(b), and the requirements identified by the Commission when it reviews BOC
interLATA applications. One obvious consequence is that BOCs will likely be subject to
different pricing standards than other LECs that do not need section 271 authorization to
offer long-distance services. Furthermore, if the federal and state pricing rules differ, a BOC
may face the dilemma of having to comply with the state rules and foregoing an opportunity
to enter the interLATA market. Similarly, states may have to choose between exercising
their authority to regulate interconnection rates or acceding to the Commission's rules so
that a BOC may pursue interLATA entry. See Iowa Utils. Mandamus Order,No. 96-3321 et
al., slip op. at 14 (8th Cir. filed Jan. 22, 1998). One should not assume that Congress intended such results in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, of which there is
none in the Ameritech Order.
243. Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, paras. 289-90.
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The BOCs and a number of state commissions petitioned the Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus compelling the Commission to comply with
the Eighth Circuit's order, thereby invalidating the pricing rules reinstituted in the Ameritech Order.244 On January 22, 1998, the court issued a
writ ordering the Commission to abide by the court's July order and "to
refrain from subsequent attempts to apply either directly or indirectly its
vacated pricing policies." 245 The court concluded that the Ameritech Order
was a "vehicle by which [the Commission] could intimidate state commissions into complying with the substance of the rules we vacated in our July
18 decision." 246 The court also expressed its suspicion that by including
within its order pricing principles that had "nothing to do with the actual
denial of Ameritech's application," the Commission was attempting to
create an opportunity to relitigate the jurisdiction issue before the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: "Having lost
its bid to usurp the [states'] power to determine intrastate prices in the
Eighth Circuit, the FCC now seeks to have a bite at the apple in the District of Columbia Circuit." 247
244. Petition of the State Commission Parties and the National Association of Regulatory Utililty Commissioners for Issuance and Enforcement of the Mandate, FCC v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-3321 et al.) (filed Nov. 19,1997).
245. Iowa Utils. Mandamus Order,No. 96-3321 et al., slip op. at 3.
246. Id. at 14.
247. Id. at 13. The 1996 Act specifies that appeals of any Commission order granting or
denying a section 271 application must be filed in the D.C. Circuit. Telecommunications
Act of 1996, sec. 151(b), § 402(b)(6)(9), 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(6)(9) (West Supp. 1997).
Parties appealing the Ameritech Ordermight be able to invoke the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to bar the Commission from rearguing the jurisdictional issue during a D.C. Circuit
appeal. Under collateral estoppel--or "issue preclusion'--"once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the
issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case." Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The doctrine's purpose is to relieve parties of the costs
and vexation of multiple lawsuits, to conserve judicial resources, and to minimize inconsistent decisions among courts. Id.; Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
In deciding whether to invoke collateral estoppel in a particular case, courts typically
undertake a three-part analysis:
First, the same issue now being raised [in a second case] must have been contested by the parties and submitted for judicial determination in the prior case.
Second, the issue must have been actually and necessarily determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction in that prior case.... Third, preclusion in the second
case must not work a basic unfairness to the party bound by the first determination.
Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted).
Opponents of the Ameritech Ordercould argue that those three factors would apply to
any effort by the Commission to reargue before the D.C. Circuit the question of its authority
to promulgate nationwide pricing rules governing interconnection, UNEs, and resale. The
issue that was at the core of the Eighth Circuit's assessment of the Commission's Local
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The rift between federal and state regulators over the pricing of interconnection, UNEs, and services for resale is ironic because there is general
agreement among them about the pricing principles that should be applied. 4 In the Ameritech Order,the FCC acknowledged that "a large ma-

jority of state commissions have stated that they have adopted or intend to
adopt forward-looking economic cost approaches."2 9 Similarly, many state
Competition Report and Order is identical to the question that would be presented in an
appeal of the pricing provisions of the Ameritech Order-who has the power to determine
the "requirements" of sections 251(c) and 252(d), whether it be for purposes of statearbitrated interconnection agreements or compliance with section 271's competitive checklist? That issue was placed before the Eighth Circuit and vigorously debated by the Commission and virtually every segment of the telecommunications industry. The court could
not have decided that case without addressing and, in some fashion, resolving the jurisdictional issue. Finally, giving preclusive effect to the court's ruling in any subsequent case
would not be unfair to the Commission because it had ample opportunity to present its
views during the Eighth Circuit appeal.
If collateral estoppel is appropriate, it can be applied even if the D.C. Circuit may have
decided the case differently than the Eighth Circuit in the first instance. See Yamaha Corp.
ofAm., 961 F.2d at 258 ("[T]he fact that the substantive law may be different in the two
jurisdictions does not affect the application of issue preclusion."); National Post Office Mail
Handlers v. American Postal Workers Union, 907 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The
doctrine of issue preclusion counsels us against reaching the merits in this case... regardless of whether we would reject or accept our sister circuit's position.").
248. It is worth noting that the jurisdictional issue-who should select the applicable
pricing principles-is separable from the substantive question-what principles would best
promote the purposes of the 1996 Act. The FCC and the states could jointly agree to implement a procompetitive pricing regime regardless of how the jurisdictional dispute is resolved. This does not mean, of course, that the jurisdictional issue is unimportant. The Solicitor General has petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Eighth Circuit's decision,
asserting that "to the detriment of consumers, the [lower courts'] interpretation of the 1996
Act will subject aspiring new entrants to delay, uncertainty, and burdensome litigation on
the basic methodological issues that the Commission sought to address well over a year
ago." Petition of the Federal Communications Commission and the United States for a Writ
of Certiorari at 24, FCC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-831)
(filed Nov.19,1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3387 & 3459 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998) (No. 97826 et al.).
249. Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 288; see also NATIONAL ASS'N
OF REG. UTIL. COMM'N'RS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION 1997: A STATE-BY-STATE
REPORT ON PRO-COMPETITIVE MEASURES IN INTRASTATE COMMUNICATIONS, pt. 1, 112-96
(Oct. 1997) (indicating that 34 states are using forward-looking cost methodologies, including TELRIC and TSLRIC, to price UNEs); Local Competition Report and Order, II
FCC Rcd. 15,499, para.631, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996) (noting that, even prior to the
Commission's decision, a number of states already employed long-run, incremental-cost
principles in setting prices for UNEs).
There is something to be said for affording states some flexibility to adopt their own
procompetitive pricing methodologies. As the Commission has conceded, "[t]he core terms
of section 252(d)---'just and reasonable' rates based on 'cost'--are elastic terms in ratemaking, for which 'neither law nor economics has yet defined generally accepted standards."' Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States at
47, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-3321) (filed Dec. 23,
1996) (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968)). Similarly, the
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commissioners downplayed the effect of the Eighth Circuit's decision because so many states already have adopted the forward-looking cost principles that the FCC espoused.25 It would be unfortunate indeed if the federal-state consensus on forward-looking pricing principles were not put
into effect expeditiously because of an unseemly and counterproductive
squabble over which level of government should implement them.
Even if state regulatory commissions are finally determined to have
the authority to set the prices for interconnection, UNEs, and services for
resale, it does not follow that those decisions are necessarily "conclusive"
on the FCC for purposes of section 271.25 IThe 1996 Act charges the FCC
with deciding whether a petitioning BOC has satisfied the statutory prerequisites for gaining interLATA entry.22 In particular, the Commission
must verify a BOC's compliance with the competitive checklist, including
its injunction that BOCs, among other things, provide interconnection,
UNEs, and services for resale in accordance with the pricing standards of
section 252(d).253 While the Eighth Circuit made the states responsible for
explicating and applying section 252(d), section 271 obligates the Commission to ascertain whether they have discharged that responsibility.
The FCC should therefore require state commissions to provide sufficient information to enable it to make that determination. At a minimum,
a state commission should specify what forward-looking, pricing princiDepartment of Justice has pointed out that "there are a variety of forward-looking cost
methodologies that are consistent with the statutory requirements." Evaluation of the U.S.
Dep't of Justice, of the Application of BellSouth Corp. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in S.C. in CC Dkt. No. 97-208, at 36 (Nov. 4, 1997) [hereinafter DOJSouth
CarolinaEvaluation].See also Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499,
para. 636, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 ("While many commenters agree that the proper economic cost standard for interconnection and unbundled elements is one based on forwardlooking [long-run incremental cost], the record indicates a lack of consensus on the precise
definition of such a methodology."). Where there is such uncertainty about the correct
pricing methodology to employ, there is cause to question the wisdom of mandating a single methodology nationwide.
More importantly, there are substantial differences among the states in terms of market
conditions, network topologies, cost characteristics, and pricing structures. Given these circumstances, a "one size fits all" approach to pricing interconnection, UNEs, and services for
resale could cause significant dislocations for incumbent firms and the customers they
serve. Affording states some latitude in selecting a procompetitive pricing methodology
could help them minimize the potential for such dislocations and, thereby, chart a smoother
course toward more local competition.
250. State Regulators Say Appeal Court Decision Won't Hurt Competition, COMM.
DAILY, July 22, 1997, at 1.
251. BellSouth Louisiana Brief,supra note 128, at 42 (State commission's "pricing determinations are conclusive with respect to particular rate levels.").
252. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(3).
253. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), (xiv).
254. See DOJSouth CarolinaEvaluation,supranote 249, at 36.
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ples it employed and should explain how those principles comport with the
language of section 252 and the procompetitive aims of the 1996 Act.25
The state commission should also detail the process by which it transformed the chosen pricing principles into the prices established. That discussion would include a description of the pricing methodology used, the
cost studies reviewed, and the state commission's resolution of the evidence before it. If such information is lacking, the FCC should dismiss the
associated BOC interLATA application as not in compliance with the requirements of section 271.
In the absence of uniform national pricing rules, there is a possibility
that some state commissions might exercise their pricing authority to protect their incumbent LECs, rather than to promote competition. 6 The

Commission can guard against such "rogue" state action without issuing
national pricing rules that may undermine the cooperation among federal
and state regulators that is essential to effective implementation of the

1996 Act or that spark complaints-whether credible or not--that the
Commission is ignoring the mandate of a federal court.Z7 As discussed
255. See BellSouth Order, CC Dkt. No. 97-208, 1997 WL 799081 (Dec. 24, 1997)
(separate statement of Commissioner Susan Ness) (offering to endorse state pricing decisions based on a "'reasoned application of an appropriate methodology' (quoting the DOJ
South CarolinaEvaluation,supra note 249).
256. See NARUC, States Impose Tues. Deadline for Resolving JurisdictionalDispute,
COMM. DAILY, Sept. 16, 1997, at 2 (staff member of one FCC Commissioner quoted as
asking "what [happens] if a state doesn't get it right" on pricing). That concern should not
be exaggerated, however. As noted above, the vast majority of state commissions appear to
share the FCC's commitment to fostering effective local competition. Indeed, some state
efforts in that direction predate both the 1996 Act and the Commission's attempts to stimulate greater local competition. See, e.g., Regulatory Policies for Segments of the Telecommunications Industry Subject to Competition, Opinion and Order, 103 PUR4th I (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1989). Furthermore, even when state legislatures have enacted legislation controlling competitive entry, the relevant state regulatory commissions have in some
cases construed those statutes so as to mitigate the potential anticompetitive effect. See, e.g.,
Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., Memorandum Opinion and Order, CC Dkt. No. 96-13 et al.,
1997 WL 603179, para. 7 (Oct. 1, 1997) [hereinafter Texas Order] (Commission opted not
to preempt certain portions of the Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1995 because the
Texas Public Utility Commission "has interpreted or applied the specific provision in a
manner that avoids or minimizes conflict with" the 1996 Act).
257. In the Ameritech Order,the Commission suggested the nationwide, TELRIC-based
pricing of interconnection and UNEs was necessary to ensure that "prices for these inputs
be set at levels that encourage efficient market entry." Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 267, para. 289 (1997). Promoting efficient entry is not a simple task, however. For
example, if TELRIC pricing of UNEs produce rates that are artificially low (e.g., those that
do not recover the true economic costs of providing such facilities), see supra note 234, it
may induce competitors to enter by purchasing UNEs, rather than by deploying their own
efficient network facilities. Although Congress chose not to favor any particular form of
entry (as between "pure" facilities-based, use of UNEs, or resale), see Ameritech Order, 9
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 387; UniversalServ. Report and Order, 12 FCC Red. 8776,
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below, in determining whether grant of a BOC's interLATA application
will serve the public interest, the Commission should consider whether the

state implicated by that application has taken all necessary steps to permit
competitive entry in that jurisdiction.2 The FCC could allow state commissions to adopt their own rules for pricing interconnection, UNEs, and
services for resale which, in most instances, would result in practices that
reflect the principles that the Commission has advocated. If, however, a

state should adopt pricing standards that diverge significantly from those
implemented in other jurisdictions, the FCC could reasonably conclude
that the offending state was not discharging its obligation to promote competition and, thus, deny any BOC application to offer interLATA service

within that jurisdiction.
B.

The "PublicInterest" Requirement

Section 271(d)(3)(C) of the 1996 Act states that the Commission may
not grant a BOC's interLATA application unless the Commission deter-

mines that "the requested authorization is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity."'

9 This

"public interest" requirement was

taken from the Senate bill, but its inclusion in Senate Bill 652 was the
subject of extensive and contentious debate on the Senate floor.260 Senator
McCain offered an amendment to strip the public interest standard from

the bill, portraying it as "an ill-defined, arbitrary standard which implies
'261
He also contended
almost limitless policymaking authority to the FCC."
para. 163, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997), there is an important difference between
them. Although entry via UNEs and resale can increase local competition, both modes of
entry require substantial regulatory oversight to ensure that the rates LECs charge for such
services are reasonable. "Pure" facilities-based entry, also promotes competition, but does
not require the same government scrutiny of the LECs' practices, because the new entrant is
less dependent on LEC facilities and services. Furthermore, substantial facilities-based entry
can exert a disciplining effect on LEC rates for resale and UNEs that could reduce, if not
eliminate, the need for regulators to monitor LEC rates for the latter offerings. In this way,
pricing rules that foster efficient facilities-based local entry may be the best way to further
the procompetitive and deregulatory goals of the 1996 Act.
258. See infranotes 286-96 and accompanying text.
259. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(d)(3)(C), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(d)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1997). Senator Hollings, a prominent supporter of the 1996 Act
and the ranking minority member of the Senate Commerce Committee, stated, "The public
interest test is fundamental to my support for the legislation." S. REP. No. 104-23, at 68
(1995) (additional views of Sen. Hollings).
260. The Conference Report and the February 1, 1996 congressional debates on the final
bill, did not address the public interest test in any detail. The House bill did not contain any
public interest language. Consequently, Congress's intentions concerning the meaning and
purpose of the public interest standard must be gleaned from deliberations in the Senate.
261. 141 CONG. REC. 57960 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. McCain); see
also id. at S7970 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Packwood) (The public interest
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that its inclusion in Senate Bill 652 would "inviteo virtually endless litigation over whether [BOC interLATA] entry is in the public interest" and
would tempt existing interLATA service providers "to use regulatory
processes to protect their market."26
After spirited debate, the Senate defeated the McCain amendment by

a vote of sixty-eight to thirty-one. Most members appeared to be persuaded
by Senator Pressler and others that the public interest test was not a license

for the Commission to commit mischief, but had been construed enough
times by enough courts over the preceding six decades to give the crucial

phrase--"public convenience, interest, and necessity"-a specificity that
the words themselves may not convey."'

In fact, courts have ruled the public interest standard "not to be too
indefinite for fair enforcement,"' but should be applied "so as to secure
for the public the broad aims of the Communications Act [of 1934].26
One statement of those aims can be found in section 1 of the 1934 Act: "to

make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States...
a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges ... ,,266
More
immediately relevant to an understanding of section 271(d)(3) is the statement of purpose in the preamble to the 1996 Act: "[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher qual-

ity services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage
the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. 267 Thus,

test is "amorphous" and "is anything the [FCC] wants it to be."); id. at S7966 (daily ed.
June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bums) ("Public interest is kind of like art or beauty; It is in
the eye of the beholder."); id. at S7964 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Craig)
(The FCC has "open field to interpret the public interest any way it wishes.").
262. Id. at S7955 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. McCain) (quoting letter
from Citizens for a Sound Economy).
263. See id. at S7970 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kerrey) (The Supreme
Court understands the intent of the public interest standard "with a lot more clarity than
meets the eye ....
"); id. at 57966 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler)
("The Communications Act specifies in some detail the kinds of regulatory tasks authorized
or required under the act.").
264. FCC v. RCA Comm., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953).
265. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 858 (5th Cir. 1971); accord Western Union Div., Commercial Telegraphers' Union v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 324, 335
(D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
266. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (although amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
relevant language of 47 U.S.C. § 151 was retained).
267. This objective is stated in the preamble of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, pmbl. (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West
Supp. 1997)). A statement of congressional purpose or declaration of policy set out in the
preamble of a statute can provide a sound basis for ascertaining the goals of the statute. See
Fort Worth & Denver Ry. v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 121, 124 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1981);
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although the Commission's public interest examination is wide-ranging, it
is not unconstrained. Further, while competitive issues are at the forefront

of that examination, other values must also be considered and safeguarded.
1.

Promoting Competition

Because Congress designated the advancement of competition as one
of the main objectives of the 1996 Act, 6'the public interest review of a
BOC's application to provide in-region, interLATA services must consider
the potential effects of BOC entry on competition. That, of course,
prompts the question of which markets should be the focus of that competitive analysis. The weight of the evidence indicates that Congress was

concerned principally with the market for local telecommunications services, rather than that for interLATA services.
During the House debate on House Bill 1555, Representative Fields,

a sponsor of that bill, stated that "central to competition to the consumer in
this legislation is opening the local telephone network to competition."26 9 It
is not surprising, therefore, that Congress decided to condition BOC entry
into new markets-including interLATA services--on
• 270 the release of their
stranglehold over local exchange telephone services.

In part, the linking

Globe Fur Dyeing Corp. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 177, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 409-10
(1967) (The Court looked to the preamble of the Interstate Commerce Act to determine the
scope of powers that Congress intended to give to the Interstate Commerce Commission.).
268. Competition was always a relevant factor in weighing the public interest under the
Communications Act of 1934. See, e.g., RCA Comm., Inc., 346 U.S. at 94.
269. 141 CoNG. REC. H8284 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields); id. at
H8464 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields) ("Central to opening up telecommunications to competition is to open the loop correctly and as quickly as possible.").
270. See, e.g., 142 CoNG. REc. E204 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Forbes) (delivered Feb. 1, 1996) ("[B]efore any [BOC] enters the long-distance market,
there must be competition in its local market."); id. at 5688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Hollings) (BOCs "should not be permitted to enter the long-distance
market while they retain a monopoly over local telephone service."); id.at HI 176 (daily ed.
Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("The bill allows the [BOCs] to enter the
long-distance market as soon as there is actual competition in the local market."); id. at
HI 169 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Markey) (The bill "breaks down the last
vestiges of monopoly control over local telephone service as a condition of Bell entry into
new business opportunities."); id. at Hi152 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Hastert) ("Fair competition means [BOCs] will not be able to provide long-distance service
in the region where they have held a monopoly until several conditions have been met to
break that monopoly."); 141 CoNG. REc. H8459 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Boucher) (The bill "establishes fair terms and conditions that will assure that the [BOCs]
open their local telephone networks before they are permitted to enter into the long distance
and equipment markets."); id. at H8458 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bunning) (The FCC "should not allow the [BOCs] into the long-distance market until there is
real competition in the local business and residential markets."); id. at H8282 (daily ed.
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of local exchange competition and BOC interLATA entry was intended to

prevent the BOCs from leveraging their local monopolies to impede competition or to gain an unfair advantage in other markets. 271 Just as importantly, however, Congress viewed and used interLATA entry as a "carrot"
to induce the BOCs to become active participants in the effort to foster local competition. As one Senator put it: "Complete elimination of barriers
to competition will occur only if the [BOCs] have positive incentives to

cooperate with the introduction of meaningful competition.
Thus, if section 271 is a door for the BOCs between the local and the
interLATA markets, Congress intended that door to swing inward-so that
Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley) ("Once the [BOCs] open the local exchange networks to competition, [they] are free to compete in the long distance and manufacturing
markets."); id. at S8224 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchison) (The FCC
"knows when there is competition at the local level so that [BOCs] can go into long distance."); id. at S8153 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Breaux) ("[BOCs] may
provide long distance service if, first, they.., allow the long distance companies to provide
local service.").
The foregoing should lay to rest the canard that Congress opted for simultaneous or
symmetric entry by the BOCs and IXCs into each other's markets. See SBC Oklahoma
Brief, supra note 66, at 13 (quoting Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of
Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, FirstReport and
Orderand FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, I1 FCC Rcd. 21,905, para. 8, 5 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 696 (1996)). Both the language and legislative history indicate that, in most
instances, local entry by IXCs and other competitors would precede BOC provision of interLATA services. In the words of one Congressman, "It will take time for the [BOCs] to
satisfy all of the conditions in the bill. This built-in delay will provide the long distance and
cable companies a head start into the local exchange." 141 CONG. REc. H8465 (daily ed.
Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte); see also BellSouth Order, CC Dkt. No. 97208, 1997 WL 7990981, para. 9 (Dec. 24, 1997) ("Congress set up a framework that requires BOCs to demonstrate that their local markets are open to competition before they are
permitted to enter the in-region long distance market.") (emphasis added).
271. See Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 388 (1997).
272. 141 CONG. REc. S8464 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan); see
also id. at H8465 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (The bill's conditioning of BOC interLATA entry on the presence of local competition "is a strong incentive
for [BOCs] to comply with the requirements of this legislation."); id. at H8282 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley) ("[T]he key to this bill is the creation of an incentive for the current monopolies to open their markets to competition.").
In its review of SBC's compliance with the competitive checklist, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission reversed the incentive structure established by the 1996 Act. It saw
SBC's entry into the interLATA market as the means of increasing new competitors' incentives to enter the local exchange market. See SBC Oklahoma Reply, supra note 101, at ii
(The state commission found that SBC's interLATA entry "is the best way to induce potential local providers to enter the local market in Oklahoma."); see also BellSouth South
CarolinaBrief,supra note 95, at 8 (quoting Entry of BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. into InterLATA Toll Market, Order, at 19 (Dkt. No. 97-101) (Order No. 97-640) (SCPSC July 31,
1997), that BellSouth's interLATA entry could speed up local competition considerably and
would "create real incentives for the major [long-distance companies] to enter the local
market rapidly").
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competing firms can enter the local exchange market before the BOCs pass
through to exploit market opportunities on the other side. Accordingly, in
conducting its public interest analysis of a BOC's application to provide
interLATA services, the Commission should focus on the status of competition in the local exchange market and, in particular, on the BOCs' continuing incentives after interLATA entry to provide meaningful opportunities for competitive entry in the local market.273
Although Congress put local competition issues at the center of the
public interest examination, it gave little guidance as to the substantive
standards that the Commission should use in making its determinationwith two notable exceptions. First, the Commission may not construe the
public interest standard to require that a minimum level of local competition exists before a BOC's interLATA application may be granted. 4 As
noted above, at least three separate attempts to establish a market share test
for local competition were defeated during the congressional debates on
telecommunications reform legislation. 275 One cannot assume that Congress, having repeatedly and explicitly rejected efforts to add such a test to
the pending legislation, subsequently decided sub silentio to include it
within the public interest test.2 6
Second, Congress did not, as BellSouth suggests, make compliance
with the competitive checklist "the exclusive test for the sufficiency of lo273. In this regard, the Commission has recognized that "incumbent LECs have no economic incentive, independent of the incentives set forth in sections 271 and 274
[concerning BOC provision of electronic publishing] of the 1996 Act, to provide potential
competitors with opportunities to interconnect with and make use of the incumbent LEC's
network and services." Local Competition Report and Order, I1 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para.
55, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996). Significantly, GTE has steadfastly opposed all efforts
to foster competition in its local markets. Ameritech's Chief Executive Officer, Richard
Notebaert, has offered one reason why: "[T]hey're already in long distance. What's their
incentive to cooperate?" Mike Mills, Holding the Line on Phone Rivalry; GTE Keeps Potential Competitors,Regulators' Price Guidelines at Bay, WASH. PosT, Oct. 23, 1996, at
C14.
274. The Commission has recognized that fact. See Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 267, para. 391 ("[W]e do not construe the 1996 Act to require that a BOC lose a specific percentage of its market share, or that there be competitive entry in different regions, at
different scales, or through different arrangements, before we would conclude that BOC
entry is consistent with the public interest.").
275. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
276. "'Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition
that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language."' Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). But see
141 CONG. REc. S7964 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Craig) (The Commission
could "decide that a market share test is required before [BOC] entry into long distance on
the grounds that the test is in the public interest.").
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cal competition under section 271 .,,277 To the contrary, the Senate debate

reveals that many members doubted the adequacy of checklist compliance
as an indicator of local competition. Senator Kerrey expressed his reserva-

tions when he rose in opposition to the McCain amendment: "This checklist, such as it is, I do not know if the checklist is going to work. 278 Other
Senators aired similar qualms during the lengthy discussion of amend-

ments by Senators Thurmond and Dorgan to give the DOJ a larger role in
reviewing BOC interLATA applications. Senator Thurmond saw a need

for greater DOJ involvement because he was "not confident that this
checklist will be adequate to take the place of thorough antitrust analysis,"
also noting that "the checklist does not require that anyone actually compete with the local exchange monopoly. '279 Senator Leahy expressed similar doubts: "But what if [the checklist] does not work? What if the checklist is not long enough to ensure that the local
' 280monopoly power of the

[BOCs] is broken and competition can develop?

A floor statement by Senator Gorton indicates that the Senate Commerce Committee, from which Senate Bill 652 emerged, was aware of the
limitations of the checklist and took corrective measures:
[W]hat [Senate Bill 652] does is to set up a set of 14 reasonably
objective conditions that must be met by the [BOCs] to open up their

local exchange before they could get into the long distance business
and provide competition and, one hopes, lower prices.
The committee was not absolutely satisfied... that the simple
mechanical meeting of those 14 conditions would, under all circumstances, be sufficient to open up the local exchange.
277. Reply Comments of BellSouth Corp., in Support of the Application of SBC Comm.,
Inc. et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121, at 8-9

(May 27, 1997) [hereinafter BellSouth Oklahoma Reply]. BellSouth's argument did not
necessarily expire with the Senate's rejection of the McCain amendment, which would have
deemed the public interest test satisfied by a BOC's compliance with the competitive
checklist. See 141 CONG. REc. S7960 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (text of the McCain amendment). One could argue that most Senators agreed that checklist compliance resolved the
competitive questions presented by a BOC interLATA application, but voted to retain the
public interest standard so that the Commission could consider and resolve other, noncompetition-related issues.
278. 141 CONG. REc. S7970 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
279. Id. at S8005 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
280. Id. at S8141 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also id. at
S8470 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("This checklist does not require that competition actually exist in local markets dominated by the [BOCs] before they
are able to use their substantial market power to enter long distance markets."); id. at S8464
(statement of Sen. Dorgan) ("A series of specified steps-for example, the competitive
check list.., is not by itself sufficient to bring real competition to local markets."); id. at
S8164-S8165 (statement of Sen. Kerrey) ("Does [the checklist] mean I have competitive
choice at the local level?... Well, I do not know if this 14-point checklist gets that job
done?").
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So it added the public interest convenience and necessity condition, requiring the [Commission]... the Government entity and
agency with expertise in this field, to determine in the broadest possible sense that the requested authorization was consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.f
Senator Gorton also explicitly linked members' concerns about the adequacy of the checklist with the defeat of the McCain amendment:
Just last week,... in balancing this bill, we turned down an
amendment which would have stricken [the public interest standard].
We did not feel, a majority of the Members did not feel, any more than
a majority in the committee felt, that we could absolutely under all circumstances rely on the 14 categories.8
Thus, on the crucial question of whether local competition is sufficient to warrant granting a BOC's interLATA application, the Senate
meant for the Commission's public interest analysis to supplement check283
list compliance. In the words of Senator Stevens, "We want to make sure
that the checklist is met at a minimum and the public interest provision
comes in at that point."2 There is nothing in the conference report or in
the congressional debate on the conference agreement that suggests that
Congress rejected the Senate's view of the respective roles of the checklist
and the public interest test in the local competition analysis.
If checklist compliance alone is not sufficient to support a finding
that there is enough local competition to permit BOC interLATA entry,
what more is required? Since Congress rejected a quantitative testhowever meager-for sufficient local competition, the Commission must
make a qualitative assessment. The Commission's task of course, is to de285
termine whether the local exchange market is truly open to competition,
or whether the BOCs' historical monopoly in that market has been brothat the door to
ken.2 6 In other words, the Commission must find evidence
the local exchange market place swings inward freely and easily for new
281. Id. at S8165 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton). Senator Gorton
was not only a member of the Commerce Committee; the principal sponsor of the bill,
Senator Pressler, described him as "key in moving this bill forward," Id. at S8450. As such,
Senator Gorton's understanding of the committee's actions and the reasons therefore should
be accorded weight in determining what the committee intended.
282. Id. at S8166 (daily ed. June 12, 1995).
283. The Commission has reached this same conclusion. SeenAmeritech Order, 9 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 267, paras. 389-90 (1997).
284. 141 CONG. REC. S8321 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Stevens); see
also S. REP.No. 104-23, at 43 (1995) ("[The] Committee intends the competitive checklist
to set forth what must, at a minimum, be provided by a [BOC] ...before the FCC may
authorize the [BOC] to provide in region interLATA services.").
285. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hollings); 141 CONG. REC. H8282 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
286. See 142 CONG. REC.HI 152 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hastert).
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entrants. Only if it finds such evidence can the Commission conclude that
the fledgling local competition that has appeared to date is not a "false
spring," but a harbinger of extensive and lasting market changes to come.
a.

Eliminationof Barriersto Entry

One essential feature of an open market is an absence of legal barriers to entry by new competitors. The need to remove such barriers is especially important in local exchange markets because "[f]or decades, U.S.
telecommunications policy has relied on heavily regulated monopolies to
provide communications services to businesses and consumers., 287 Although the Commission and many state regulators have moved in recent
years to reduce or to remove legal barriers to competitive entry in local
and other telecommunications markets, that process is far from complete.
Realizing the persistence of such impediments to expanded competition, Congress in the 1996 Act specifically outlawed any "State or local
statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, [that] may
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide
any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."2 That provision
is not self-enforcing, however. Consequently, even plainly anticompetitive
state and local restrictions can remain in force until they are preempted by
the Commission or, in some instances, overturned by a federal district
court. 219 Furthermore, the 1996 Act permits states to impose, "on a competitively neutral basis... requirements necessary to preserve and advance
universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of
consumers." 290 In short, although a central purpose of the 1996 Act is to
promote competition in all telecommunications markets, the Act did not
sweep away existing legal barriers to competitive entry.
A number of states have moved aggressively to implement local
competition. Indeed, some state initiatives predated passage of the 1996
Act by several years. Available evidence indicates, however, that in other

287. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 47 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11;
see also id. at 50, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 14-15 (LECs "are frequently protected from competition by government barriers to entry.").
288. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 253, 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a) (West
Supp. 1997).
289. Id. § 253(d). Section 253(c) preserves the rights of state and local authorities to
manage public rights-of-way and to require fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers that use those rights-of-way. Section 253(d) bars the Commission from hearing claims that nonfederal regulation of public rights-of-way violate section
253(a). Such claims must instead be litigated in federal court.
290. Id. § 253(b).
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states, old barriers persist while new barriers continually appear. Some
state laws still prohibit the provision of telecommunications by any company other than the incumbent LEC, without that carrier's consent. 29 In

1995, the Texas State Legislature enacted a telecommunications statute
that severely limits the ways in which some firms may offer competitive
local telecommunications services in the state. 212 In 1997, Arkansas enacted telecommunications legislation that bars the Arkansas Public Service
Commission from prescribing access and interconnection obligations for
LECs in excess of those set forth in the 1996 Act and the Commission's
implementing regulations.2 This was enacted despite the fact that the
1996 Act explicitly authorized state commissions to adopt additional access and interconnection obligations that do not conflict with federal requirements.294 Finally, there are increasing complaints that local governments are limiting access by new entrants to public rights-of-way or
imposing
unreasonable and discriminatory franchise obligations on those
295
firms.

Recognizing these facts, the Commission has decided that its public
interest review of a BOC's application to offer interLATA services should
include a comprehensive and independent analysis of the legal and regulatory environment in the state in which the BOC intends to operate.296
291. See, e.g., Comments of the Ass'n of Local Telecomm. Servs., to the Access Charge
Reform, Notice ofProposedRulemaking, in CC Dkt. No. 96-262, at 11-12 (Jan. 30, 1997).
292. See Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1995, TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
1446c-0, §§ 3.251, 3.2531-.2532 (West 1997). The Commission recently preempted several
provisions of the Texas statute. Texas Order, 1997 WL 603179 (1997). The Commission
declined to invalidate other challenged sections of the law because the Texas Public Utilities Commission had interpreted and applied them "so as not to conflict with section 253
and other provisions of the Communications Act ..... Id. para. 8.
293. Telecommunications Regulatory Reform Act of 1997, 1997 ARm. ACTS 77, § 9(d),
(f), (i). Petitions seeking preemption of portions of the Arkansas Act are currently pending
before the Commission. See Pleading Cycle Est. for Comments on MCI Petition Expedited
Declaratory Ruling Regarding Preemption of Ark. Telecomm. Reg. Reform Act, Public
Notice, 1997 WL 298071 (1997); Pleading Cycle Est. for Comments on ASCI Petition for
Declaratory Ruling Regarding Preemption in Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Public Notice, 12
FCC Rcd. 3765 (1997).
294. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(3). Editorializing against the Arkansas statute when it was
being considered by the state legislature, the state's largest newspaper opined that the
pending bill "could be considered environmental legislation; it seems designed to protect
the [local] phone companies' revenue stream." Hold the Phone: Why Rush Telecom Legislation?, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAzEIrE, Jan. 23, 1997, at 6B.
295. See, e.g., Comments of the Michigan Cable Telecomm. Ass'n to the Application of
Ameritech Mich. to ProvideIn-region, InterLATA Servs. in Mich. in CC Dkt. No. 97-137, at
19-26 (June 9, 1997); Reply Comments of the Competition Policy Inst., to the Application
of SBC Comm., Inc. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No 97121, at 7 (May 27, 1997) [hereinafter CPI Oklahoma Reply].
296. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 396 (1997).
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Through that assessment, the Commission should satisfy itself that the
state's laws and regulations afford new entrants maximum flexibility to
pursue and to exploit market opportunities whenever and wherever they
find them.2 It should also ensure that where states have imposed requirements designed to preserve universal service, to protect consumers or public safety, or to maintain service quality, such requirements are competitively neutral in intent and in effect, and are no broader than necessary to
achieve their stated ends.

b.

"Commercially Useful'"Availability ofAll Items in the
Competitive Checklist
Removing legal barriers to entry is just one step toward fully opening

the local exchange market to competition. There is also a need to address
the economic and technical impediments that can deter or hinder new en-

trants from offering alternative local telecommunications services. That, of
course, is the function of the access, interconnection, and resale provisions
in sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act and the competitive checklist in
section 271 (c)(2). The checklist identifies "those things that a telecommunications carrier would need from a [BOC] in order to provide a service
such as telephone exchange service or exchange access service in compe-

tition with the [BOC] .,,298 As such, the checklist "provides the formula for
removing the monopoly powers of local telephone exchange providers to

297. As noted above, the Commission should assure itself that a state's pricing policies
for interconnection, LUNEs, and resale are compatible with the goals of the 1996 Act and
consistent with the pricing principles employed by other state commissions. See supra text
accompanying notes 258-59. The Commission should also consider whether new entrants
have a fair opportunity to qualify as "eligible telecommunications carriers" (ETCs), so that
they can receive universal service support payments that will enable them to compete fully
with incumbent carriers. See CPI Oklahoma Reply, supra note 295, at 9 ("[E]ligibility for
universal service support is sometimes limited is [sic] to the incumbent local telephone
company...."). See also Telecommunications Regulatory Reform Act of 1997, 1997 ARK.
ACTS 77, § 5(b)(5), (d) (barring the Arkansas Public Service Commission from certifying
multiple ETCs in nonrural areas unless it finds that the public interest will be served
thereby; precluding the certification of a second ETC in areas served by a rural telephone
company unless the incumbent waives its "right" to be the only ETC). In its review of state
laws and regulations, the Commission intends to consider "whether a state has adopted
policies and programs that favor the incumbent, for example, those relating to universal
service." Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 396.
Of course, as the Commission points out, the best evidence of a procompetitive legal
and regulatory environment is the appearance and growth of new alternative service providers. Id. para. 391.
298. 141 CONG. REc. S8469 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler). The
1996 Act makes compliance with the interconnection, unbundling, and resale requirements
in section 251 an explicit part of the competitive checklist. See 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), (xiv).
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allow real competition in the local loop." 299
Section 271(c)(2)(B) requires the BOCs to "provide" or to "offer"
each checklist item to other telecommunications carriers. There has been
much debate and disagreement about when a BOC must "provide" the
checklist items, and when it simply may "offer" them. As noted above, a
BOC generally must provide (or supply) all of the checklist items to carriers requesting access and interconnection.? In the event that a BOC does
not receive an interconnection request, it need only offer (or hold out) each
checklist item for sale to prospective customers.
Whichever verb applies, however, the Commission has ruled that two
basic requirements must be met before it will deem a BOC to be
"providing" a particular checklist item. First, a BOC must "actually furnishol the item [to competitors] at rates and on terms and conditions that
comply with the Act or, where no competitor is actually using the
item ....[A] BOC must have a concrete and specific legal obligation to
furnish the item upon request... ."0,Second, a BOC "must demonstrate
that it is presently ready to furnish each checklist item in the quantities that
may reasonably demand and at an acceptable level of qualcompetitors
°2
'

ity. 0

The following standards should be employed, at a minimum, to determine whether a BOC is fulfilling those conditions:3 3
•
The item must be available for immediate ordering, and the competing carrier can receive it in sufficient quantities. Quantities should
generally be deemed sufficient if they enable the purchaser to satisfy
current and reasonably foreseeable demand;
"
All necessary testing of the checklist item must have been completed.
Where testing has been conducted solely by the BOC, its test results
should be subject to review by an independent entity;
"
Regulatory authorities must be substantially certain that the checklist
item will function as expected in a commercial setting;
*
The BOC's provision of the item must be at least equal in quality to
the service that it provides itself;
*
Checklist items must be made available at rates that satisfy the pric299. 141 CoNG. REC. H8289 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hastert); see
also id. at S8469 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler) (The checklist
"open[s] up the local loop from a technological standpoint as section [253] opens the local
loop from a legal barrier to entry standpoint.").
300. See supra Part II.A.3.
301. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 110 (footnote omitted).
302. Id. (footnote omitted).
303. See Illinois Hearing Examiner Says Ameritech Falls Short on InterLATA Requirements, TELECOMM. REP., Mar. 10, 1997, at 13.
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ing standards of section 252(d).
The Commission has also recognized that the competitors' ability to
provide alternative local services via interconnection, UNEs, and resale
will be "significantly impaired" if they do not have access to LECs'
"operations support systems" (OSS). 3' Accordingly, the Commission has
classified OSS as a "network element" that must be provided to competitors under section 25 1(c)(3).3" 5 It has also mandated that LECs offer competitors access to OSS functions "under the same terms and conditions that
they provide these [functions] to themselves and their customers" 3Mand in
a way that "would provide an efficient competitor with a meaningful opportunity to compete. 30 7
To determine whether a BOC's provision of OSS functions satisfies
its checklist obligation to afford nondiscriminatory access to network elements "in accordance with the requirements of section[] 25 1(c)(B), ' 3 8 the
Commission has put a finer point on these general obligations. Specifically, it will conduct a two-step inquiry:
First, the Commission must determine whether the BOC has deployed
the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to
each of the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement
and use all of the OSS functions available to them. Second, the Commission must determine whether the OSS functions that
30 9 the BOC has
deployed are operationally ready, as a practical matter.
To pass through the first stage of this evaluation, a BOC must comply
with a series of very specific requirements:
o
It must give competitors electronic access to OSS functions that the
BOC itself accesses electronically, although the BOC may offer
manual access as an alternative method of access in some instances.31 °
304. Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 522, 4 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996). The Commission has defined OSS to encompass "those systems and
databases required for pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and
billing." Id. para. 505.
305. Id. paras. 516-525. That portion of the Commission's order was upheld on appeal.
Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 808-810 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W.
3387 & 3459 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998) (No. 97-826 et al.).
306. Local Competition Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, para. 316, 4 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1.
307. Id. para. 315.
308. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271 (c)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
309. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 136 (1997).
310. Id. para. 137. Electronic access would permit, for example, a competitor to order
one or more network elements via computer-to-computer interaction with the BOC's OSS
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The BOC must provide competitors enough information so that they
may design or modify their OSS in a way that will allow them to interact seamlessly with the BOC's system.3 '
"
The BOC must disclose to competitors sufficient information
(including information relating to ordering codes and internal business rules) so that they can format, process, and transmit service requests that will flow into and
312 through the BOC's system "as quickly
possible."
as
efficiently
and
In the second stage of its evaluation, the Commission will consider
how well a BOC is meeting its access obligations with respect to OSS. The
central question, in the Commission's view, is current performance and
future readiness---"whether the OSS functions provided by the BOC to
competing carriers are actually handling current demand and will be able
to handle reasonably foreseeable demand volumes.3 M The Commission
correctly concludes that the most reliable measure of a BOC's performance is commercial usage--evidence gathered from a BOC's actual provision of OSS functions to itself or to competitors. 314 It has therefore required, for example, that where a competitor requests an OSS function that
a BOC currently employs in its retail operations, "the BOC must provide
access to competing carriers that is equal to the level of access that the
BOC provides to itself, its customers or its affiliates, in terms of quality,
accuracy and timeliness. 3 5 For those OSS functions without retail analogues, such as ordering and provision of UNEs," 6 the Commission should
require BOCs to establish specific performance measures and standards to
"

database. Under manual access, the same order would involve at least some human interaction, such as a telephone call or a facsimile transmission.
311. Id.
312. Id. "Business rules refer to the protocols that a BOC uses to ensure uniformity in
the format of orders." Id.para. 137 n.335.
313. Id. para. 138.
314. Id.; see also DOJ Oklahoma Evaluation, supra note 189, at 29-30 (In determining
whether a BOC's OSS processes can provide the necessary functionality to competitors, the
most persuasive evidence is "commercial operation."). In the event that competitors freely
choose not to use a particular OSS function, the Commission may allow a BOC to demonstrate operational readiness through "carrier-to-carrier testing, independent third-party testing, and internal testing, without commercial usage...." Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg.
(P & F) 267, par. 138. Because a BOC would have an incentive to manipulate the conduct
and results of its own tests, the Commission should consider internal testing to be the least
reliable of the three.

315. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P& F) 267, para. 139. The Commission has determined that "OSS functions associated with pre-ordering, ordering and provisioning for
resale services, and repair and maintenance for both resale services and unbundled network
elements all have retail analogues." Id.para. 140.
316. Id.para. 141.
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make certain that BOC provisioning of those functions accords with their
checklist obligations."'

c.

Ensuring ContinuingCompliance with the
Competitive Checklist

Although the Commission must be able to determine whether a BOC
is complying with the competitive checklist at the time it files its section
271 application, the BOC's future behavior is arguably more important to
the goal of fostering meaningful local competition. The market-opening
potential of the competitive checklist will be fully realized only if the
BOCs' compliance is a continuing phenomenon, rather than a temporary
course of conduct embarked upon to qualify them to provide interLATA
services. One way to ensure continued compliance would be to require that
each of the BOC's access and interconnection agreements contain specific
performance standards that can be used to track the quality of the service
that the BOCs provide their competitor-customers over time. 318
Ameritech has asserted that its interconnection agreements in Michigan "contain specific performance benchmarks and standards that ensure
that all checklist items are available to competing carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis and at parity with what Ameritech provides to its end users, its affiliates and any other competing carrier.
Those benchmarks
and standards, which in most instances have been approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission, allegedly measure Ameritech's performance in critical areas
such as service provisioning, service reliability, and
S
320
service maintenance. Ameritech then issues monthly reports that purportedly enable each of its competitor-customers "to compare Ameritech's
performance for that carrier with the specified benchmarks and with the
performance that Ameritech provides to other carriers and to itself."32
If Ameritech has described its practices accurately, they could provide a useful model for the sorts of performance standards that should be
included in each interconnection agreement and that the Commission
317. A number of parties have petitioned the Commission to initiate a rule making to
prescribe such standards. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, to Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, FCC
(Aug. 12, 1997).
318. See Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 393 ("[P]erformance
monitoring establishes a benchmark against which new entrants and regulators can measure
performance over time to detect and correct any degradation of service once a BOC is
authorized to enter the in-region, interLATA services market."); see also DOJ Oklahoma
Addendum, supra note 196, at 4-6; Ameritech Michigan Brief,supra note 141, at 30-34.
319. Ameritech Michigan Brief,supra note 141, at 30.
320. Id. at 31-33.
321. Id. at 31.

Number 2]

CREAlTNG BEfl'ER INCENTIVES

should insist upon as evidence of BOC compliance with the competitive
checklist.3 2 Requiring that all access and interconnection agreements contain effective and functional performance standards would not in any way
extend the terms of the checklist, in violation of section 271(d)(4). As
noted above, the checklist identifies the things that a BOC must provide to
permit another carrier to furnish a competing service.3 2 A performance
standard is not a "thing" to be provided, but rather a mechanism for assessing the manner in which a checklist item is provided.
The first two elements of the competitive checklist, moreover, require the BOCs to furnish competitors with interconnection and UNEs in
accordance with sections 251(c)(2) and 251(c)(3), respectively.3 24 The latter provisions mandate, among other things, that the BOCs must furnish
interconnection and network elements on just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions.3 And the Commission has concluded
that performance standards "provide[] a mechanism by which to gauge a
BOC's present compliance with its obligation to provide access and interconnection to new entrants in a nondiscriminatory manner."3 26
The BOCs will be more likely to adhere to their checklist obligations
and to satisfy their performance standards if the penalties for violations of
those standards and obligations are swift and certain.327 To this end, BOC
interconnection agreements should contain provisions for prompt resolution of complaints by competitor-customers (for example, binding arbitration). Alternatively, regulatory agencies could establish expedited processes for handling such complaints.32 Whichever procedures are employed
322. See Evaluation of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, of the Application ofAmeritech Mich.
to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Mich. in CC Docket No. 97-137, at 39-40 (June

25, 1997) (Although the DOJ noted "important gaps" in Ameritech's proposed performance

measures, it nonetheless "fully endorse[d] Ameritech's commitment to measuring and reporting its performance and [found] its efforts to be significant, especially because Ameritech appears to have implemented specific business policies consistent with that commit-

ment.").
323. 141 CONG. REC. S8469 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
324. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 47 U.S.C. §

271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1997).

325. Section 251(c)(2) adds the requirement that the interconnection provided must be
"at least equal in quality to that provided by the [BOC] to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which the carrier provides interconnection." Id. § 251(c)(2)(C).
326. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 393 (1997).

327. See id. para. 394 ("[A]s part of our public interest inquiry, we would want to inquire whether the BOC has agreed to private and self-executing enforcement mechanisms
that are automatically triggered by noncompliance with the applicable performance standard

without resort to lengthy regulatory or judicial intervention.").

328. The 1996 Act states that, unless the parties agree otherwise, the Commission must

act on complaints concerning BOC failures to comply with their checklist obligations
within 90 days. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(6)(B).
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to identify violations, interconnection agreements should generally provide
for automatic penalties (including credits and liquidated damages) in the
event that a violation occurs. As the Commission has pointed out, "The absence of such enforcement mechanisms could significantly delay the development of local exchange competition by forcing new entrants to engage in protracted and contentious legal proceedings to enforce their
contractual and statutory rights to obtain necessary inputs from the
[BOC]. ,329
d.

Commitment to Competition

In the 1996 Act, Congress both established the goal of promoting
competition in all telecommunications markets and provided the blueprint
for a regulatory structure that will move the country toward that end. Conscientious and forward-thinking action by federal and state regulators will
help accelerate the rate at which competition grows. The goal cannot be
reached, however, unless members of the industry work cooperatively and
in good faith to make the regulatory structure fashioned by Congress function as intended in the marketplace.330 As the dominant firms in what is
now the least competitive telecommunications market, the BOCs and other
LECs are crucial to the success of this final implementing stage of the
1996 Act.
Recognizing that fact, the Commission, in determining whether
granting a BOC's interLATA application would serve the public interest,
wisely intends to assess that BOC's commitment to promoting competition, particularly within its local exchange market.33 ' Relevant questions in
this regard might include: How has the BOC conducted itself in negotiations with prospective competitor and in arbitrations before state commissions? Has it, like GTE, attempted at every turn to minimize its marketopening obligations under the Act• or
332 has it been receptive to additional access and interconnection requests? Has the BOC worked with prospec329. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 394.
330. See id. para. 397 ("[T]he success of the market opening provisions of the 1996 Act
depends, to a large extent, on the cooperation of incumbent LECs, including the BOCs,
with new entrants and good faith compliance by such LECs with their statutory obligations.").

331. Id.
332. See Erik R. Olbeter, Competition Partnership, J. COM., Sept. 11, 1997, at 8A
(noting that GTE has filed court challenges against state arbitration decisions in 23 jurisdictions); Mills, supra note 273. Similarly, SBC's stated strategy for local competition is "'to
make our welcome mat smaller than anyone else's."' Peter Burrows, Pick of the Litter: Why
SBC Is the Baby Bell To Beat, Bus. WK., Mar. 6, 1995, at 70 (quoting J. David Gallemore,
SBC Vice-President for Marketing). Although SBC should not be condemned for a statement that would elicit nods in most corporate headquarters, it has also taken steps to put its
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tive competitors to resolve technical and operational problems expeditiously and in a mutually-acceptable manner? Although this line of inquiry
is necessarily qualitative and impressionistic, it is essential nonetheless. In

the end, a strong BOC commitment to the goals of the 1996 Act is the best
evidence that its entry into the interLATA market will not come at the ex-

pense of competition in the local exchange market.
Maintaining Service Quality and Protecting
Telephone Subscribers
Although competition issues are at the center of the public interest
analysis, some Members of Congress were concerned that competition
2.

may not always be a benevolent force. During the Senate debate on the

McCain amendment (which would effectively have stripped the public interest standard from Senate Bill 652), there was more than a little discussion about the potential adverse effects of competition for some customers
and some areas. Senator Hollings, an influential supporter of Senate Bill
652, spoke at some length about the uneven effects of competition and

market forces and linked those concerns with the need for a public interest
test.333 Later on, Senators Hollings, Rockefeller, Dorgan, and Snowe engaged in an extensive discussion of the detrimental effects of airline competition and deregulation
334 on the price and availability of air service, particularly in rural areas. The fact that this conversation occurred in the
context of the general debate on the McCain amendment suggest that those
Senators supported a public interest test to ensure that similar concerns
words into action. Thus, SBC lobbied heavily for the Texas statute that makes it more difficult for some firms to enter the local marketplace in Texas. See Mike Mills, The Bells'
FastestOperator,WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1998, at D4; Edmund L. Andrews, SBC Communications Chief Tests Deregulation'sLimits, AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 7, 1996, at DI.
Similarly, SBC pushed for passage of the Arkansas law that limits the ability of the Arkansas Public Service Commission to adopt access and interconnection requirements beyond
those prescribed by the 1996 Act and the Commission's implementing regulations. See An-

drew Moreau, Law Hogties Competition, Phone Firms Say,

ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAzEE,

Mar. 28, 1997, at IA; see also supra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
333. 141 CONG. REC. S7962-63 (daily ed. June 8, 1995).
334. Id. at S7973-74 (statements of Sen. Hollings, Sen. Rockefeller); id. at S7975-77
(statement of Sen. Dorgan); id. at S7978 (statement of Sen. Snowe); id. at S7979-80
(statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (daily ed. June 8, 1995). Senator Dorgan's remarks neatly
summarize that discussion:
Airline deregulation had at its roots the notion of let the marketplace decide who
gets air service, at what price, and what convenience in this country.
We know what has happened with airline deregulation despite all the little
statistics and charts people keep bringing to my attention. If you live in rural
America and you access airline service, you have less choice and higher prices. It
is a plain fact.
Id. at S7976 (daily ed. June 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan).
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would be addressed during the Commission's review of BOC interLATA
applications.
In the House of Representatives, the concern was the possible effects
of BOC interLATA entry on the quality of local service. Representative
Wyden addressed the issue directly: "as telephone companies enter new
fields, we must ensure current customers are not discarded and left without
basic phone needs. The drive to streamline and to downsize has subjected
local telephone customers in my region of the country [Oregon] to poor
' To alleviate that concern, he successfully offered an
customer service."335
amendment to House Bill 1555 that authorized state commissions, when
they review BOC compliance with the bill's competitive checklist, to
"establish[] or enforc[e] other requirements of State law... including requiring compliance with intrastate telecommunications service quality
standards or requirements."336 Although the Wyden amendment does not
appear in the 1996 Act, its absence does not mean that Congress rejected
his concerns about customer service after BOC interLATA entry. Section
253(b) of the 1996 Act, for example, permits states to impose competitively neutral requirements to "ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services." Members of Congress also could have assumed that
any potential adverse effects of BOC interLATA entry on service quality
could be considered as part of the Commission's public interest analysis.
In fact, the Commission has consistently considered potential adverse
effects on local telephone ratepayers and service quality in deciding
whether a carrier's actions or a particular transaction among carriers would
serve the public interest. For instance, in passing on GTE's application to
acquire Telenet, an unregulated enhanced service provider, the Commission noted that "if the [GTE] telephone companies were to lend money to
Telenet, the former's financial wellbeing and, hence, its ability to operate
could be affected by the economic health of Telenet. Thus, a bankrupt
Telenet could conceivably impair the lending telephone companies' operations ....
Consequently, the Commission attached conditions to the
merger designed, in part, "to allow Telenet as a subsidiary to obtain the
economically desirable benefits of a parent-subsidiary relationship while

335. Id. at H8287 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
336. See H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., § 101(a) (1995) (enacted), reprintedin 141 CONG.
REc. H9980 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (adding section 244(b)(1) to the Communications Act
of 1934).
337. Application of Gen. Tel. and Elecs. Corp. to Acquire Control of Telenet Corp. and
its Wholly-Owned Subsidiary Telenet Comm. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 72
F.C.C.2d 111, para. 101, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1021, modified by Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 72 F.C.C.2d 516, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1346 (1979).
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ensuring that ratepayers and competitors are protected from abuse., 338
Several years later, when the Commission reviewed the public interest implications of GTE's proposed purchase of Sprint, the Commission
again addressed the question whether GTE could finance Sprint's growth
"without adversely impacting [GTE's] ability to reasonably maintain and,
if necessary, expand its present local telephone network." 339 The Commission also acknowledged concerns that "if needed capital for local telephone operations were diverted to finance the acquisition [of Sprint] ...
the quality of [GTE's] local service would invariably suffer."3 ° In the end,
it required GTE "to operate [Sprint] separately from its local exchange operations, thereby helping to assure that funds infused into [Sprint] will not
be at the expense of the local telephone companies. 34'
When the Commission considered AT&T's application to implement
the Bell System divestiture, the Common Carrier Bureau directed AT&T
to answer a series of questions "on the impact of the divestiture upon ratepayers in terms of rates and quality of local and toll service."' 42 In responding to AT&T's objections to the scope of the Commission's public
interest review, the Commission noted that "[iln determining whether the
acquisition of a carrier's facilities or a transfer is in the public interest the
Commission has considered a broad range of factors," including "the impact on the ratepayers of the carriers involved" and "whether services
would continue to be available to the public in a satisfactory manner." 3
Although the Commission eventually concluded that "any service problems that may arise from the divestiture can be handled adequately by the
concerted efforts of all carriers," it nonetheless conditioned its grant of
AT&T's application on a commitment from AT&T and the BOCs to file
periodic service reports. 3"
In short, the public interest standard gives the Commission ample
authority to consider and, if necessary, to rectify potential harms to local
service quality and local ratepayers resulting from the BOC's provision of

338. Id. pam. 135.
339. Application of GTE Corp. and S. Pac. Co. for Consent to Transfer Control of S.
Pac. Comm. Co. and S. Pac. Satellite Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order,94 F.C.C.2d
235, para. 25, 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 161 (1983) (footnote omitted).
340. Id.
341. Id. para. 29.
342. Consolidated Application of Am. Tel. and Tel. Co. and Specified Bell Sys. Cos. for
Authorization under Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Comm. Act of 1934, Memorandum
Opinionand Order,96 F.C.C.2d 18, para. 54, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 435 (1983).
343. Id. para. 68 (footnotes omitted).
344. Id. para. 176 (condition 11).
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interLATA services.1 The legislative history discussed above suggests
that Congress wanted the Commission to conduct just such an inquiry.
Furthermore, to the extent that state commissions are concerned about
BOC interLATA entry on local service, section 253(b) of the 1996 Act
would seem to authorize them to condition their certification of a BOC's
compliance with the competitive checklist on the BOC's acceptance of
reasonable and competitively neutral service standards.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Section 271(d) delineates the procedural framework governing the
Commission's evaluation and disposition of BOC interLATA applications.
It fixes the time frame within which the Commission must act, identifies
the government agencies with which it must consult, and adumbrates the
sort of order the Commission must issue. As was the case with section
271(c), however, the statutory text does not furnish definitive answers to a
number of important questions-notably, the scope and effect of the
Commission's consultation with the DOJ and state commissions and the
scope of review.
A.

Consultationwith State Regulatory Commissions

Section 271(d)(2)(B) provides that before the Commission may act
on a BOC's interLATA application, it "shall consult with the State commission of any State that is the subject of the application in order to verify
the compliance of the [BOC] with the requirements of subsection (c)."4 It
347
cannot be said that the state commission's task is limited to factfinding;
in order to assess whether a BOC has complied with "the requirements of
section (c)," the state commission must form some opinion of the legal
standards that must be satisfied. At the same time, and in sharp contrast to
the Act's provision concerning the FCC's consultation with the DOJ, section 271(d)(2)(B) does not require the FCC to accord any weight to the
345. The Commission could, of course, determine (as in the cases cited) that any potential problems could be addressed adequately by conditioning, rather than denying, a BOC's
application.
346. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(d)(2)(B), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1997). Because the statute refers to the requirements of section
(c), the federal-state consultation must address both checklist issues (subsection (c)(2)) and
the facilities-based competitor requirement (subsection (c)(1)). Thus, the Commission erred
when it concluded that the checklist "is the one subject on which the Commission is required to consult with the state commissions." Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
267, para. 34 (1997).
347. See Reply Comments of Sprint Comm. Co., to the Application of SBC Comm., Inc.
et al. to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97-121, at 3 (May
27, 1997) ("The specific task set out for the states is one of factfinding.").
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state commission's findings, whether factual or legal. The FCC must consult with the state commission "in order to verify" the BOC's compliance
with section (c). Although the state commission advises, however, the task
of verification is plainly the Commission's alone. In allocating decisionmaking authority in this fashion, Congress abandoned the approach taken
by the House of Representatives in House Bill 1555, which charged state
commissions with certifying a BOC's compliance with the competitive
checklist and made the state's findings binding on the Commission in most
instances.34
Although section 271(d) does not oblige the Commission to defer to a
state commission's findings of fact, sound administrative practice and federal-state comity counsel against relegating states to a purely advisory role.
Given the tight timetable that the Act establishes for considering a BOC's
application, and the likelihood that there will be multiple applications
pending before the Commission at any one time, the Commission may be
hard pressed to resolve the myriad factual issues raised by the typical BOC
application within the brief time allowed if it does not take advantage of
the resources and expertise of state commissions. Additionally, because
state commissions will be more familiar than the Commission with local
competitive conditions and will have reviewed and, in many instances, arbitrated interconnection agreements between a BOC and potential competitors, state commissions should be well positioned to assist the Commission in determining
whether a BOC has complied with its obligations
34
271(c).
section
under
For these reasons, in determining whether a BOC has satisfied the requirements of section 271(c), the Commission should respect the factual
findings
of the state commissions with which it is legally obligated to con350
sult. A reasonable approach would be for the Commission to accord state
348. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., § 101(a) (1995), reprintedin 141 CONG. REc. H9980-81
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (adding sections 245(b)(1) and 245(c)(1), (2) to the Communications Act of 1934). Under the House bill, the Commission could conduct a de novo review
of the state commission's certification "only if a State commission lacks, under relevant
State law, the jurisdiction or authority to make the required certification, fails to act within
ninety (90) days of receiving a BOC request for certification, or has attempted to impose a
term or condition that exceeds its authority." H.R1 REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 78 (1995),
reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 44.
The Senate bill did not create any role for the states in the Commission's review of a
BOC's interLATA applications. See S. 652, 104th Cong., § 221(a) (1995) (enacted), reprinted in 141 CoNG. REc. H9966 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (adding section 255(c) to the
Communications Act of 1934).
349. See SBC Oklahoma Reply, supranote 101, at ii-iii.
350. There is less reason for the Commission to defer to a state commission's views on
the legal requirements of section 271 (c). The Commission is arguably under no legal obligation to do so. Cf. Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495 (9th Cir. 1997)
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commissions the same degree of deference that federal courts must give to

the factual findings of state administrative agencies. The Supreme Court
has articulated that standard as follows:
[w]hen a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an

adequate opportunity to litigate," federal courts must give the agency's
factfinding the same
35 1 preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in
the State's courts.

The Court has also stated that the suitability of "administrative estoppel"
may vary from case to case "according to the specific context of the rights
at stake, the power of the agency, and the relative adequacy of agency procedures. ,352
Thus, before deferring to the factual determinations of a state commission, the FCC should satisfy itself that (1) the state commission has the
authority to act, (2) the procedures employed by the state commission to
"resolve disputed issues of fact" have given interested parties "an adequate
opportunity to litigate" their claims, and (3) state courts would be bound to
accept the facts as found by the state commission. With respect to the
(Federal courts do not need to afford state agency's interpretation of a federal statute the
same deference that courts must give to construction of the same law by the federal administrative agency charged with its implementation and enforcement.); accord AMISUB
(PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dept. of Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 795-96 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990); Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1989).
Further, while state commissions can contribute much to the FCC's assessment of the
factual questions presented by section 271 applications, they have no special expertise concerning the interpretation of a federal statute. Finally, whereas the same factual issues (for
example, checklist compliance) will tend to recur with each BOC application (because the
underlying facts themselves will generally differ), the doctrine of stare decisis will ensure
that the same will not be true of legal questions. As a result, legal issues should not impose
the sort of demands on the Commission's time and resources that militate in favor of close
federal-state cooperation to resolve factual questions.
The Commission should also not be bound in any respect by a state commission's conclusions as to whether granting a BOC's application will or will not be in the public interest. As noted, section 271(d)(2) only mandates federal-state consultations concerning the
requirements of section (c). The public interest test is contained in section 271 (d)(3).
351. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (quoting United States v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394,422 (1966)).
352. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110 (1991).
353. The Commission has decided to adopt a variant of this approach, which links the
degree of deference afforded to the factfinding procedures that a state commission employs:
The Commission, therefore, has discretion in each section 271 proceeding to determine what deference the Commission should accord to the state commission's
verification in light of the nature and extent of state proceedings to develop a
complete record concerning the applicant's compliance with section 271 and the
status of local competition. We will consider carefully state determinations of fact
that are supported by a detailed and extensive record, and believe the development of such a record to be of great importance to our review of section 271 applications.
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second requirement, the obligation to "actl in a judicial capacity" suggests

that a state commission must, at a minimum, conduct an adjudicatory
hearing. Moreover, the case law indicates that such a hearing should also
include rigorous procedural safeguards to ensure that each party has an opportunity to make its case.354
A fair process may not guarantee a reasonable decision on the merits,
however. Procedures that allow the contending parties to present their

cases fairly and completely will amount to nothing if the decisionmaker
selectively reviews evidence gathered to substantiate a predetermined out-

come, whether for or against the petitioning BOC. In this regard, opponents of BellSouth's interLATA application for South Carolina alleged
that the state commission adopted almost without change a proposed order
submitted by BellSouth and ignored evidence unfavorable to BellSouth's
application."' If those assertions are true, the state commission's order
merits little, if any, deference. As a general rule, the FCC should not give

weight to a state commission's decision concerning a section 271 application unless the FCC assures itself that the state agency not only employed
procedures that permit full discussion of the underlying issues, but also
conducted a searching and independent examination of the record developed.

Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 30 (1997).
354. See, e.g., Plough v. West Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 512, 515 n.8
(8th Cir. 1995) (Administrative estoppel applied when agency conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing that was adversarial and adjudicative in nature and that allowed parties to call
witnesses, to testify under oath, and to cross-examine.); Kleenwell Biohazard Waste and
Gen. Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 394-395 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Administrative estoppel applied to factual findings of Washington regulatory commission
after it held an adjudicatory hearing in accordance with the state's Administrative Procedure
Act; gave proper notice and opportunity to be heard; accepted briefs and exhibits; allowed
both direct and cross-examination; and heard evidentiary objections.).
If multiple state agencies should consider a particular BOC application, the amount of
deference that the Commission affords to their factual findings should depend on the degree
of agreement as to the facts found and the conclusions to be drawn from those facts. In
Oklahoma, although the state commission decided by a 2-1 vote that SBC had satisfied the
competitive checklist, the Administrative Law Judge who held hearings on SBC's applications concluded otherwise. See Comments of the Okla. Corp. Comm'n, to the Application of
SBC Comm. Inc., et al. to Provide In-Region InterLATA Servs. in Okla. in CC Dkt. No. 97121, at 3 (May 1, 1997). Indeed, of the Oklahoma officials that considered SBC's application, the two-man majority of the Corporation Commission appears to have been alone in its
conclusion that SBC had satisfied the checklist. DOJ Oklahoma Evaluation, supra note
189, at 25-26.
355. See, e.g., Comments of AT&T Corp., to the Application of BellSouth Corp. et al. to
Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in S.C. in CC Dkt. No. 97-208, at 47-48 (Oct.
20,1997); Comments of MCI Telecomm. Corp., to the Applicationof BellSouth Corp. et al.
to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Servs. in S.C. in CC Dkt. No. 97-208, at 9-10 (Oct. 20,
1997).
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Consultationwith the DOJ

Section 271(d)(2)(A) of the Act requires the Commission to notify
the Attorney General of any BOC interLATA application, to consult with
the Attorney General about that application, and to include any DOJ comments in the Commission's record of its decision. The Act also directs the
DOJ to provide the Commission with "an evaluation of the [BOC's] application using any standard the Attorney General considers appropriate.
Finally, the Commission must give substantial weight, though not preclusive effect to the DOJ's evaluation.
1.

Scope of DOJ Review

The question of the DOJ's proper role in the Commission's review of
a BOC interLATA application pervaded the congressional debates over
telecommunications reform legislation. The language of section
271(d)(2)(A) represents the culmination of repeated and bipartisan efforts
by many Members of Congress to increase the DOJ's role beyond that
contemplated in either Senate Bill 652 or House Bill 1555. That language
demonstrates that they were at least partially successful. On its face, section 271(d)(2)(A) identifies an important and expansive role for the DOJ in
the Commission's review of a BOC's application.
BOCs, however, contend that the DOJ's participation is circumscribed in important respects. BellSouth claims, for example, that the
DOJ's role "is limited to an analysis of the competitive impact of BOC
entry into the in-region, interLATA market., 357 The Commission properly
rejected that argument. 358 As BellSouth concedes, Congress intended the
DOJ to conduct a "'substantial competition-oriented analysis' of a BOC's
interLATA application.359 There is nothing in the text of the Act or in the
legislative history to suggest that the DO's examination must be limited
to the interLATA market. As discussed above, Congress was principally
concerned about the effects of BOC interLATA entry on the introduction
and growth of competition in local--as opposed to interLATAmarkets. 361 It is therefore difficult to believe that Congress would then have
excluded local markets from the DOJ's competition analysis.
The legislative history confirms that Congress did not so restrict the
356. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(d)(2)(B), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271 (d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
357. BellSouth Oklahoma Reply, supra note 277, at 2.
358. Ameritech Order,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, para. 37.
359. BellSouth Oklahoma Reply, supra note 277, at 2 n.1 (quoting with approval DOJ
Oklahoma Evaluation,supra note 189, at 39 n.46).
360. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
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DOJ's review. During the debate on the conference agreement, Senator

Dorgan noted that "[tihere will now be a strong role for the Justice Department in evaluating competition in local exchanges before allowing the
[BOCs] to go out and compete in long distance service." '' Senator Kerrey
stated that approval of a BOC's interLATA application: "requires an FCC
finding that such entry is in the public interest, and that a facilities-based
competitor is present. On both of these issues, the DOJ's expertise in telecommunications and competitive issues generally should be of great value

to the FCC."3 62 In contrast, there is nothing in the legislative history to
support BellSouth's claim that the DOJ may only consider effects of BOC
entry on interLATA markets.363
Both BellSouth and SBC allege that Congress restricted the DOJ's

participation in the Commission's review of BOC application to consideration of antitrust issues.364 As a result, they conclude that the DOJ has
nothing to contribute to the question of whether a BOC has complied with
the competitive checklist.16' But, as the Commission determined, it is not at
all clear that Congress confined the DOJ to an antitrust review of BOC applications. 366 Although one can easily cull statements to that effect from the
361. 142 CONG. REC. S690 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dorgan).
362. Id. at S698 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
363. The statements that BellSouth cites indicate only that some in Congress wanted the
DOJ to conduct an "antitrust" review of a BOC's application. BellSouth Oklahoma Reply,
supra note 277, at 3 & nn. 3-4 (referencing remarks by Representatives Sensenbrenner and
Hyde). The statements contain nothing to suggest that such antitrust review must be limited
to only one of the markets implicated by a BOC's application for interLATA services.
364. Id. at 3-4; SBC Oklahoma Reply, supra note 101, at 14.
365. BellSouth Oklahoma Reply, supra note 277, at 6-7; SBC Oklahoma Reply, supra
note 101, at 14-15 (suggesting that issues of checklist compliance are "outside" the DOJ's
"area of specialized knowledge"). The notion that the DOJ is "quite obviously ill suited to
play the role of evaluating compliance with the checklist" or is "beyond its expertise when
assessing the details of network operations," BellSouth Oklahoma Reply, supra note 277, at
7, is fatuous. In fact, the DOJ has spent at least two decades learning the intricacies of telephone operations-first to litigate the AT&T antitrust case, then to draft, implement, and
enforce the consent decree that terminated that litigation. During that time, the agency has
likely acquired considerable knowledge and expertise about network operations and the access and interconnection arrangements that could foster local telephone competition. While
the DOJ's views may not represent the final word on any question, they are, at a minimum,
deserving of respect.
BellSouth's statement that the DOJ's views on the legal interpretation of section 271
"are no more important than anyone else's" is likewise without merit. BellSouth Oklahoma
Reply, supra note 277, at 5. Because the DOJ is the federal agency responsible for enforcing
the nation's laws, it probably has developed some facility for construing the statutes it is
charged with enforcing. More importantly, the DOJ was actively involved, on behalf of the
Administration, in the congressional debates, deliberations, and negotiations on the 1996
Act. As such, it arguably is more qualified than most to assist the Commission in determining what the statute means.
366. Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267, paras. 38-39 (1997).
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the statute plainly
says that
368 DOJ may use "any
• , the
•

standard the Attorney General considers appropriate.
That this standard gives the DOJ considerable latitude is reinforced

by a comparison of section 271 (d)(2)(A) with the parallel language of the
House and Senate bills. House Bill 1555, as passed by the House, required
DOJ to evaluate "whether there is a dangerous probability that the [BOG]
or its affiliates would successfully use market power to substantially impede competition" in the interLATA market-clearly an antitrust-type
analysis.30 As adopted by the Senate, Senate Bill 652 directed the DOJ to
apply "any appropriate standard," thereby at least permitting an inference
that the Senate meant for an antitrust agency to employ an antitrust standard. 37 Congress's retreat from these formulations to the open-ended language that appears in section 271(c)(2)(A) defeats the claim that the latter

provision restricts the DOJ to an antitrust examination of BOC applications.
2.

According "Substantial Weight" to the DOJ's Views

Although Congress required the Commission to give substantial
weight to the DOJ's evaluation of a BOC's application, it gave no clear
guidance about how that standard should be applied in practice.3 7' The
367. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. Hi175 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte) (The DOJ "may submit an evaluation to the FCC using any antitrust statute that
the Attorney General believes the FCC should consider .... "); id. at HI 157 (daily ed. Feb.
1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (The DOJ "will apply any antitrust standard it considers
appropriate.").
368. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(a), § 271(d)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). BellSouth correctly cites the conference
report as indicating that the DOJ can employ the "dangerous probability" or "substantial
possibility" tests, which are indeed antitrust standards. BellSouth Oklahoma Reply, supra
note 277, at 3. It neglects to mention, however, that the report then repeats the "any standard" verbiage that appears in the statute. See Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267,
para. 39.
369. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., § 101(a) (1995) (enacted), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC.
H9981 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (adding section 245(c)(3) to the Communications Act of
1934).
370. S. 652, 104th Cong., § 221(a) (1995) (enacted), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC.
H9966 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (adding section 255(c)(2)(A) to the Communications Act
of 1934).
371. BellSouth asserts that the Commission must give substantial weight "only to an
evaluation grounded in the DOJ's expertise in antitrust matters." BellSouth Oklahoma Reply, supra note 277, at 3. However, the statute plainly instructs the DOJ to evaluate a BOC
application using "any standard the Attorney General considers appropriate," even nonantitrust standards. The Commission must then give substantial weight to that evaluation and,
implicitly, the standard on which the evaluation is based. Further, as the Commission observed, while Congress limited state commissions to addressing the requirements of section
(c), it imposed no such constraints on the DOJ. Ameritech Order, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
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statute merely recites the phrase with the added caveat that the Commission may not give preclusive effect to the DOJ's conclusions. The conference report is silent on the matter, and the legislative history is only
slightly more illuminating. 2 Representative Goodlatte, a member of both
the House Judiciary Committee and the conference committee, emphasized
the limitations of the statutory standard: "the FCC is free to give substantial weight-indeed greater weight if justified by the proffer-to the evidence offered by the applicant [BOC]."3 73 Representative Sensenbrenner,
on the other hand, suggested that the Commission had considerably less
freedom to reject the DOJ's conclusions and recommendations:
In those instances when the cumulative effect of all other factors
clearly and significantly outweighs the Justice Department's competitive concerns, the FCC should not be precluded from acting accordingly. However, I expect that the FCC will not take actions that,
374 in the
Justice Department's view, would be harmful to competition.
Senator Thurmond also addressed the standard at some length, but he
was primarily concerned with consideration of DOJ's views on appeal of
an FCC decision:
The substantial weight requirement will also ensure that the expertise of the Antitrust Division will be brought to bear in any appeal
of a decision made on long distance entry. If the FCC rejects the Antitrust Division's recommendation, the court must look to the weight the
FCC accorded the Attorney General's evaluation in ascertaining
whether the FCC correctly followed the law.
Review of this legal requirement should be governed by the
standard that generally applies to questions of law. As a practical matter, this legal requirement ensures that the reviewing court will con-

267, para. 37. Thus, while some statements can be found suggesting that substantial weight
may be accorded only to the DOJ's antitrust conclusions, see 142 CONG. REc. H1i178 (daily
ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner), the weight of the evidence indicates
that the Commission's reliance on the DOJ's conclusions should extend further. Id. at S71 1
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ('Through its work investigating the
telecommunications industry and enforcing the MFJ, [DOJ] has accumulated important
knowledge, evidence, and experience that can be constructively brought to bear on these
evaluations."); id. at S698 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerrey) ("DOJ's expertise in telecommunications and competitive issues generally should be of great value to
the FCC."); id. at HI 175 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (The Commission must give substantial weight to DOJ's evaluation.).
372. Because the substantial weight standard did not appear until the conference committee's deliberations, evidence as to its meaning can only be gleaned from the statute itself,
the conference report, or the congressional debates on the conference agreement. In the latter debates, most of the Members of Congress who addressed the issue simply restated the
standard or indicated how its inclusion strengthened the DOJ's role in the section 271 process.
373. 142 CoNG. REc. HI 175 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
374. Id. at HI 178 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
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sider the Antitrust Division's position on the merits--and will assess
for itself the views and evidence put forward in support of that position-and will not discount that
375 position out of customary judicial deference to the FCC's decision.
That very day, on the other side of the Capitol, Representative Goodlatte,
took the opposite position:
[The substantial weight] provision is also not intended to give
the views of the Attorney General any special weight or entitle them to
any special deference upon judicial review of an FCC decision under
[section 271].... The courts will accord that FCC determination "full,,376
Chevron deference ....
Although it is difficult to conclude anything definitive from the
available evidence, one can reasonably construe the substantial weight requirement as declaring Congress's intent that the DOJ's conclusions are
sufficient to provide primafacie support for any Commission decision under section 271. If the DOJ concluded that a BOC's interLATA entry
would harm competition in local or interLATA markets, a Commission
decision to that effect should withstand appeal. If the Commission chooses
not to follow a DOJ recommendation either for or against entry, it would
need to justify that decision by citing clear and significant evidence to the
contrary in the record.
C. Appellate Review
Because section 271 establishes no procedures governing appeals of a
Commission decision on a BOC's interLATA application, any such appeal
will be subject to the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3 "
Section 10 of the APA states that, in most instances, a "court must uphold
a federal agency's action unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' 3 78 Court review under
the more stringent "substantial evidence" test occurs only when a federal
agency issues a decision after an adjudicatory hearing379 or if the governing
statute requires the agency to conduct a rule making "on the record."38
Section 271 does not require the Commission to hold an adjudicatory
375. Id. at S711 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
376. Id. at H 1175 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
377. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). That appeal must be filed in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 151(b), § 402(b)(6) n.9, 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(6) n.9 (West Supp.
1997).
378. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C. Cir
1995) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
379. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557.
380. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,414 (1971).
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hearing on the BOCs' interLATA application and the Commission has decided not to hold one on its own motion."' Similarly, the 1996 Act does

not direct the Commission to conduct its review of a BOC's application

"on the record." Indeed, in fashioning the final version of section 271(d),
the conference committee rejected language in Senate Bill 652 that com-

manded the Commission to grant or deny a BOC application "on the record after a hearing and opportunity for comment .... 3 2 The Senate bill
would also have required the Commission's order to be based "on sub'
stantial evidence on the record as a whole."383

Thus, the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard-rather than its
substantial evidence test-will control an appellate court's review of a
Commission order disposing of a BOC's interLATA application. Although
some recent court decisions have conflated the two standards, 384 in general,
the former is a less exacting standard of review." 5 Although the court's in-

quiry under the arbitrary and capricious test "is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. 386 In particular, "[t]he
' 387
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Furthermore, where the meaning of the statute is unclear, the reviewing court should defer to the construction given by the Commission,
the agency charged by Congress to implement the statutory scheme that
Congress adopted.38 8 "[1If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer
381. In the absence of a specific statutory mandate, federal agencies have broad discretion to choose the procedures they will use. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) ("Agencies are free to
grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts
are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.").
382. S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 221(a) (1995) (enacted), reprintedin 141 CONG.
REC. H9966 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (adding section 255(c)(2)(A) to the Communications
Act of 1934).
383. S. REP. No. 104-23, at 44 (1995).
384. See, e.g., Kisser v. Cisneros, 14 F.3d 615, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, "[t]he court must determine whether the agency has articulated a
'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made' and "may reverse only
if the agency's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or the agency has made a
clear error in judgment.") (quoting Bowman Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419
U.S. 281, 285 (1974)).
385. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-23, at 44; 141 CONG. REc. S7961 (daily ed. June 8, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Stevens).
386. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
387. Id.
388. "The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and
funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to
fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974).
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' The court's task is
is based on a permissible construction of the statute."389
to determine whether the agency's interpretation is a reasonable one and,
again, the court "may not substitute its own construction... for a reasonable interpretation made by the agency.""39

V. CONCLUSION
Section 271 of the 1996 Act purports to provide a roadmap for BOC
entry into the interLATA marketplace, but the routes are not all wellmarked. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the statutory text and accompanying legislative history, informed by a knowledge of the fundamental
goals of the Act, clarifies many ambiguities and, thus, facilitates construction of most of the central provisions of section 271-the interplay between Tracks A and B, the requirements for satisfying Track A, the basics
and significance of checklist compliance. In this way, one can develop a
sense of what a BOC must show, at a minimum, to make a plausible case
for interLATA entry.
Although a thorough understanding of these threshold questions is
important to implementation of section 271, the assessment of a BOC's
interLATA application must go far beyond whether, for example, Track A
applies and, if so, whether it has been satisfied. The overarching goal of
the 1996 Act, after all, is to promote competition in all telecommunications markets. Consequently, a BOC's application ultimately must be
judged by its effects on competition in the local and long-distance markets
implicated by that request.
Whereas some degree of local competition is, under most circumstances, a statutory prerequisite to interLATA entry, Congress determinedly rejected any requirement that such competition be either robust or
389. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (footnote omitted).
390. Id. at 844. Section 271(d)(3) provides that the Commission "shall issue a written
determination approving or denying" a BOC's interLATA application "[n]ot later than 90
days after receiving" that application. Given the many difficult and controversial issues
raised by the typical BOC application, such a tight deadline might be at war with reasoned
decision making, especially with respect to the first applications. Although the Commission
should obviously process each BOC application with all deliberate speed, its principal objective should be a complete and through evaluation of the application. It is worth noting,
therefore, that despite the mandatory language of section 271 (d)(3), the deadline specified is
not inviolable. The Supreme Court has ruled that when a statute creates a seemingly mandatory schedule for agency action, but (like section 271(d)(3)) does not specify any consequence for noncompliance, the agency will not lose jurisdiction to act if it fails to meet that
deadline. See Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 258-66 (1986). The Commission
should not hesitate to take additional time to complete its evaluation of a BOC application,
if the alternative is to dismiss the application and compel the BOC to begin again, or to
forego a complete, thorough, and sustainable review of that application.
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pervasive. On the other hand, the legislators also understood that the 1996
Act would be a failure if local competition only reached the modest levels
necessary to support a BOC interLATA petition. Congress, moreover, conceived of section 271 as a mechanism for involving the BOCs in the quest
for increased competition in the coming years. Thus, in implementing that
provision, the Commission should develop an approach conducive to the
growth in local competition from the limited amount required to satisfy
Track A to the healthy levels desired for the future.
As the Commission well understands, one such approach would be
for the Commission's review of BOC interLATA applications to be forward-looking in nature-where the agency's attention is focused less on
what has happened before an application's filing and more on what will
happen in the event that the request is granted. The fundamental objective
is to ensure that the conditions are in place so that the local competition on
which a BOC application is predicated can proliferate in the future. There
must be evidence, for example, that legal barriers to entry have been removed and that state authorities are committed to fostering competition.
New entrants must be able to secure the facilities and services they need
from incumbents on just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms, in sufficient quantities, and in a timely fashion. Customers must be able to
switch from carrier to carrier without significant service interruptions or
billing problems. Standards and mechanisms should be in place to gauge
BOC compliance with their service obligations and swift and certain penalties must be available in the event that they fail to do so. Perhaps most
importantly, while the BOCs need not be enthusiastic participants in this
process, they should give evidence that they are aware of their obligations
and are prepared to fulfill them promptly and conscientiously.
A forward-looking assessment of BOC applications will require the
Commission to make difficult factual and predictive judgments, as the
agency itself has recognized. Accordingly, the Commission should not deliberate alone. The statute, of course, requires the Commission to consult
with the DOJ and give substantial weight to the Department's recommendations. The FCC should also confer with the state commission connected
with each BOC application. As former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt once
pointed out "each state's knowledge of local conditions and experience in
resolving factual disputes enables it to play a vital role" in the section 271
process. Thus, where a state commission conducts a meticulous and disinterested investigation of a BOC application, the Commission should accord substantial weight to the state agency's factual findings and due re391. Chairman Reed Hundt, Address to the Communications Committee of the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (Feb. 24, 1997).

398

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS L4 W JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

spect to its policy recommendations. federal and state regulators should
also work together to develop pricing principles that are consistent with
the procompetitive purposes of the 1996 Act and that accommodate the
state's jurisdictional authority as defined by the Eighth Circuit.

